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Symptoms of the  
Planetary Condition
Rather than going for the new object of study, 
the new product to consume, one should work 
on new ways of seeing, of being, or of living the 
world. Perhaps it is time to look at the nature 
of our own understanding of what you just 
called “productive resistance” and to assess 
how – in our very “resistance” – we may have 
been working in complicity with what we set out 
to criticize.  
– Trinh T. Minh-ha, D-Passage, 122
In 2015, the Los Angeles Review of Books launched a series entitled 
“No Crisis” to examine the state of critique in the humanities 
understood as both a university institution and a theoretical field. 
In view of what was at the same time acknowledged and refuted 
as a crisis of the humanities, the series wanted to show how 
criticism is “actually written in the present,” a decade and a half 
into the 21st century. In her contribution, Johanna Drucker notes 
that an important move for contemporary criticism would be to 
leave behind the principle of “‘critique’ and negation, a stance of 
moral superiority and outsider position” (Drucker 2015). Instead 
of maintaining negation, opposition (and judgment, we might 
add) as the traditional attributes of critique, a crucial step would 
be to recognize the complicity of oneself, of one’s criticism, of 
any critical practice, with­in the conditions or phenomena that 
8 are under critical consideration. These are not exactly Drucker’s 
words. The way she puts it is:
Oppositional tactics are always reactive. We have to realize 
that negative notions, like the bankrupt ideas of critique, 
don’t offer a way forward. They keep us at a superior dis­
tance from reality. We need to formulate a modernism of 
engagement founded in a recognition of complicity – ours 
and its – with the machinations and values according to 
which we live. (Drucker 2015)1 
The project of this vocabulary starts from a similar hunch: namely 
that negativity and judgment, the modes in which critique and 
critical analyses were practiced and thought since Kant, have 
run their course. Seeking to maintain an outsider’s stance vis­
à­vis the phenomena or situations that are critically examined, 
reaching for an Olympian objectivity, disinterest: these, the 
instruments of Enlightened critique, are exhausted. They have, as 
Drucker suggests, not only run their course because they are in 
a Nietzschean sense “reactive” – that is, because they are unable 
to bring forth real transformation and newness. They have 
also run their course because this 21st century is slowly realizing 
a transition in daily experiences (technological, biomedical, 
ecological) from a Newtonian to a quantum universe. Due to this 
transition, entanglements at a fundamental level must be taken 
into account or, in other words, the complicity and co­emergence 
of any knowledge or assessment with what is known and with 
whoever knows, its always perspectival, situated and implicated 
nature. Complicity and entanglement at such a fundamental 
level preclude the neat distinctions between subject and object, 
knower and known that practices of critique traditionally rely on. 
Rather, these distinctions themselves emerge in relational fields 
of power, and in that sense are deeply entangled and complicit.
1 Drucker is revisiting T. J. Clark’s Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of 
Modernism (1999), as each contributor was asked to engage with a favorite 
critic.
9Unlike Drucker, however, we do not want to conclude from this 
description of matters today that critique is bankrupt. While the 
compilation of terms in this book starts from the assumption that 
negativity, judgment and opposition as modes of critique have 
indeed “run out of steam” (Latour 2004), we insist that critique 
as an attitude and a manner of enquiry has not. It remains a 
crucial aspect of the work done in the humanities and the arts, 
inside and outside academic institutions, and it is worth striving 
to keep critique as such a crucial attitude, an important angle 
from which to pose questions and contest political quietism. 
Furthermore, different from the “No Crisis” project, but also in 
difference to recent re­turns to critique such as Rita Felski’s The 
Limits of Critique (2015), this project understands critique as a 
much broader practice than merely a textual one. Even though 
critique is resolutely affirmed here as a practice of reading, 
such reading is not undertaken mainly or exclusively in the 
realms of literary, textual or even cultural criticism. Situations, 
constellations, power relations and technological connected­
ness also have to be read. Nor are we interested primarily in a 
new, however radical or “post­critical” (Felski) hermeneutics or 
criticism. If we speak of critique, we do not mean primarily the 
activity of professional critics, although that activity may be part 
of it. Rather, our project affirms critique as a praxis of intellectual 
and worldly intervention, as an attitude that not only comes to 
bear on the writing (and critical reading) of texts, but also affects 
the material, habitual, everyday and minute dimensions of living. 
For the process of outlining such an embodied mode of critique, 
which has immediate implications for political, ethical as well as 
media­material thought­practice, the humanities are of crucial 
relevance. The strength of the humanities lies precisely in the 
methodological, onto­epistemological questioning of how to 
proceed, in view of what and in the interest of whom – therefore 
moving critique not only from matters of fact to matters of con­
cern (Latour 2004), but taking it a step further to interested and 
situated matters of care (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). Accordingly, 
10 the humanities are understood and exercised here as worldly 
practices themselves.
The overall aim of this vocabulary is to begin reexamining 
critical practice under the conditions of the 21st century, which 
means first of all to assert critique as a crucial tool of intellectual 
and practical intervention. At the same time, it also means to 
acknowledge that contemporary realities are immanent, terran 
and co­dependent in multiple ways; ways that even the enumera­
tion of the attributes of these co­dependences – economic, 
ecological, symbolic, socio­political, intra­species, historical, 
technological, affective, to name but a few – do not exhaust. 
To begin with, it means to acknowledge that there is no outside 
from which to gauge things, which has two implications for critical 
practice. On the one hand, as poststructuralism and decon­
struction have brought to the fore for quite a while already, and 
science and technology studies, quantum theory and their recent 
humanities receptions demonstrate today, there is no categorical 
separability in critical endeavors. Rather, as Karen Barad argues 
in Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007) with recourse to Niels 
Bohr’s analysis of “measurement interactions,” any measurement 
has an effect on what is being measured. The insistence on inde­
terminacy or “the indeterminable discontinuity” which quantum 
theory shows “undermines the classical belief in an inherent 
subject­object distinction” (Barad 2007, 127). Barad explains this 
as follows:
Making the ontological nature of this indeterminacy explicit 
entails a rejection of the classical metaphysical assumption 
that there are determinate objects with determinate properties 
and corresponding determinate concepts with determinate 
meanings independent of the necessary conditions needed to 
resolve the inherent indeterminacies. (127)
With this in mind, an outside stance from which to assess and 
judge things becomes an illusion – and with it the “superior 
distance” which Drucker rightly rejects. The calm distancing 
11that enables judgment, achieved by way of setting apart, dis­
secting and reflecting is no longer tenable (Haraway 1997). Such 
an approach presumes molar units (Deleuze/Guattari 2000), 
which – after Bohr, but also after Simondon’s idea of individu­
ation (Simondon 2007) or Margulis’s concept of symbiogenesis 
(Margulis 1998) (and we could name others, too) – we are coming 
to understand as molecular processes. The traditional practice of 
critique ignores this processual entanglement of what is known 
with the one who does the knowing, so that “reflection” as its cen­
tral image is best to be traded for new images of critical practice. 
The entries that make up this volume hope to work towards such 
new images.
On the other hand, in terms of political imaginaries, to 
acknowledge that there is no outside from which to gauge things 
means that any terra incognita was only ever a powerful (in 
both senses of “effective” and “dominant”) narrative to imagine 
“progress” or “redemption.” Yet, specifically today, it is evident 
that there is no untouched corner of the planet that could entice 
us to believe in better versions of ourselves, to be achieved 
in a New World. The spectre of a terra incognita, haunting the 
phantasmatic machineries of escape, adventure, social exper­
imentation and political progress, has always been in denial of 
the fact that it was only incognita to those who recently arrived 
at its shores in pursuit of power, money or a better life for 
themselves. The geographical, political and industrial exhaus­
tion of the earth – of its spatial expansion, as well as its natural 
resources – has also slowly exhausted the political purchase 
of the phantasm of an incognita or a new start (Glissant 1997, 
Wynter 1995). The classical understanding of critique as laying 
bare the presumed boundaries of a status­quo in order to 
establish a “better” political project, an “elsewhere” in linear 
spacetime, is thus also no longer plausible. The past centuries 
have witnessed the downsides or downfalls of earlier “better” 
projects that promised social emancipation (from humanism, real 
existing socialism to bourgeois nationalism/colonialism), but did 
12 so only for certain groups. Social and philosophical critique was, 
however, often articulated in the name of these projects. Given 
these histories of our co­dependent, entangled world(ing)s, social 
and philosophical critique done “in the name of” this or that 
“better” political project or social experiment has lost traction. 
The power of utopias as achievable solutions is dwindling, as his­
torical experience has shown that they tend to rely on sameness 
and exclusion at the expense of difference. And yet, utopia as a 
name for the possibility of difference and deferral, as a horizon 
of social justice, remains a powerful force for critical thinking and 
practice. Thus, the question that our project also aims to address 
is how to practice critique with no concrete “better” and “final” 
solution in view.
The contributors to this book hold that giving up on critique as 
intervention – that is, on questions motivated by the ambition 
of furthering social and ecological justice – is not an option. The 
world today has indeed become (or has always been, but today 
comes to be more and more understood as) a terra critica: a 
planet in critical economic, ecological, symbolic, socio­political, 
intra­species condition, demanding an un/relearning of dominant 
habits and practices (Guattari 2008, Stengers 2015) and/as a 
revision of the modi and methods of critical intervention. In 
respect to what Spivak calls planetary conditions (Spivak 2003), 
established knowledge­regimes need to be unworked so that 
we can learn to know, feel and live otherwise. Thus, it is time for 
an earthly form of critique. Yet again, precisely with that goal 
in mind, the question remains: What would critique under such 
conditions be like? What are the symptoms of our planetary 
condition, which are starting to become visible, but are not yet 
fully readable? And how are we to intervene in effective ways in 
conditions commonly indicated with descriptors such as finance 
capitalism, the anthropocene and neoliberalism? 
The present book will, of course, not deliver definitive answers 
to those questions. How could it? Un/relearning social, affective 
and corporeal habits as well as daily practices cannot simply be 
13done by means of a book. It requires more than that. Still, we 
hope for this project to be a starting point. It stays with the above 
mentioned questions – weighs them, turns them over, trans-
lates them into a set of terms which are tentatively explored here 
as one way of figuring critical practice otherwise. Evidently, the 
terms in this vocabulary are not new; many of them have a long 
philosophical, critical tradition and are in frequent use. Their 
assemblage does not strive for a complete or exhaustive survey 
of relevant terms. Others could be added, for sure. Neither do the 
individual entries aim to provide encyclopedic, neutral definitions 
of each term. The ambition here is not to offer a dictionary, or 
to arrive at a new, neat definition of critique. Instead, the book 
sees itself as a rhizomatic and speculative toolbox that offers 
multiple entries and routes into the question of critique. Its aim is 
to inspire potential additions to the assemblage of terms offered 
here and different practices of critique and critical intervention 
for future use. 
The present assemblage of terms emerged out of the past four 
years of work done by Terra Critica, an interdisciplinary network 
for the critical humanities (www.terracritica.net). The network 
was founded in 2012, and the terms that appear in this vocabulary 
surfaced as crucial tools­to­think­with. Each contributor to 
the vocabulary participated in one or more of the network’s 
workshops, and the entries have grown out of the pool of per­
spectives, reference points and terminologies that appeared 
and reappeared in these meetings. Each entry offers a personal 
take on the term. This means that collectively, these terms have 
been significant in Terra Critica’s work, yet individually, each of 
them carries the mark of its author. Had a term been explored 
by someone else, its presentation would have been somewhat 
different, perhaps distinctly different. It is precisely this open and 
in/determinate toolbox characteristic that we affirm as a most 
fruitful presentation of critical work. 
In that sense, this book does not represent the network Terra 
Critica. Rather, it is a stutter: every entry makes a new attempt 
14 to articulate what might be the sense of critique today, without 
arriving at a clear silhouette or conclusive statement. The book 
can be used as a rhizomatic map, to be entered at any point, 
where each entry gives evidence of its author’s distinct style 
of writing and conceptual registers. Composed as an open 
assemblage, the terms can nevertheless call forth various 
constellations. They can be read with and through each other 
and as such, like a watermark, hope to bring forth the sets of 
problems that we are concerned with: How to practice a kind of 
critique that helps to dis/entangle our contemporary planetary 
conditions? How to read the symptoms of those conditions, and 
which symptoms to begin with? And how to develop the concep­
tual and terminological tools needed in order to approach them 
in meaningful ways? This book is a step to develop those tools, 
offering various potential itineraries, some of which we suggest 
in the diagrams at the end of the book. The diagrams propose 
constellations of terms that speak to each other in prominent 
ways and that – taken as a interference pattern (a diffraction) – 
highlight, according to our reading, particularly relevant aspects 
of the question of critique today. And we invite readings to be 
added.
We have stressed the necessity to re­evaluate critical practice 
today, in the early decades of the 21st century, partly from a 
sense of acute crisis (which has been tied to critique and the 
humanities at least since Husserl (1936) and Kosellek (1959)) to 
which we feel we must respond. Yet, our concern comes also 
from the insight that any “today” requires re­evaluation and 
work: in the spirit of here and now “think we must,” as Virginia 
Woolf (1966, 62) stresses in Three Guineas, written on the verge 
of World War II. And, as Jacques Derrida demonstrates in The 
Other Heading (1990), today is always anew “this time that is ours” 
(79) – the “now” that urges us to regard what “is taking place now” 
(30). Such a task, then, falls upon every era, on every “today,” as 
Walter Benjamin also notes in “On the Concept of History”: “In 
every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition 
15away from a conformism that is about to overpower it.” (Benjamin 
2006, 391) At the same time, every era needs to find its own, 
specific responses – it is our today for which critique needs to 
be sharpened. There is a tradition to draw on, but no models to 
follow. At present, critique is perhaps in particular need of being 
reconsidered as an attitude, in view of the neoliberal­capitalist 
machineries that ingest all critique and celebrate difference as 
lifestyle. This underlines the continuing validity of Derrida’s ques­
tion: “Is it not necessary to have the courage and lucidity for a 
new critique of the new effects of capital (within unprecedented 
techno­social structures)?” (Derrida 1992, 57).
In their engagements with the legacies of critique and the 
demands made on it in the present, i.e. “today,” the contributions 
to this vocabulary therefore affirm two things at once: critical 
practice is vital for any pursuit of social and ecological justice, yet 
it also needs to be wrested from its tradition as judgment, which 
threatens to stifle it and is no longer pertinent to the planetary 
conditions we live in today. In view of these conditions, our con­
ceptions of critique need to be adjusted, revised, reexamined. 
Only then does critique become a critical ontology of ourselves 
today, in Foucault’s terms:
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, 
certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent 
body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be con­
ceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which 
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an exper­
iment with the possibility of going beyond them …. (Foucault 
1997, 319)
We hope that this book will be used – critically, that is 
affirmatively and creatively – as such an experiment. That it will 
help wrest terms away from their present (socio­ethico­political) 
overdeterminations to put them to new uses, so that we can start 
to invent new ways of speaking and new ways of living with­in 
16 always (re­)productive power relations. That it will remind us that 
critique means to dare to take risks and to exploit the leeway for 
negotiations that power permits: to push power a little.
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Affect 
Bettina Papenburg
Affect – a palpable intensity, the atmosphere in a room – is trans­
mitted below the threshold of conscious perception, manifesting 
as bodily tension and relaxation. Affect is involuntary, non­con­
scious, contagious, and to a certain degree automatic. Thus affect 
is at odds with the conception of the rational subject, a clearly 
bounded entity, the self­contained individual that is markedly 
differentiated from others, which for centuries has been assumed 
to be the sole agent capable of critical thinking. Rather, the very 
workings of affect hint at connectedness, at interaction, at inter­
dependency. Or, as philosopher Teresa Brennan puts it in her 
reflections on the transmission of affect: “The origin of trans­
mitted affects is social in that these affects do not only arise 
within a particular person but also come from without. They 
come via an interaction with other people and an environment. 
But they have a physiological impact.” (Brennan 2004, 3, emphases 
mine) As Brennan aptly notes, affect flows and circulates between 
people, effectively mediating between our shared biological 
dispositions and culturally shaped meanings. Affect takes hold 
of the person in the interaction with other people in a shared 
space, most palpably perhaps in the synchronization of kinetic 
movements of bodies collectively attuned to vibrations or 
frequencies. Affect is in essence communal, yet tangible for each 
of us as energy that enhances or diminishes our capacity to act.
20 The “affective turn” evolving since the early twenty­first century 
in fields as broad as philosophy, media studies, cultural studies, 
and gender studies signals an intense scholarly engagement with 
affect. The label announces and propels a thorough investigation 
of the complex feedback loops connecting people and environ­
ments, which bring forth specific moods facilitating a thought 
process and enabling meaningful social actions and political 
activism. Scholars working in this vein challenge the tradition that 
links the production of knowledge to rational thinking alone, to 
value­free neutrality and to disembodied objectivity, a tradition 
that hinges on the exclusion of affect.
Affect, however, is not solely positive and certainly not always 
politically subversive – indeed there is a growing body of scholar­
ship in feminist and queer theory that engages the “negative 
affects” such as pain, hate, fear, disgust, anger, depression, and 
failure. Ever so often affects are mobilized for uncritical ends 
– when, for instance, television commercials entice viewers to 
attach specific positive feelings to consumer goods, or when 
video games require immediate sensorimotor responses from 
players. Affects are even employed for achieving destructive 
purposes – as in “scarless torture,” a practice used in the “war on 
terror” in detention camps like Guantanamo Bay, which, without 
leaving visible traces on the victims’ bodies, severely diminishes 
the victims’ capacity to act. In the German context, the affective 
mobilizing of the masses creating a group mob as in, for instance, 
Hitler’s speech at the Nuremberg Rally, or most recently by the 
Pegida movement, an anti­immigration movement gathering 
forces stretching from the far right to the center of German 
society. In light of these examples, the question that arises is 
then: how can affect work as a critical political force?
In an essay entitled “The Autonomy of Affect,” published in Para-
bles for the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002), philosopher 
Brian Massumi develops an elaborate theory of sensation that 
adequately accounts for the sensing and feeling body. However, 
one of the drawbacks for a more encompassing understanding 
21of affect’s critical potential is that Massumi, following the line of 
Baruch de Spinoza, Gilbert Simondon, and Gilles Deleuze, insists 
on sharply differentiating between affect and emotion. Massumi 
sees emotion as contained by the subject and affect as existing 
in excess of the subject. He stresses the “irreducibly bodily and 
autonomic nature of affect” while asserting that an “emotion is a 
subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal” 
(Massumi 2002, 21, bold added). While affect is a force or intensity 
flowing through subjects, an emotion becomes a property of the 
subject. Yet, as Massumi admits, affect and emotion are closely 
related: while emotion contains affect, emotion does not exhaust 
affect. 
Different from yet closely related to thinkers following Deleuze’s 
line of thought, literary scholar and queer activist Ann Cvetkovich 
employs the terms “affect, emotion, and feeling … more like key­
words, points of departure for discussion rather than definition” 
(2012, 5, emphases in original). Cvetkovich uses “affect in a generic 
sense, … as a category that encompasses affect, emotion, and 
feeling, and that includes impulses, desires, and feelings that get 
historically constructed in a range of ways (whether as distinct 
specific [sic!] emotions or as a generic category often contrasted 
with reason)” (2012, 4, brackets in original). Rather than pursuing 
the task of definition, Cvetkovich is interested in the question of 
how affect works politically. The political project Public Feelings 
that she herself pursues together with fellow thinkers and 
activists, testifies to affect’s critical and transformative potential 
and, indeed, its political force.  
Public Feelings, a “cell” of a larger project entitled Feminism 
Unfinished launched by academics and activists at the University 
of Texas in 2001, with various spin­offs across the US, hinges on 
participants professing, sharing, and publically declaring their 
feelings, including negative feelings, such as feeling depressed. 
In the context of this collective endeavor, it became apparent 
that depression, generally understood as a medical condition, is 
22 not an individual malaise, but more accurately that it might be a 
symptom for larger social and political structural inadequacies, 
and that there could be alternative cures than simply treating 
it in a medical sense. Depression – which Cvetkovich envisions 
as “a form of being stuck” (2012, 26), a (conceptual) blockage, an 
impasse – is widespread among academics, and, as the group 
Public Feelings asserts, must be grasped as an effect of the 
political conditions, including the working conditions in academia, 
the marginalization of the humanities, doubts about the social 
relevance of one’s work, and – in the case of the US – the stifling 
consequences of the fact of being citizens of a nation at war. 
In her personal politics and practices, Cvetkovich found remedy 
to depression in a combination of various forms of mental, 
emotional, and bodily movement – her antidote to inertia –, 
enabling flexibility and creativity, in a turn to the embodied 
senses, specifically to the haptic and the tactile, and in new 
ways of relating to temporality to challenge ideas of progress by 
emphasizing retrograde and lateral moves. In terms of academic 
research and writing practices, she suggests “alternatives to 
critique and new ways to describe feelings” (2012, 24). Her book 
Depression: A Public Feeling offers an example for what she 
proposes, since it combines classical methods, such as concep­
tual work, close reading, and narrative analysis, with the genre of 
the “critical memoir” (a term proposed by Jill Dolan), to the effect 
that portions of Cvetkovich’s book take the form of a depression 
diary.
On the one hand, the political employment of affect, the sharing 
of feelings that is, in the Public Feelings project is a very inter­
esting and inspiring example for how processes of political trans­
formation can be initiated on a micropolitical, affective plane, 
and for how negatively coded emotions traditionally linked to 
the medicalization of depression can be effectively recoined. It 
seems very promising, as this brings such feelings into position 
for launching a critique of social institutions and for mobilizing 
them against the more subtle social pressures. However, the turn 
23to spirituality, handiwork, and do­it­yourself work, which is the 
cure that Cvetkovich ultimately proposes on the other hand, is 
not utterly convincing. 
Literary scholar Lauren Berlant, a member of the Public Feelings 
project and co­founder of Feel Tank Chicago – a related project 
“organized around the thought that public spheres are affect 
worlds at least as much as they are effects of rationality, 
rationalization, and institutions”1 –, advocates a more persuasive, 
more intellectually­attuned stance. In a reflection on her inter­
vention at a conference on political feeling (2007), hosted by 
Public Feelings, Berlant lays out her thoughts on acting profes­
sional in the academy: “It ’s our job to show up and think, to show 
up and think with others, to collaborate using what we know and 
what we don’t know to push concepts beyond where they were 
when we entered the room” (2009, 133). Here Berlant responds to 
some academics who proudly consider themselves amateurs and 
situate themselves as politically progressive as a consequence. 
These scholars dismiss professionalism on the grounds of the 
understanding that acting professional equates with acting 
bureaucratic, elitist, inauthentic, authoritarian, and mediocre. 
Taking issue with this way of self­positioning, Berlant argues for 
accepting and confronting “the complexities of ambition and the 
desire for distinction and the role of discipline and normative 
skill­building in teaching” (2009, 133). According to Berlant, 
academics should face – and not evade – these desires and aim to 
foster an attitude that values merit and rigor. Berlant’s reflection 
about the responses to her credo and the aftereffects of her 
intervention is a perfect example for how addressing head­on the 
anxieties that come with academic work can facilitate a collective 
thought process about the working conditions in academia, the 
question how to situate oneself vis­à­vis those very conditions, 
1 Wikipedia entry on Feel Tank Chicago, January 29, 2015: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Feel_Tank_Chicago.
24 and the reinvention of engaged academic work reaching out to 
groups of workers in other fields.
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Affirmation 
Kathrin Thiele
Affirmation is not the opposite of negation. If merely seen as 
the opposite of negation, that is as the negation of negation, 
affirmation is not taken seriously in respect to what it has the 
potential for. As a critical tool, affirmation offers a different 
register for thought and practice “before” or “in advance of” 
the opposition of our habit of saying “yes” and “no.”1 The “no” 
that instigates the statement “affirmation is not the opposite 
of negation,” is thus not to be read as a contradiction in terms. 
Rather, it is what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe in 
What is Philosophy? as a pedagogy keeping “an essential relation­
ship with the No that concerns it” (1994, 218). If we speak of 
affirmation as a critical tool, it is this emphasis on concern and 
relationality as giving direction to the whole undertaking that 
makes all the difference.
In the history of continental philosophy, Baruch de Spinoza’s and 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s legacies figure prominently for this kind of 
different register of thought and practice. And, if one continues 
to follow the Deleuzian (and Guattarian) line, it can also be read 
1 I use “before” as an alternative to “beyond” (the German (immanent) dies-
seits, instead of (transcendent) jenseits). “In advance of” is the formulation 
Rodolphe Gasché finds for this different register of thought in his Geo-
philosophy: On Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s What is Philosophy? (2014, 
102).
26 in certain strands of the pragmatist tradition (linked to William 
James’s and Alfred Whitehead’s “radical empiricism,” and thereby 
also keeping Henri Bergson in the loop) where an affirmative 
“believing in this world” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 75) is what 
concerns “mature” philosophizing. Currently, an emphasis on 
“affirmation” as a critical tool can be found most explicitly in 
feminist traditions, where a “we are in this mess all together” 
(Braidotti 2013, 141) or an endurance “to stay with the trouble” 
(Haraway 2013, 137) provocatively reinstigate affirmation as 
critical engagement. Instead of limiting the practice of critique 
and the development of critical knowledges to a merely reflexive 
move – distancing and dissecting, whereby the critical position 
claims superiority – feminist thinking “at its best” (and certainly 
in all its plurality) “is about generation of new thought, new 
concepts, as much as if not more than it is about the critique of 
existing knowledges” (Grosz 2011, 77). Affirmative critique, there­
fore, is for sure about diagnosing precisely “what is,” with an eye 
schooled in detecting inequalities, asymmetries, and the never 
innocent differentiations we live in. And yet, it also always needs 
to do the work of envisioning transformation and change. The 
risks that such an affirmative critical approach implies are man­
ifold, but they cannot be avoided. Otherwise we would succumb 
to those “beautiful souls” – “cultivat[ing] goodness in solitary 
isolation from the actual social world” (Baille in Hegel 2014) – for 
which Georg W. F. Hegel already felt so much contempt.
In a bit more detail then, what does affirmation as a register of 
thought do in the practice of critique? Why emphasize “affirmative 
critique,” why turn away from critique as negation? The following 
aims to explicate this specific potential in keeping with a femi­
nist Deleuzian approach that has already given guidance here: 
Affirmation both adds to thought a concern from which it emerges 
and with which it stays related, and it initiates a belief. A worldly 
belief, one that “becomes belief in the world, as it is” (Deleuze 
2000, 172); a belief for the “here and now,” radically immanent, 
terran, and earthly. Only thus does affirmative critique initiate 
27transformation in the here and now, without the messianic 
promise or need for a “beyond” – another world supposedly 
escaping “this mess” we are in “all together.”
Spinoza’s entire philosophizing already expresses such an 
affirmative approach in and of this world, and in this sense it 
can be read as a critical, interventionist practice. His ontology as 
ethics departs from the vertical Cartesian categorical separation 
of transcendence (perfection) and worldliness (imperfection). For 
him every­thing, every mode, is nothing but the expression of 
substance itself, i.e. the “all there is.” With this, Spinoza elabo­
rates a horizontal or at least flattened ontology, according to 
which there is no given (moral) hierarchy between “what is” and 
“what should be.” This utter affirmation of “what is” leads to his 
famous monist formula that “no one has so far determined what 
[a] body can do” (Spinoza 2000, 167 [EIIIP2]) as well as to his harsh 
judgment in A Political Treatise ([1677] 1951), where he shares his 
great discontent that “[the philosophers] conceive of men, not as 
they are, but as they themselves would like them to be” (Spinoza 
1951, 287). Differing from idealist traditions in philosophy, Spinoza 
suggests in his work a radically immanent onto­ethology of 
which Deleuze once said: “There is only Spinoza who has man­
aged to pull off an ontology” (Deleuze 2007).
After having grounded affirmation as critical tool in such onto­
ethological manner with Spinoza, Nietzsche’s philosophy can 
specify affirmation further, as a task – as an issue of “will” or 
“power.” His affirmation thereby links life and thought. But it 
also becomes the “heaviest weight” of all, as he writes in The Gay 
Science ([1882] 2006). For, affirmation is to will “[t]he life as you 
now live it and have lived it … to live once again and innumerable 
times again” (Nietzsche 2006, 194); or as Deleuze’s even more 
imperative interpretation of the “eternal return of the same” is 
phrased: “[W]hatever you will, will it in such a way that you also 
will its eternal return” (Deleuze 1983, 68). The critical task is such 
enduring (indifferent) affirmation which, however, in its doing 
has the potential to release a difference, or better still, it cannot 
28 but be released in difference. The formula of “difference and 
repetition” (Deleuze 1994) is therefore the modus of affirmative 
critical praxis. Nietzsche’s amor fati as affirmation, in which 
even nihilism is affirmed and can no longer escape the (radically 
indifferent) affirmation, allows things to return “in difference.” It 
instigates the transvaluation that critical endeavors aim for – in 
philosophy, but also in politics, and therefore in life and thought. 
If today’s “world, as it is” is one in which systemic destruction, 
exploitation, and ecological catastrophes are our everyday 
news, the question of critique as affirmation poses itself in all its 
urgency, but also in all its difficulty. What to do in the face of the 
violent realities shaping our today? How to approach them so as 
to avoid the return of the same – once again hatred and violence, 
further exclusion and destruction – instead another opening 
becomes imaginable? How to address the current fortressing of 
categories, borders, and boundaries in a non­negative manner, 
yet without losing the radical critical edge of saying “no” in such 
a way that this “no” keeps us concerned and related to what we 
refuse? These are urgent questions of the affirmative critical 
endeavors that no longer have the luxury of withdrawing from 
“what is happening to us” (Nancy 2014; Wynter 2015). There is no 
outside to this world – as there is no outside of power (Foucault) 
and no outside of text (Derrida). To instigate a concern for, a 
relationality with the situation we are always already participating 
in and entangled with, and thereby to instigate a belief  “in this 
world, as it is” – this is the critical mantra of affirmation through 
which life and thought (thought as life and a life as thought) 
become so intertwined that a different attitude as ethos (Foucault 
1997) and maybe even a different “humanness as praxis” (Wynter 
2015) can be enabled. It means believing in this possibility without 
making a program of it. Attitude and ethos as praxis imply, or 
even better, they live from ontological in/determinacy: The 
condition that things are bound to be determined, yet never 
once and for all and always anew at every turn of the world’s 
differential becoming (Barad 2007). What affirmation as critique 
29and critique as affirmation suggest is to endure the turns things 
take, without ever letting go of the (critical) potential of “what our 
bodies can do” (radical immanence). It means continuing the work 
of critique “in­differently,” because other realities and relations 
are always already with­in that which actually is.
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Capital 
Mercedes Bunz
Capital is a term whose meaning one cannot catch. Several 
words and worlds unfold it in inconsistent directions. One thing, 
however, is certain: It is currently the term ruling the present 
discourse, rather lonesomely, ever since economy has taken over 
the place once reserved for politics, which it had stolen before 
from religion. That there is a link between politics and religion 
was noticed by Walter Benjamin, who wrote “one can behold in 
capitalism a religion” warning that its universalism affects the 
position of critique: “We cannot draw close the net in which we 
stand” (1921, 259). Today, capitalism’s universalism seems to 
be stronger than ever, leaving no outside to flee to. Capital has 
successfully infected areas formerly addressed as autonomous, 
such as education and the idea of the university, but also science, 
culture, or art. In other words, it has successfully positioned 
itself as the sovereign ruler of our contemporary discourse. What 
else can we do but to stare at capital’s powerful ruling insignia 
– “measurement” and “efficiency” – as if we were conservative 
Catholics enveloped by an unfurling enlightenment? Where is our 
imagination? It is needed in a time in which one cannot see an 
end to capitalism, although it had a beginning: Following Marx, 
theorists from Rosa Luxemburg (1913) to David Harvey (2014) have 
treated capital as a historical phenomenon starting when stable 
property was converted into fluid wealth invested to bring gain. 
32 Unfortunately, it seems to have become more fluid and more 
universal ever since. The hope of facing capital as a historical 
phenomenon with an end in sight seems to be gone. But never 
mind. The present is a formidable place to escape our gloomy 
future. 
Theorists have taken up the challenge of a sovereign capitalism 
with new answers, for example, to question the role of human 
agency (Parisi 2004; Noys 2011; Zizek 2014). Furthermore, his­
torical reasons (the end of actually existing socialism) as well as 
contemporary reasons (that the actual crisis of existing cap­
italism has no crucial effect on capital) gave rise to discontent 
regarding once powerful political ideas like communism and 
communization (Noys 2011). The fact that capitalism is con­
tinuously appropriating alternative approaches has lead to a 
call for a radical non­relation: “The new mantra is: we have no 
demands. We don’t want political representation. We don’t want 
collective bargaining. We don’t want a seat at the table” (Galloway 
2011, 244). An elegant suicidal gesture that needs to be thought 
through further.
 The effect of having no demand is withdrawing. To withdraw, 
however, also means that the “we” is not turning somewhere else 
affirmatively. As such, withdrawing replaces opposition with a 
non­relation, which causes the dispersion of one’s own collective 
force. In being withdrawn, there will be no “we” anymore. Our 
highly individualized time (which with hindsight could be called 
“the era of the individual”) seems anyway to have a weakening 
effect on critique. Withdrawing from a collective force means to 
leave a tool of critique even further behind. For when we work 
together to become someone else (a force we can call upon 
each time we turn up music and dance, or write texts, build 
organizations or houses or computer programs, are with friends, 
live a relationship, or simply: speak) we question the capitalist 
idea that a collective is nothing more than the sum of individual, 
exchangeable people. Using a collective force means unlocking 
capitals of critique that do not reply to capitalism. 
33Capitalism, however, has replied – and successfully appropriated 
its other. The environmental protests of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which accused companies of exploiting Planet Earth in addition to 
workers, have been turned into the concept of the organic super­
market and the fair­trade brand to allow a healthy consumption 
for the better­off. Although capitalism presents itself with a 
friendly face – as if it could be a dialectical unity of itself and of its 
other – it is not. Starbucks might sell fair­trade coffee and “Ethos” 
water with the claim of “helping children to get clean water,” but 
its water, to illustrate the general problem with one example, 
is continuously involved in scandals: Despite an exceptional 
drought in California, Starbucks has used a water supplier located 
in drought territory; the bottles did not contain recycled plastic; 
and only five cents of the retail price ($1.95) is given to the charity. 
A bit of googling quickly shows that the water’s social wrapping is 
primarily a commercial for a for­profit organization. 
Here, it becomes apparent that capital – always full of contra­
dictions – managed to assimilate the position of its opponents 
while still operating capitalistically. This trick has created a 
paradox reality, which weakens capital’s political opponents as 
much as it challenges the concept of political thinking. For what 
becomes of resistance when resistance just gets appropriated 
by capitalism? An urgent question. Although one could also ask 
a very different and in no sense a less urgent one: Might it be the 
case that to render resistance as “useless” means playing into 
the hands of capital? Irritated by this, one must move. “Think we 
must!” (Woolf 2006, 62). In order to enter this problem from a 
different perspective that makes resistance distinguishable and 
allows one to be anti­capitalistic, one could face contemporary 
capitalism informed by Karen Barad’s method of diffraction, for 
example. So what is her take on diffraction?
As a conceptual approach, diffraction avoids focusing on 
essential otherness and oppositions to involve reading insights 
through one another, a process Barad (2007) has turned into an 
inspiring method. In the humanities so far mostly recognized as 
34 a reading method (for example Kaiser 2014, Tuin 2011), Barad also 
indicates that one could understand diffraction patterns in a far 
broader sense as “the fundamental constituents that make up 
the world” (2007, 72). Applying the method of diffraction when 
exploring the problem of contemporary capitalism resonates 
in so far as one faces two moments, which at first sight seem to 
be indistinguishable: like Starbucks pretending to be a charity, 
the physical phenomenon of diffraction is based on the inter­
ference of waves being interwoven with each other. However, 
although the different elements are intra­acting, not everything 
has become just the same. Here, Barad demands attention to 
the details: “fine­grained details matter” (90). Turning to these 
details shows that five cents of the water bottle are devoted to 
social engagement, while the rest is following capitalistic inter­
ests of making the most profit. The look of resistance has been 
appropriated, but this should not be mixed up with resistance 
itself. When studying the material closely, differences emerge, 
because “details of diffraction patterns depend on the details of 
the apparatus” (91). 
In other words, the political meaning of resistance always evolves 
from and with a concrete set­up. With this, it becomes the task 
of critique to turn to the fine details. It is the fine details that give 
a glimpse of today’s paradoxical reality, which finds capitalism 
assimilating the position of its opponents, interweaving formerly 
antagonistic positions that no longer seem to be oppositional. 
But only at first sight does this appear to produce the problem 
Benjamin described when saying “one can not draw close the net 
in which we stand” (1921, 259). A dialectical tension is still there: 
withstanding capitalism is not capitalism, although it cannot 
be rigidly coupled anymore to something (there is no political 
essence, even not an anti­capitalistic one). In the post­dialectical 
setting of today, oppositional relations are given, but they don’t 
operate anymore in an antagonistic mode. Instead, they function 
as the flipside of each other: “/” instead of “vs.” Which (flip­)side 
35someone or something is on depends on the details: on the 
apparatus used, the setting, the waves. 
In fact, the force of capital itself has a flipside, since there is a 
small but crucial difference between capital and capitalistic inter­
ests. While “capitalist” and “capitalism” describe the exploiting 
principle of making profit, an inconsistent term like “capital” is 
not necessarily capitalistic – which is why we could, for example, 
take part in a seminar about the “Capital(s) of Critique.”1 Capital 
is, however, necessarily imaginative and surprising – a productive 
force that is always creating new space. Being new, it is open 
to be used in order to make the evidence of a different world 
appear. Or as Benjamin would say: “Someone is sure to be found 
who needs this force without making profit from it” (1931, 541). 
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Creation
Kiene Brillenburg Wurth
Creation is speculation. To speculate is to consider, to think 
through, and to guess. The uncertainty, the openness inherent 
in the verb speculate indicates our direction to think through 
creation. The oldest frame for conceptualizing creation is creatio 
ex nihilo, the speculation about absolute beginnings that bring in 
the new: to generate something new out of nothing. For a long 
time – we tend to say until the Romantic era – creatio ex nihilo 
was an activity preserved for the gods. It was an activity beyond 
existing knowledge, beyond existing rules: an act of freedom. 
What was created was truly new, that is to say, distinct from god, 
and it was good, as it emanated from an overflow of gratuitous­
ness (Blowers 2012, 168–169). We can see in this early conception 
of creation the kernel of modern conceptions of human creativity: 
the ability to operate beyond established criteria and rules of the 
game, to produce new modes of thinking, feeling, experiencing, 
sensing, or knowing. The overflow of gratuitousness of a creative 
god already announces, we might say, the Kantian purposeful­
ness without a purpose that was to be the blueprint for Romantic 
creativity. To create out of freedom something that need not 
serve a purpose outside of itself – that modern notion of art 
as autonomous holds within itself a religious idea of creation. 
Wordsworth’s “overflow of powerful feeling” signals this 
embedded presence of creation. 
38 Modern philosophers like Alfred Whitehead (1925, 1926, 1929) 
and Gilles Deleuze (1988), as well as process­ and relational 
theologists (such as Catherine Keller in The Face of the Deep, 
2003) have a problem with creatio ex nihilo because it starts 
from the model of an origin that annuls all difference and halts 
all movement. Everything begins and ends with this origin that 
typically generates the new as order out of chaos, form out of 
monstrous formlessness. We do not want this origin, not only 
because it is violently charged but also because the dichotomy 
between order and chaos does not do justice to creation as 
constant process. Keller and others (Bauman 2009; Justaert 2012) 
have therefore started to rethink origin as beginning: the logic of 
an opening that, as Edward Said already observed in Beginnings, 
“encourages nonlinear development, a logic giving rise to the 
sort of multileveled coherence of dispersion” (Said 1985, 372f.). 
If we reconceive of creation as a process that is always already 
scattered, and as such always happening anew, the archaic 
notion of creatio continua we find in Maximus and Hildegard von 
Bingen (Keller 2003) gains new significance. Creatio continua holds 
that creation did not happen once and for all by an all­powerful 
divinity but is an ongoing presence: the cut that creation marks is 
the onset of a process.
Sigmund Freud invokes this process in Jenseits des Lustprinzips 
(1920) where he thinks the creative entanglement of life and 
death in terms of molecular diffusion: the pressure of matter 
to return to its original, inanimate state. Elaborating on Arthur 
Schopenhauer and contemporary speculative biology, Freud 
suggests that matter may have once been shocked out of inan­
imation, and then inadvertently became ever more complex to 
preserve itself. Evolving life is, as it were, a constant attempt to 
ward off the shock of animation of which it is the effect. What 
drives such matter is a compulsion to return: Life is just a detour 
to death, and as such not “its own” but an ongoing effect of a 
primary trauma. Creation here no longer emanates from a single 
principle (God) but is present as an irreducible trace in every 
39being as becoming – or rather, a becoming that veils a desired 
unbecoming. The shock of animation is not an identifiable single 
moment: It is, comparable to Derrida’s concept différance, a 
movement that may signal beginnings (and deferrals) but no 
origins. Freud’s speculation very sharply shows us creatio con-
tinua as processual de­creation. Towards the end of the twentieth 
century, Jean­François Lyotard (1997) would adopt this Freudian 
logic of accidental, ongoing creation in his aesthetics of the sub­
lime: the instance of the “now here happening,” an instant that 
overwhelms through its incalculable occurrence. The sublime is 
invasive as it makes the soul or anima, as Lyotard calls it, aware 
of its own dependability on an “outside.” The soul is not itself, 
but an other that propels its animation or creation: “Existing is 
to be awoken from the nothingness of disaffection by something 
sensible over there.” (Lyotard 1997, 243) In the feeling of the 
sublime, the soul senses its vulnerability, its contingency on a 
violence that poses itself as “external” but is at the same time 
always already internal in its constitutive force. The experience 
of the sublime could thus be seen as an experience of one’s own 
creativity.
To regard creation as continuous, and happening in every 
moment, is not only to allow for change but also to acknowledge 
potentiality as an ontological force – in everyone and everything. 
Creation in this perspective is distributed and as such can be 
thought of as a “first” principle. This is a way of thinking about 
creation that can in part be traced to Henri Bergson’s notions of 
virtuality and of duration as differentiation (Bergson 1911, 1946). 
Duration is the space that opens up becoming. As Elizabeth Grosz 
explains the double movement of duration: 
Duration is that which undoes as well as what makes: to 
the extent that duration entails an open future, it involves 
the fracturing and opening up of the past and the present 
to what is virtual in them, to what in them differs from 
the actual, to what in them can bring forth the new. This 
unbecoming is the very motor of becoming. (Grosz 2005, 4–5) 
40 Difference propels becoming as a continuous multiplicity. Con­
tinuous multiplicity is what constitutes the virtual: a dynamic 
estuary of the actual that can only be gauged through intuition. 
In intuition, we appreciate and tap into the flux that perception 
casts as static material. Though never opposed to the intellect, 
intuition requires a different kind of thinking that is creative to 
the extent that it combines concentration with distraction: it is 
fluid. 
A wonderful example of such a fluid, creative thinking is offered 
in the picture book – the search book – The Yellow Balloon by 
Charlotte Dematons (2004). This book offers a series of land­
scapes that include different time scales simultaneously – eigh­
teenth­century air balloons alongside twenty­first century 
planes, medieval German farmhouses next to twentieth­century 
Dutch houseboats – as if they were cities in which such time 
scales have been spatially deposited. It is clear for us to see that 
The Yellow Balloon is in fact not just about looking for a yellow 
balloon drifting through different landscapes with their multiple 
time scales. Rather, it is about the exploration of the conceptual 
space of storytelling: there are no plots or margins, no words 
or storylines, just fragments of events that give the impetus 
to multiple narratives. An endless number of narratives could 
be created. Yet, The Yellow Balloon is not about distraction and 
multiplicity alone: It shows us the double movement of intuition. 
On the one hand, there is the purposive­ or directedness of 
searching for the tiny yellow balloon on each page. On the other, 
and at the same time, there is the purposelessness of the virtual 
– the dynamic estuary of virtual stories that is real, though not yet 
actualized, on every page. 
The felt and fruitful tension between such a limiting and limit­
less thinking epitomizes creation as a constant becoming and 
differing – in being, but also in art. In twentieth­century psy­
chology, these contrasting but interrelated attitudes of thinking 
have come to be known as convergent and divergent thinking: 
thinking in a specific, perhaps pre­determined direction, and 
41thinking that is freer in that it does not start from a set goal. 
Convergent thinking means finding the “right” answer, based 
on skills and knowledge, while divergent thinking means finding 
as many (unapparent) answers to a problem as possible, based 
on analogical patterns. Divergent thinking is what Gilles Del­
euze and Félix Guattari preached when, in What is Philosophy? 
(1994), they posited philosophy (and science) as an inventive 
discipline, opening up new fields with the creation of new con­
cepts. Divergent thinking is the production of novelty and the 
production of novelty that is useful and valuable nowadays 
makes up “creativity.” While philosophy and critical theory after 
Deleuze have spent a lot of time thinking through difference, 
repetition, virtuality, and creation as becoming, the concept of 
creativity has not been thought through as rigorously. We need 
to turn to psychology and cognitive theory to make the transition 
from creation to creativity, from ontology to epistemology and 
aesthetics. If creation is differing, how can we critically conceive 
of creativity as an ability to generate novelty? If we start from the 
concept of creation as sketched out here, we would want to move 
beyond the idea of a creative author (whether artist or common 
individual) paralleling the idea of a creative god. We would have 
to invoke our knowledge of inter/intratextuality, actor­network 
theory, and new materialism to rethink creativity as productive 
potentiality: a potential in things, generating ever new forms, 
images, and ideas in the collision with other things. However, 
creativity requires an entirely new entry in this book of critical 
concepts. Alfred North Whitehead, thanks to whom the term 
“creativity” became current in the twentieth century, would be 
the logical starting point for such an entry.
We have moved from theology to philosophy to a little psy­
chology, from being to thinking, to unravel creation as a critical 
concept. This entry has only done a little justice to this concept 
(for instance, it did not even begin to invoke philosophers like 
Baruch de Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz) because, as we 
have seen, creation is bound up with the most pressing questions 
42 in Western philosophy: questions about origins and beginnings, 
about the future, perception, experience, experimentation, the 
infinite, the soul, time, language, and difference. At the same 
time, it is difficult to carve out the concept of creation in itself 
because we still lack a specific critical theory of creation and 
creativity. Such a critical theory is especially urgent today now 
that creation and creativity has been appropriated all around us, 
from innovation sciences to organizational psychology, without a 
proper conceptual regime. 
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Entanglement
Kathrin Thiele 
It seems all too easy to speak in terms of entanglement 
today: Everything is connected with everything – eco­
nomically, ecologically, politically. Who would not know that? 
The discourse that everything depends on something else is 
omnipresent; and also that really changing anything is impos­
sible, because everything is always entangled with everything 
else. Neoliberalism is the short term for this discourse (Butler and 
Athanasiou 2013; Brown 2015; Harvey 2007), and its current grip 
must also be seen from within this framework. Its (sad) ideology 
of self­sufficient individuals can only ever be so effective under 
conditions in which no­thing, not even the cosmological nothing 
as quantum field theory shows (Barad 2012), is categorically sep­
arable from every­thing (else). So, one thing that I want to claim 
here, somewhat “in general,” is that today’s realities make aware 
– everywhere and to everybody (though precisely not in the same 
way to and for every­body [Ferreira da Silva 2009; Wynter 1994]) 
– that in this globalized and interconnected world one major 
critical symptom of the planetary condition is the very state of 
being entangled: often painfully entangled, implicated, caught up, 
and complicit. 
From this beginning the problem of making entanglement 
an affirmative critical tool is obvious: criticality must be at 
work in order to twist entanglement away from the above 
44 characterization – another vision of and regard for entanglement 
is needed. Karen Barad’s use of diffraction – a term that Donna 
Haraway introduced into critical discourses as “a metaphor 
for another kind of critical consciousness” (Haraway 1997, 273) – 
might be inspirational here. In Barad’s quantized version (which 
in no way implies a removal from “reality”), diffraction is the 
phenomenon of entanglement par excellence. In Meeting the Uni-
verse Halfway, she spells out that “[i]n fact, diffraction not only 
brings the reality of entanglement to light, it is itself an entan­
gled phenomenon” (Barad 2007, 73). And in her central chapter 
on “Quantum Entanglements: Experimental Metaphysics and the 
Nature of Nature,” which discusses the quantum mechanical and 
mathematical details of the two­slit diffraction experiment and 
its lively discursive history in twentieth­century quantum physics 
and beyond, Barad specifies further: 
Importantly, I suggest that Bohr’s notion of a phenomenon 
be understood ontologically… phenomena do not merely 
mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and 
“observed”; rather, phenomena are the ontological insepa-
rability of intra-acting “agencies.” That is, phenomena are 
ontological entanglements. (333) 
Speaking of the ontological inseparability of intra­acting 
“agencies” emphasizes the necessity to no longer envision entan­
glement(s) as based on pre­existing relata. Rather, “relata­within­
phenomena emerge through intra­action” (334); or, as Vicki Kirby 
argues in her Quantum Anthropology: “Entanglement suggests 
that the very ontology of entities emerges through relationality: 
the entities do not pre­exist their involvement” (Kirby 2011, 76). 
Compared to the neoliberal diagnosis, the approach to entan­
glement as relational ontology introduces then a significant 
difference. With Gregory Bateson one can say it introduces 
“a difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 1972, 453). 
Entanglement here is precisely not a descriptive matter of fact 
(the neoliberal “everything is entangled”), which relies on the 
45claim that its measurement is not (part) of the same entangled 
constellation it seeks to understand; or, put differently, that 
“we” could simply be taken out of the equation when measuring 
(this assumption also underlies the classical image of critique in 
which the subject of critique is clearly delimited from its object). 
To the contrary, as soon as entanglement(s) are engaged in the 
quantized sense outlined above, they matter. They are con-
structive matters of concern. “Phenomena are the basis of a new 
ontology” (Barad 2007, 333), and entanglements, therefore, imply 
the real possibility for the transformation of how things are. 
Yet, this claim for transformation, a new ontology, should not mis­
lead us, and neither should the understanding of entanglement 
as foundational relationality. We might easily believe that these 
hopeful sounding attributes in themselves necessitate a “better” 
toward which “we” are heading; as if a progressive direction could 
still guide us here. Nothing would be a greater misunderstanding 
of the quantum critical registers, which show that temporalities 
are anything but linear and in which (ontological) indeterminacy 
rules. A strong claim for this can once again be found in Barad’s 
discussion of “nature’s queer performativity” (Barad 2012) in 
which she stresses the onto­epistemological dimension of inde­
terminacy (Bohr) over uncertainty (Heisenberg). While the latter 
zooms in on the epistemological dimension only and ultimately 
maintains a humanist (and therefore progessivist) linearity, the 
entanglement of ontology and epistemology shakes up such an 
understanding. The radical onto­epistemological dimension of 
indeterminacy can no longer offer a progessivist temporality on 
which an understanding of indeterminacy as (epistemological) 
uncertainty would still stand. 
To recapitulate then, instead of taking entanglement as a 
mere “given” to which there is no alternative (neoliberalism) or 
proposing it as the “better solution” (progressivism), working with 
entanglement as an affirmative critical tool entails something 
else. It means attending to the constructive and/as relational 
ontology in a diffractive sense and/as utter indeterminacy. It 
46 means attending to the phenomenon as a question to arrive. 
Here, I refer to Jacques Derrida, whose radical thought of 
“undecidability” and “hauntology” (instead of onto­theology) 
lives of the same warped (or queer) temporality: “Turned toward 
the future, going toward it, [the question] also comes from it, it 
preceeds from [provient de] the future. It must therefore exceed 
any presence as presence itself.” (Derrida 1994, xix)
If entangledness as undecidability and indeterminacy is the 
(onto­/hauntological) state of every­thing; if there is, therefore, 
no non­related (outside) position from which an authoritative 
or prescriptive critical judgment and evaluation can be issued, 
what follows for how we can take measure of the world – this 
capital of critique that we cannot afford to loose, although we 
realize how entangled, implicated, or complicit we are? What 
definitely follows is that responsibility for how things take shape 
with­in their entangledness will in no way shrink, but instead 
is growing. If entanglement is not seen as a mere descriptive 
denominator of how things appear today (matter of fact) but is 
rather taken seriously as the entangling situation itself in which 
how something is accounted becomes just as important as what is 
accounted for (matter of concern), then one can once more agree 
with Barad’s statement: “Accountability cannot be reduced to 
identifying individual causal factors and assigning blame for this 
or that cause…. Taking account entails being accountable, for all 
ac/countings are from within, not without” (Barad 2012, 46–47). 
We have moved from a matter­of­fact­engagement with entan­
glement to one that still acknowledges its systemic – and 
therefore intra­active – nature, yet approaches it as a matter 
of concern, a mattering matter in need of attunement and 
care (Chow 2012; Latour 2004; Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). Entan­
glement in this perspective – as hauntology – entails that there 
is no simple opposite to entangledness, but only the in(de)finite 
re­arrangement of every­thing in its differential becoming. Every 
cut, split or categorical delimitation, in as much as every turning 
away in indifference or as refusal, does not escape the condition 
47of entanglement or relationality. Instead, it is but one form of 
(non­)relating to the issues at stake. In this matter lie both the 
painful or terrifying aspect of entanglement and its ethico­
political potential. As Sarah Nuttall announces in her study on 
post­apartheid South Africa: 
Entanglement is a condition of being twisted together or 
entwined, involved with; it speaks of an intimacy gained, 
even if it was resisted, or ignored or uninvited. It is a term 
which may gesture towards a relationship or set of social 
relationships that is complicated, ensnaring, in a tangle, but 
which also implies a human foldedness. (2009, 1) 
The ethico­political potential lies in the ways we fold, or better 
yet, in the ways we become fold, i.e., the ways we practice (our) 
foldedness. Nuttall continues: “A focus on entanglement in part 
speaks to the need for a utopian horizon, while always being 
profoundly mindful of what is actually going on.” (11, emphasis 
added) And Barad spells this out as follows: “An ethics of entan­
glement entails possibilities and obligations for reworking the 
material effects of the past and the future” (Barad 2012, 47). 
Final redemption is never the goal of such an ethics. Rather, in a 
most affirmative sense it calls for the persistent work of opening 
up, in as much as it demands the “wit(h)nessing” (Ettinger 2006) 
of the very specific entanglements we are inhabiting: They are 
never innocent, always with­in asymmetrical power relations 
and always having certain lives more precariously affected than 
others. 
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Experience
Annemie Halsema
In standard philosophical encyclopedias you will not find an 
entry on “experience.” That does not imply that the notion is 
not referred to, but that it is too encompassing and disputed 
to dedicate one single entry to it. Also in critical studies, such 
as feminist theory, it is a contested notion (Scott 1991). Should 
it then be part of a vocabulary that aims at bringing together 
notions around critique in the twenty­first century? Is experience 
not contaminated by power structures and practices, as critical 
philosophers from Karl Marx until Michel Foucault have argued, 
and as Joan Scott contends for feminist thinking? Should the 
immediateness and the first person perspective that experience 
implies not be criticized and embedded within a discourse that 
analyzes the practices that constitute something like it? Are we 
capable of interpreting experience, of philosophically analyzing 
it, as phenomenology is supposed to do? Or should we be sus­
picious of the immediate knowledge it presumes to offer? And 
last but not least, does experience not centralize the philosophies 
of the subject too much, instead of thinking ahead of them? This 
entry will therefore first show why experience is disputed, only 
to argue subsequently that despite this critique, it still is a notion 
that deserves to remain central in critical thinking. 
In the philosophical tradition, experience mainly plays a role in 
epistemology, and was contested already long before critical 
50 philosophers doubted it. In fact, it is a crucial notion in the dis­
tinction between appearance and reality that is discussed from 
Antiquity onwards; it plays an important role in the idealism­
realism discussion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; 
and in the rationalism­empiricism debate in epistemology; it 
is presumed to be the central concept in twentieth­century 
phenomenology but has already been contested by the dis­
cipline’s founding father Edmund Husserl. 
The notion of experience as human experience, often related 
to the sensations, starts playing an important role in modern 
philosophy, that is, from the seventeenth century onwards. In 
ancient Greek philosophy, contemplation of ideas was central in 
acquiring knowledge – be it more importantly so in Plato than 
in Aristotle – and human experience was not the main source 
of reaching true knowledge about reality. But when in modern 
philosophy the subject becomes the origin and foundation of 
knowledge, the notion of experience also gains influence. Yet, not 
without being questioned from the start.  
One of the problems the notion of experience faces is that it 
can be deluded or misled and does not lead to true knowledge. 
René Descartes’s famous problem is that one’s experiences 
can be deceived in dreaming or by an evil demon. His doubt 
experiment in the Meditations aims at reaching the foundation 
of all knowledge and thus at absolutely certain knowledge. He 
contends that because I cannot exclude that I am dreaming, my 
present belief in my sensations is not sufficiently justified. While 
dreaming doubts the sensual perceptions, the possibility of an 
evil demon even calls into question the seemingly evident math­
ematical truths. 
Another important step in thinking about experience is taken 
by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. While we 
may experience the outer world as existing independent 
of us, Kant contends that human experience, that is to say, 
sensory perceptions, are constructed by the human mind as a 
51combination of sensory matter that we receive and a priori forms 
supplied by our cognitive faculties (Rohlf 2014). Kant makes the 
famous distinction between analytical judgments a priori, syn­
thetic judgments a posteriori and synthetic judgments a priori. 
While the analytical judgments do not pertain to experience, the 
synthetic do. The synthetic judgments a posteriori are based on 
experience in the sense that we need perceptual information 
in order to judge whether they are valid. These judgments are 
experiential (for instance, “this paper is white”; because paper 
can have several colors, I need to check on the basis of sense 
perception whether this paper indeed is white). The synthetic 
judgments a priori combine experiential knowledge with the a 
priori character of knowledge, that is, its universality and neces­
sity. In other words, they are based upon experience but are not 
confined to experiential knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge 
to be found in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics.
Kant in his analysis of synthetic a priori judgments bridges 
the gap between empiricism and rationalism by arguing that 
there are two components of knowledge: there is something 
that is known, the contents given to consciousness, and there 
is something that knows, the active process of knowing. This 
distinction is taken further by Husserl in twentieth­century 
phenomenology and developed to noema (the ideal content of 
consciousness) and noesis (the intentional process of conscious­
ness, its act). Therewith also the notion of experience at once is 
more centralized in conscious processes, and differentiated.
In the twentieth century, phenomenology developed into the 
stream of thought in which experience is central. The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia, for instance, defines phenomenology as “the 
study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the 
first­person point of view” (Smith 2013). Likewise, in analytical 
philosophy, phenomenology is considered to be concentrating 
upon the “what it is likeness” of sensations and experiences. 
Phenomenological research methods in the social sciences 
are empirical qualitative research methods that pertain to the 
52 meaning people give to their lives, as expressed by them in qual­
itative interviews. These streams of thought relate all in different 
ways to the notions of “experience” and “intentionality” as devel­
oped by Husserl. The latter implies that consciousness is always 
of or about something. Phenomenology studies these contents of 
consciousness (noema), as well as its acts (noesis).
While thus centralizing the notion of experience, from the start 
Husserl also problematizes an overly simple notion of experience. 
He first of all distinguishes between Erfahrung (experience) and 
Anschauung (intuition), arguing that while we may experience 
cases that are at least supposedly real, in Anschauung things may 
also be imagined or recollected. For Husserl phenomenology 
does not analyze experience but Anschauung, phenomenological 
intuition. Furthermore, these intuitions have intentional quality, 
which implies that they are experiences of a certain type (hope, 
desire, memory, affirmation, doubt, etc.), and that they have 
an intentional matter: that what they are about. For Husserl, the 
latter, that which we perceive, the objects, are not experienced. 
What is experienced are our sensations and the acts that inter­
pret or apperceive them (Husserl o.c. in Zahavi 2003, 27). As 
Zahavi exhibits, intentionality thus consists of “the interpretation 
of something as something” (27). Experience implies the con­
stitution of something in our consciousness.
During the same period in which Husserl founded phenome­
nology, the beginning of the twentieth century, the notion of 
experience was severely criticized by the masters of suspicion, 
that is, by critical thinkers such as Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. 
They further complicated the notion of experience by contending 
that human experience is constituted by economic structures 
and the unconscious. Instead of being certain of one’s expe­
riences and taking them as starting point for gaining knowledge 
of the world, in their analysis our experience appears to be 
influenced by what remains outside of it. Therewith they give 
way to twentieth­century streams of thought in philosophy that 
fundamentally question the centrality of the subject and inherit 
53the difficulties with experience already prevalent in modern 
philosophy. 
Notwithstanding the questioning of experience by Marx, Freud, 
and others, the notion today still remains relevant for critical 
thinking. In feminist theory, Scott’s forceful rejection of the 
notion of experience, on the ground of its exclusivity (its being 
prototypical for white, middle­class women) and its being 
constructed by the power relations under critique, has led to 
defenses of women’s experiences. In the context of cosmetic 
surgery, Kathy Davis (1997) secures the experienced body as a 
source of empowerment for women; Sonia Kruks (2001) argues 
that embodied experience for women who have faced physical 
violence can form an affective basis for solidarity. Yet, Scott’s 
restraint about the social constructedness of experience cannot 
simply be put aside, presuming that there is some sort of 
pre­discursive embodied experience that escapes social con­
struction and power relations. Instead, it should be contended 
that experience is historically and culturally specific through and 
through. As experience, however, it does not coincide with dis­
course and with prevailing power structures but can be thought 
of as what Johanna Oksala calls “a sense of disorientation and dis­
satisfaction” (2014, 396). In critical perspectives, experience itself 
can be critical, in the sense of exhibiting a gap with dominant 
cultural representations, a realization “no, these representations 
do not accord with the way I perceive/feel/sense myself.”  
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Fable
Sam McAuliffe
The projections of the imaginary as they appear across the field 
of modernity give rise to a series of questions for the work of 
critique. A reality less and less distinguishable from fable, to 
the point that the longstanding arrangement securing their 
opposition begins to give way, disrupting in turn the wide array 
of premises and certainties that rest upon this distinction; a 
reality, above and beyond this, increasingly derived from and 
conditioned by the processes of fabulation running through it: 
this is, for Roger Caillois, the characteristic signature of a certain 
experience of this modernity. Such experience not only tes­
tifies to the repositioning of the sphere in which the fabular 
circulates but an intensification of its efficacy. Having ceased 
to be situated at a distance from what is real, no longer casting 
its shadow over lived reality from an indeterminate elsewhere, 
it becomes instead the very material out of which the real is 
composed. “The world in which everything, everywhere, is pos­
sible at all times, because the imagination has sent there its 
most extraordinary enticements ahead of time and discovers 
them at once – this world was no longer remote, inaccessible, 
and autonomous. It was the world in which people lived” (Caillois 
2003, 178). Now what brings this transformation to pass – Caillois 
dates it to the first half of the Nineteenth Century – is the 
emergence of the modern city, the city as backdrop to “a keen 
56 commitment to modernity” (182). This shows itself above all in 
the representational forms devoted to urban experience, and 
the relation that subsists between the two. Why, then, does the 
cityscape constitute a privileged point of reference for the study 
of “the social processes of the imagination”? Because for the first 
time within modernity’s scope the conditions emerge for a form 
of “mythic” experience that had otherwise fallen into dormancy. 
Myth, Caillois’s preferred term here, is a strain of “collective 
property”; once it ceases to encompass the collective, pertaining 
to the individual alone and in isolation, it can no longer be under­
stood as mythic, properly speaking (176). And the same must be 
said of any fabular phenomenon: it is a projection that nec­
essarily extends beyond the private imagination, that circulates 
at the level of the socius, is even a means by which sociality is 
itself underwritten.
For Caillois the modern cityscape facilitates such conditions. 
Within its horizons a “collective mental atmosphere” is incul­
cated, exerting a “powerful hold”, a “constraining force” over an 
imagination that exceeds the confines of individuated experience. 
Yet it is one that offers up the city as setting in a particularly 
paradoxical form, inasmuch as the mythic projection concerns 
neither the real nor the imaginary in isolation, but the real as 
imaginary: “the realist depiction of a clearly defined city (more 
integrated than any other in readers’ actual lives) was suddenly 
exalted along fantastic lines” (177). Writing on the same context 
some time after Caillois, Michel Foucault will pick up the trail of 
the very same tendency: “For the attitude of modernity, the high 
value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness 
to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it 
not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is” (Foucault 1997, 
311).1
1 For both authors (and for Walter Benjamin too, of course), Baudelaire 
provides the exemplary figure of this “commitment” or “attitude” that con­
founds any simple opposition between reality and imagination.
57Myth, fantasy, and fable, no longer concerned with a world 
beyond this one, are rerouted back through reality, so that the 
distinction between the real and the imaginary is reproduced on 
this side of reality itself. For the collective subject encompassed 
by this realignment of the spheres of experience in question, 
what is real seems increasingly dissociated from itself, appearing 
as its own vestige. “Under these conditions,” Caillois writes,
how could each reader fail to develop the intimate belief (still 
manifest today) that the Paris he knows is not the only one? 
Is not even the real one? That it is only a brilliantly lit decor, 
albeit far too normal, whose mechanical operators will never 
reveal themselves? A setting that conceals another Paris, the 
true Paris, a ghostly, nocturnal, intangible Paris that is all the 
more powerful insofar as it is more secret; a Paris that any­
where and at any time dangerously intrudes upon the other 
one? (2003, 179–180)
Reality encompassed by fable appears to retreat behind its 
own façade, so that contact with it is always imminent, always 
prolonged – “everywhere, reality was contaminated with myth” 
(181) – and as Caillois suggests, this myth has yet to relinquish its 
hold.
It would be possible to plot across the terrain of modernity the 
new forms of “collective property” precipitated at the level of 
the imaginary by abrupt changes in social conditions, forms 
that each time draw the spheres of reality and fable into a zone 
of disarming indiscernibility. The series of phenomena and the 
range of contexts brought together in this way would no doubt 
bear little external resemblance to one another, but they would 
nevertheless be analogous at the level of structure and function, 
allowing critique to take stock of the implicit social process at 
work in the projections of the imaginary. In answer to where such 
a series would take us, it would no doubt have to pass through 
– and would perhaps reach its apotheosis in – a text closer to 
our own historical present, Jacques Derrida’s “No Apocalypse, 
58 Not Now.” The nuclear age with which the latter is concerned is 
animated by an intrinsically aporetic circumstance, one that, as is 
the case with Caillois’s Paris study, has acute implications for the 
relation between reality and the fabular.
The circumstance at stake here is that of nuclear war, the taking 
place of which raises for Derrida the specter of a properly total 
event. It brings with it the prospect of an act of destruction that 
would potentially be without delimitation, one that would with­
draw the very ground from which it could be surveyed, an event 
without spectators, only participants, and as such it implicates 
“the whole of the human socius today” (Derrida 2007, 394). In 
other words, it traces out the conditions for an unprecedented 
instance of collectivity (the cityscape is, after all, a local setting, 
whilst the stage of this war is “nonlocalizable,” global and, once 
underway, would by no means leave the stage itself unaffected).
This is the context in which Derrida begins to approach a dis­
arming hypothesis: With this total event we are left facing “a 
phenomenon whose essential feature is that it is fabulously 
textual, through and through.” Why is this so? Because something 
can be said of it only insofar as it has not yet come about, insofar 
as it remains in abeyance, a “non­event.” Reference to it in any 
form is dependent upon its non­occurrence. “The terrifying 
‘reality’ of nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, 
never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text.” 
In this sense, it “has existence only by means of what is said of it 
and only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, 
a pure invention” (393). To be clear, this does not consign the 
destruction it threatens to a realm from which existence can con­
sider itself protected, sheltered, or shielded. On the contrary, it is 
precisely as a piece of fabulation that the nuclear event acquires 
its force, that it becomes the “horizon” or the “condition” of all 
that is considered real.
For the “reality” of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear 
war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate 
59things…. “Reality,” let’s say the general institution of the 
nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an 
event that has never happened (except phantasmatically, 
and that is not nothing), an event of which one can only 
speak, whose advent remains an invention of men … The 
anticipation of nuclear war (dreaded as the phantasm of a 
remainderless destruction) installs humanity – and even 
defines, through all sorts of relays, the essence of modern 
humanity – in its rhetorical condition. (394, 396)
That there is nothing left of the order of reality that is not con­
ditioned by the fable in question is, for Derrida, the signature of 
the nuclear age, and if this announces a new set of imperatives 
to which critique must respond, chief amongst them would be 
the following: should this circumstance be considered unique, 
singular, something without precedent, or is it the latest stage 
of a tendency apparently intrinsic to modernity, whereby the 
potency of the fabular appears to be increasing exponentially 
and hyperbolically (from the nineteenth century city to the 
twentieth century war), each time encompassing more and more 
of “reality”?
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Immanence
Leonard Lawlor
Since the time of Immanuel Kant, philosophers, and cultural 
theorists (like Friedrich Nietzsche) have always engaged in 
immanent critique. Most generally and negatively, immanent 
critique criticizes on the basis of no transcendent idea or value. 
Immanent critique therefore is undoubtedly a kind of relativism. 
We must not be afraid of relativism. Depending on no transcen­
dent value, immanent critique depends on immanence itself. 
Immanent critique then looks to be paradoxical. It is. Immanent 
critique is a difficult idea. It means a critique that does not appeal 
to a transcendent or other worldly value or idea. It is a critique 
that remains within experience but is done in the name of a 
different kind of experience such as responsibility (Deleuze 
1983, 91–93). In order to start to understand the immanence 
found in immanent critique, we must distinguish immanence 
from apparently related forms of thinking such as materialism 
and naturalism. And we must distinguish immanence from 
its opposite term, which is not just the transcendent but also 
transcendence.
Immanence seems to have two senses. As we can see already, the 
first sense of “immanence” must be opposed to the transcendent. 
Abandoning the transcendent (and therefore certain forms of 
religious belief), we are no longer concerned with a second, 
heavenly world; we no longer gaze at an idea that lies beyond 
62 our world and our experience. Our gaze is now turned back to 
this world and to our ideas. We are now concerned with our 
experience or experience in general. Phenomenological inves­
tigations have shown that experience is necessarily structured by 
time. While our experience is ours and while it is of this world, the 
fact that experience is fundamentally temporal opens experience 
to something that goes beyond it. The fact that every present 
moment of experience is retained makes the retained image 
repeatable. And this repeatability provides the retained image 
with a powerful form of potentiality. In other words, due to the 
structure of temporalization, there is becoming in experience. 
Becoming is the second and more profound sense of immanence. 
It is this second sense of immanence that we find in Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari.
Before we turn to the second sense of immanence as becoming, 
we must stress the definition of immanence as experience. Del­
euze and Guattari themselves define immanence as experience: 
immanence is a “field of experience” (1994, 46–48). When they 
speak of a field of experience, Deleuze and Guattari ask us, 
however, to reverse the traditional way we think of experience. 
Usually, we think of experience as a relation between a sub­
ject who senses and an object that is sensed. Usually, we think 
of experience as vision and something seen. In this case, the 
experience and the thing seen are related back to the seeing 
subject who synthesizes the views of the thing seen. The syn­
thetic activity of the subject is therefore prior to the experience 
and makes it possible. By asking us to reverse the traditional 
view of experience, Deleuze and Guattari ask us to imagine 
experience itself as being prior to subjects and objects. Thanks 
again to phenomenology, we can imagine such a subjectless and 
objectless field of experience. Maurice Merleau­Ponty has shown 
that, in our usual, everyday experience, our vision is oriented by 
the objects and the world that surrounds them. The thing seen 
presents profiles that motivate the viewer’s synthetic activity, 
and the profiles appear against the background of a world 
63that already makes sense. However, like Deleuze and Guattari, 
Merleau­Ponty also asks us to reverse this common under­
standing of experience. He asks us, for example, to think of night­
time experience, experience during a very dark night. In such an 
experience, we lose the orientation of the object and the world as 
its background. In fact, the night “envelops me, it penetrates me 
through all of my senses, it suffocates my memories, and it all but 
effaces my personal identity” (Merleau­Ponty 2012, 296). Merleau­
Ponty himself compares the experience of the night to mystical 
experience, which implies that, when we follow the reversal of 
normal experience, we find ourselves in an unusual experience. 
Being in an almost mad experience is not something we should 
fear: only in such experience are we jarred out of our common 
sense opinions and beliefs. It opens our minds to other ideas 
and thought. Only through such a nearly mad experience are we 
able to enter into immanence. Only through such an experience 
are we able to engage in immanent critique. As Merleau­Ponty 
might have said, we enter into immanence only by trying to 
depersonalize experience. The required depersonalization 
explains why the idea of immanence is so difficult for us to 
understand.
With the transition through a nearly mad experience, we are 
now prepared to examine the second definition of immanence. 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari define immanence 
as a plane with two sides, with the two sides being thought and 
extension, or consciousness and matter (1994, 48–49). And to this 
list of sides, we could add subject and object. In the plane with 
two sides, we must note that the plane of immanence is neither 
matter nor consciousness. Therefore, immanence cannot be 
immanent to matter or to consciousness. If Deleuze and Guattari 
call the plane of immanence at times “nature,” they mean nature 
in a sense entirely distinguished from anything like a natural sub­
stance. As they say in A Thousand Plateaus, 
[t]his plane [as opposed to the plane of transcendence] 
is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocity. We 
64 therefore call it a plane of Nature, although nature has 
nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no dis­
tinction between the natural and the artificial. However 
many dimensions it may have, it never has a supplementary 
dimension to that which happens upon it. That alone makes 
it natural and immanent. (1987, 266)
The plane of immanence “never has a supplementary dimension.” 
Therefore, the plane of immanence is based on nothing but 
itself, which gives it the status of being that which is prior to the 
two sides. Only in the sense of priority to the two sides is the 
plane of immanence “natural” (or better, “vital”). It is not natural 
in the sense of objective laws, chemical processes and causes, 
or neuro­chemical processes and causes, material forces; all of 
these scientific entities would be “supplementary dimensions.” 
To reduce the plane of immanence to these scientific entities (to 
reduce being to these beings, as Martin Heidegger would say) 
distorts the very concept of immanence. One misunderstands the 
conceptual core of Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of immanence if 
one identifies their thinking with naturalism or materialism.
Through the quotation above we just mentioned transcendence, 
which leads us back to the second and more profound sense of 
immanence. Immanence is a becoming. It becomes because it 
has “no supplementary dimension.” In other words, it is infinite, 
in the sense of having no absolute endpoint and no absolute 
starting point. It is based on no principle and on no purpose (no 
arché and no telos). In order to understand the infinite becoming 
of immanence, we must distinguish transcendence (which 
oriented so many phenomenological investigations) from the 
transcendent. As the literal meaning of the word indicates, with 
transcendence, we can say that the other (person) is beyond 
me, but in a sense that the other is still of this world or of this 
experience. The transcendence of the other indeed opens 
experience. Yet, it does not, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
open it enough. In the transcendence of the other, we might con­
ceive the other as another subject. In other words, we conceive 
65the other as an always hidden subjectivity, the form of his or her 
experiences being always hidden from my gaze by the face, but 
still there somewhere like a secret. If we conceive the transcen­
dence of the other in this way, then we have set up a starting 
point and an endpoint to becoming. Instead of the face as the 
expression of a hidden subjectivity – a hiddenness that implies a 
transcend subject – we can conceive the face as the expression 
of a possible world, with the eyes as portals through which I can 
see the other world and through which I can become other. The 
difference between transcendence and immanence therefore is 
the difference between the other and becoming­other: not just 
“alter,” but alteration. Transcendence is a point at which we could 
imagine movement stopping (as if we were finally to reach the 
secret life of the other), while immanence is a vanishing point 
toward which one never stops moving (as if we always reach 
beyond ourselves). The unlimited movement of becoming is why 
we must really imagine immanence as a plane. On the vastness of 
this surface, it is possible to move and keep moving, especially if 
there are no objects or subjects at which to stop. On this surface, 
we are able to continue to fly. The image of incessant flight gives 
us an image of freedom. Perhaps to help others flee, escape, and 
be free is the highest form of responsibility.
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The Inhuman
Veronica Vasterling
In The Inhuman (1991) and Postmodern Fables (1997) Jean­François 
Lyotard outlines an anthropology of the inhuman that takes 
its cues from psychoanalytical theory and Kant’s notion of the 
sublime. Starting from the standard observation that humans 
are not born human as, for instance, cats are born cats, Lyotard 
relates the inhuman to infancy (Lyotard 1991, 3). Infants lack 
language, common reason, locomotion, in short, they lack almost 
everything that is considered to be typically or essentially human. 
In contrast to humanist anthropology, Lyotard maintains that the 
initial inhumanness persists in adulthood as an irreconcilable 
remainder that haunts and agitates the soul.
The import of Lyotard’s anthropology of the inhuman is not 
simply its critique of anthropocentric humanism. Critique of the 
latter is a common goal of poststructuralist philosophers and 
new materialists like Karen Barad (2012). Lyotard’s critique stands 
out from the others in that it reflects on the point of view of the 
one who does the criticizing. His anthropology decenters the 
human point of view but also acknowledges that critique always 
involves a human point of view. Instead of eclipsing the human 
viewpoint, Lyotard’s critique, therefore, attempts to account for 
the critical potential of a decentered human perspective. 
68 In the history of Western philosophy, from Aristotle onwards, the 
initial inhumanness of human life has been interpreted in two 
ways. It has been understood either as a potentiality that will 
develop into human maturity, or as a first nature that is compen­
sated by a second acquired nature, also known as culture. This 
teleological view persists to this day, both in the sciences and 
in common sense understandings of human nature. Criticizing 
the essentialism inherent in developmental models, which 
take humanness as their telos, twentieth­century continental 
philosophy has provided a dialectical­hermeneutical reinter­
pretation of the teleological view of human nature. The re­inter­
pretation emphasizes, in Jean­Paul Sartre’s famous formula, that 
existence precedes essence (Sartre 2007). Sartre’s existentialist 
account of the human is reworked in Maurice Merleau­Ponty’s 
phenomenological account of the human body­subject. Despite 
its non­essentialist character, the anthropology of Sartre and 
Merleau­Ponty does not constitute a break with humanist 
tradition. As Lyotard points out, essentialist and non­essentialist 
anthropologies are humanist in that the heterogeneity of the 
inhuman and human is reconciled and unified without leaving 
any remainder. The seemingly innocent unification of all human 
beings under the cloak of humanism hides the violent exclusion 
of many in the name of the fully human. The unifying gesture of 
humanism neutralizes and totalizes, transforming contingent 
heterogeneity into a (supposedly) meaningful whole, thereby 
opening the door to the closed systems of totalitarianism to be 
witnessed in modern European history and beyond. Humanism, 
moreover, was and is an important source of the “grand 
narratives” of modernity, the utopian blueprints for a better 
future that invariably end in hell, epitomized by Auschwitz and 
the Gulag in the last century, and perhaps by the expanding war 
and chaos of the Middle East in the present century.
Lyotard details the humanist character of Merleau­Ponty’s 
chiasmic ontology of the flesh as “a congruence of mind and 
things” (Lyotard 1991, 11), suggesting the attunement of human 
69flesh and flesh of the world. In contrast to Merleau­Ponty (1995), 
he emphasizes the ambivalence of sensibility, drawing attention 
to the disruptive openness of the human­world relation. Whereas 
sensibility, in Merleau­Ponty, enables the attunement of body 
and environment, sensibility in Lyotard is primarily affecta­
bility. A sentient body is an affectable body in the sense of 
non­intentional, heteronomous, and vulnerable openness to the 
world. Sensibility in the sense of affectability implies the pos­
sibility of becoming overwhelmed by what affects us. Lyotard’s 
elaboration of sensibility in terms of affectability is inspired by 
Immanuel Kant’s exposition of the sublime in The Critique of 
Judgment.
Kant describes the sublime as, ”the absolutely great,” as that 
which is in every respect and “beyond every comparison great” 
(1974, 91). Perceiving the overpowering greatness of nature gives 
rise to contradictory feelings. According to Kant, the reason of 
this ambivalence is that we are capable of an idea but not of a 
representation of the absolute. On the one hand, perception of 
something sublime gives rise to a feeling of pain because the 
faculty of imagination (Einbildungskraft) is incapable of rendering 
a representation (Darstellung) of the sublime. On the other hand, 
it also arouses a feeling of pleasure because the sublime reminds 
us of the limitless power of the faculty of ideas (Vernunft). 
Incapable of providing a representation of the absolute (the 
sublime), we are nevertheless capable of thinking the absolute, 
of having an idea of the absolute. In its humanist reading, the 
experience of the Kantian sublime is emblematic of human 
nature that compensates finite sensibility with infinite reason. 
In Lyotard’s reading, the experience of the Kantian sublime is 
exemplary for the irreducible heterogeneity of human faculties, 
entailing a reconsideration of these faculties. Thought is no 
longer the faculty that overcomes or compensates the finiteness 
of the senses, of embodiment in general. What the senses – in 
collaboration with imagination – fail to grasp or conceive is not 
recuperated in thought but rather registered as an irrecoverable, 
70 inarticulable feeling which precisely for that reason incites us to 
think. The failure of the senses and imagination attests to the 
fact that the body is not necessarily attuned to what affects it. On 
a more primordial level sensibility is affectability to the point of 
violation:
Sensation makes a break in an inert nonexistence …. What 
we call life proceeds from a violence exerted from the out­
side on a lethargy. The anima exists only as forced. The ais-
theton tears the inanimate from the limbo in which it inexists, 
it pierces its vacuity with its thunderbolt, it makes a soul 
emerge out of it. (Lyotard 1997, 243)
Instead of a body­subject in tune with the world, Lyotard’s 
anthropology of the inhuman foregrounds a body­soul whose 
openness to excesses of affection is unmasterable. The excess 
of affection causes a breakdown of the capacity to process and 
articulate what affects me. The effect of unmasterable affecta­
bility is comparable to what Sigmund Freud calls “primary 
repression” (Urverdrängung; 1960). Something has happened, 
but the event is not and cannot be processed and integrated 
in the framework of experience. The feeling of pain and con­
fusion evoked by the event is repressed and its cause – the 
event – remains unknown because it never became part of one’s 
knowledge or experience in the first place. But what is repressed 
returns to haunt us: the soul remains hostage to the irrecover­
able and inarticulable feelings evoked by the excess of affection. 
According to Lyotard it is “the task of writing, thinking, literature, 
arts, to venture to bear witness” (1991, 7) to this anguish of the 
soul. Haunted by the “sublime breakdowns” resulting from an 
excess of affection, the soul gives rise to “true thought”: “If you 
think you’re describing thought when you describe a selecting 
and tabulating of data, you’re silencing truth…. Thinking, like 
writing or painting, is almost no more than letting a giveable 
come towards you.” (18)
71The unmasterable openness and affectability of infancy is the 
inhuman that inhabits humankind. Lyotard’s anthropology of 
the inhuman replaces humanism’s harmonious ontology of a 
body­subject whose existence is co­extensive with, and attuned 
to the world with the ontological heterogeneity and finiteness 
of a body­soul forced into life by a violently affecting exteriority. 
Inhabiting humankind as an unmasterable openness and affecta­
bility, the inhuman provides the conditions of reflective critique. 
True, that is, critical thought and art is not taking and defending a 
point of view, it is bearing witness to what emerges in one’s view. 
In “letting a giveable come towards you,” thought and art require 
patient irresoluteness, waiting till “what doesn’t yet exist, a word, 
a phrase, will emerge” (19).
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Inner Voice
Sam McAuliffe
In a short text written in exile in 1941, Theodor W. Adorno 
identifies the emergence of a “new type of human being,” and 
as a functional corollary of the administered world, it falls to 
critique to reconstruct the configuration of indices through which 
this incipient Menschentypus has been cast. Pursued to these 
ends, the resulting analysis repeatedly lays bare the following 
tendency: when modeled after this type, nothing of the interior 
world of the resultant individual is exempt from heteronomous 
determination; its inner space is permeated by the governing 
structures of external reality all the way down to its “innermost 
constitution” (Adorno 2009, 463). This process extends well 
beyond one of outside influence (“‘Beeinflussung’ von außen”) 
acting upon an otherwise self­subsistent entity. As Adorno later 
writes in Minima Moralia, his expanded study of the typology 
in question, “there is no substratum beneath such ‘defor­
mations,’ no ontic interior on which social mechanisms merely 
act externally” (Adorno 2000, 229). The seclusion of the subject’s 
interior world has always already been breached. The social 
mechanism is at work and in force on both sides of the threshold 
that separates the inner world from outer (it engages the 
individual, whether the latter is aware of it or not, on either side 
of this division). Inwardness persists for this new human type as, 
at most, a semblance, shorn of whatever necessity it once had.
74 This is certainly the case when it comes to the position allo­
cated to the heteronomous subject within its discursive field, the 
schema for which is drawn up by Adorno in much the same way 
in this text. Insofar as the administered world is composed of 
“a synthetic, essentially advertising­determined language,” the 
terms of which circulate all the more readily the more opaque 
they are, the new type of human being is struck with a form 
of aphonia, “the wasting away of language [die Verkümmerung 
des Sprachschatzes] and the capacity for expression through 
language” (Adorno 2009, 464). So too, then, within this linguistic 
sphere is the subject expropriated of even the pretense of auto­
nomy and intentionality. It is as if the synthesis that produces 
meaning, that guides the passage of what is said by determining 
the form of relation between words and things, and between 
words themselves, has always already been locked in place. The 
speech of this subject is prefabricated, reduced without remainder 
to the circulation of formula.
It is this that leads Adorno to identify the faltering of speech – the 
culminating point of which would be its falling away altogether – 
as one of the primary characteristics of the new type of human 
being, a privation encompassing all of its actions and passions, 
and one it would have no available means to counter; again, in 
Minima Moralia, he writes: “the rigor mortis of society is spreading 
at last to the cell of intimacy that thought itself secure. No harm 
comes to man from outside alone: dumbness [das Verstummen; 
falling silent, becoming mute] is the objective spirit” (Adorno 
2000, 138). But what is surprising here, as this line of thought 
approaches its conclusion, is the specific instance of discourse 
invoked as evidence of this tendency, as well as the dimension of 
experience within which this privation is said to come into effect.
The change in the body of language concerns the interior 
monologue most of all. So far, there has not been any inves­
tigation of the influence of this nascent speechlessness on 
the overall condition of the people who are made speechless. 
(Adorno 2009, 464)
75The tendency towards speechlessness that accompanies the 
expansion of the administered world would first and foremost 
make itself known within the integral structure of the subject. 
No doubt this privation will have further consequences for the 
possibility of communication in general, but not before it has 
impinged upon the subject, in and of itself. What lapses into 
silence, ceasing not only to speak but to hear itself speak, is the 
monologue of the inner voice, the voice that addresses itself, that 
alone receives what it emits, and this disrupts, if it doesn’t with­
draw it altogether, the very condition of reflexive experience, the 
possibility of staging a relation between the self and itself in any 
given form. It would mean that the subject could no longer take 
up a position in relation to itself, not even one of estrangement, 
because the primary term of this relation has been dissipated: 
“there is no longer an ‘ego’ in the traditional sense,” it no longer 
holds together as a point of reference (462).
At issue here is nothing less than a constitutive change in what 
Adorno elsewhere refers to as “the facticity of inwardness” 
(Adorno 1991, 32), that which, within the subject, takes the 
form of spontaneous, ever­present immediacy. Once the inner 
voice has ceased to speak, once the living support it appears to 
grant to experience is withdrawn, not only the formal cohesion 
but the material composition of the interior world finds itself 
fundamentally affected. This is one of the primary tasks that falls 
to a critique of “the new type of human being”: to analyze the his­
torical conditions for this lapse into speechlessness and to gauge 
the full range of its consequences, from the effect this silence 
has on the distribution of the individual’s other faculties and the 
various spheres of psychic life, to its wider implications for the 
social categories in which the individual is embedded, the division 
between the public and private self, for example (consequences 
which are, no doubt, still unfolding today).
Such analysis may even show that the tendency in question is 
not entirely detrimental. It could well harbor a potential of sorts. 
Something of this is already apparent in the fact that the critical 
76 model developed by Adorno here at no point speaks in the name 
of the supposed integrity of subjective inwardness, as though 
the inner voice was a property that should be restored to the 
individual, even if this was indeed somehow possible. On the 
contrary, Adorno subscribes to a doctrine of the individual for 
which interiority is a condition that must be worked through and 
ultimately overcome: “the subject does not come to itself through 
the narcissistically self­related cultivation of its being­for­itself 
but rather through externalization, by devotedly abandoning 
itself to what is not itself” (Adorno 1998, 164). There is always 
a danger, after all, that the inner voice impedes the process 
of externalization on which the subject’s realization is said to 
depend here, that it leaves the subject estranged from itself by 
confining it within itself, locking it into its accidental particularity. 
Interior monologue is a resource that can always lead the subject 
to mistake inwardness as a value in and of itself, thus sus­
pending the process of self­reflection by which “the ego becomes 
transparent to itself as a piece of the world” (Adorno 1973, 73). 
Conversely, then, a model of language from which the structural 
possibility of interior monologue had been withdrawn, a language 
given over entirely to externalization, at all points transparent in 
its mediations: would not such a language necessarily draw the 
subject out of its self­seclusion, so that, in speaking, the latter 
would be left “transparent to itself as a piece of the world”? And 
would this not offer the prospect of a new form of sociality, a 
revised social relation between its speakers? In his essay on the 
totally administered society of Huxley’s Brave New World, Adorno 
does in fact entertain such a possibility, when he writes: “Through 
total social mediation, from the outside, as it were, a new 
immediacy, a new humanity, would arise” (Adorno 1967, 106).
In any case, an intimation of where this question would take us 
is given intermittently in Adorno’s subsequent critical writing. 
From the radio’s phantasmatic mediation of the living voice to the 
popular cult of biography; from the talking cure in psychoanalysis 
to the psychotechnical procedures underwriting administered 
77life (the aptitude test, the questionnaire, and so on): once 
viewed from within the scope of this question, it would be pos­
sible to treat these widely disparate yet historically convergent 
phenomena as so many prostheses for the absent voice, so many 
attempts to make speak what has fallen silent, the subject’s 
interior monologue.
References
Adorno, Theodor W. 1967. “Aldous Huxley and Utopia.” In Prisms, translated by 
Samuel and Shierry Weber, 97–118. London: Spearman Press.
Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity. Translated by Knut Tarnowski 
and Frederic Will. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Adorno, Theodor W. 1991. “The Position of the Narrator in the Contemporary Novel.” 
In Notes to Literature, Vol. 1, translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 30–36. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Adorno, Theodor W. 1998. “Gloss on Personality.” In Critical Models: Interventions 
and Catchwords, translated by Henry W. Pickford, 161–165. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Adorno, Theodor W. 2000. Minima Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Life. Translated 
by E. F. N. Jephcott. London: Verso.
Adorno, Theodor W. 2009. “The Problem of a New Type of Human Being.” In Current 
of Music: Elements of a Radio Theory, edited and translated by Robert Hullot­
Kentor, 461–468. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Metaphor
Annemie Halsema
Metaphor is not only one of the most commonly used figures 
of speech in everyday language, it also has attracted more 
philosophical interest than any other figure of speech. Metaphor 
is defined in the Merriam­Webster dictionary as a form of 
figurative language; it is “a figure of speech in which a word or 
phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in 
place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.” 
Besides, it also denotes the object or activity or idea of metaphor 
itself. Philosophically interesting about the notion is the pos­
sibility of using one word or phrase instead of another, which 
introduces analogy, similarity, displacement but also imagination 
and creativity into language and, for some philosophers, into 
everyday life.
Metaphors are of interest to philosophers in the Anglo­American 
analytic tradition, because they escape the accepted conditions 
for determining the truth value of statements, yet cannot 
simply be set aside as not meaningful. Consequentially, analytic 
philosophers such as Max Black (1962, 1979) and Donald Davidson 
(1984) aim to define the function of metaphor as heuristic and 
as inspirational and guiding our insight, and not as related to 
truth. Especially Black (1979) develops a theory of metaphor in 
which the interaction between the two subject terms explains 
its meaning, thereby at once alluding to the conventions within 
80 a linguistic community as leaving some space for creating new 
meaning.
Continental philosophers do not so much tackle metaphor 
in a linguistic context but rather consider it in a broader 
sense. Philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche ([1873] 1999) 
and Jacques Derrida (1982) point critically at the metaphor­
ical character of all concept formation and of metaphysics in 
particular, while others, such as Paul Ricoeur,  understand 
metaphor more positively in terms of our abilities to see things 
anew making use of imagination. In The Rule of Metaphor (1977), 
Ricoeur draws together insights from Kantian philosophy, notably 
the notion of productive imagination, and linguistic philosophy 
(i.e., the ideas of structuralists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, 
Émile Benveniste, Roman Jakobson, but also of the father of 
analytical philosophy, Gottlob Frege), in order to describe 
metaphor as the stimulus of change in both the linguistic and 
ontological or existential field. Metaphor for Ricoeur makes us see 
things differently, because of its transformative aspect, which 
at once disturbs the logical order while begetting it in a new 
form. Living, as opposed to dead, metaphors cannot be simply 
translated into existing terms; understanding them requires a 
novel way of perceiving reality. As such they create new reality. 
Metaphors, in other words, pertain to sameness and difference, 
they refer to reality while at the same time redescribing it.
Derrida in “White Mythology” (1982) uses this ambiguous 
character of the metaphor to critique philosophy, while at the 
same time affirming it. He relates metaphor to philosophy itself, 
claiming that philosophy is nothing more than a process of 
metaphorisation. Philosophy, he writes in a Nietzschean fashion, 
aims at a ruling metaphor, at similarity, and in its deepest dreams 
at reducing all significations to a principal, fundamental, or cen­
tral metaphor. But metaphoricity in itself implies multiplicity, 
and philosophy expresses itself in texts, which implies that 
meaning can never be exhausted. He detects two trajectories in 
philosophy, that he both calls self­destructive and that are closely 
81related: One is the metaphysical sublation of the metaphor into 
the proper sense of being in which metaphor implies a detour 
and loss of meaning, but one in which the literal, proper sense 
can be appropriated in the end (Derrida 1982, 270). In the other, 
the opposition between metaphoricity and the proper itself is 
set aside, an opposition foundational for metaphysics. Thereby 
metaphysics in the end sublates itself. 
Since metaphor in the analytical and continental tradition of 
philosophy is already described in detail in other sources (e.g., 
Hills 2012; Theodorou), here we can further concentrate on the 
notion of metaphor as influential in critical forms of theory, 
notably in psychoanalysis and feminist theory. Jacques Lacan 
famously introduced the notion of metaphor, in distinction to 
metonymy, to reinterpret the central workings of the Freudian 
unconscious. Both notions play an important role in the French 
psychoanalytically inspired feminist theories, such as Julia 
Kristeva’s and Luce Irigaray’s. The latter is especially critical of 
Lacan’s use of metaphor and develops notions such as the “two 
lips” and “the mucous” with the aim of rewriting and recreating 
the symbolic. These notions are either interpreted as metonymic 
(Whitford 1991, 180) or as subverting the binary metonymy/
metaphor (Fuss 1990; Joy 2013).
Lacan introduced the notion of metaphor in his rereading of 
the processes of repression and displacement, both of which 
are for Freud the basic functions of the unconscious. As is well 
known for Lacan Freud’s discovery anticipates modern linguistics 
(Lacan 2006, 578). He uncovers a relation between the laws 
governing the unconscious and the laws of the signifier: repres­
sion is related to metaphor, and displacement to metonymy. He 
thereby draws upon Jakobson’s distinction between selection and 
combination, which in itself is a reinterpretation of a similar dis­
tinction made by de Saussure, and was related to Freud already 
by Jakobson himself. Lacan reorders the terms: metonymy cor­
responds to Jakobson’s “combination,” that is, it relates two terms 
in presentia. Metaphor, in contrast, relates two or more terms 
82 in absentia. Lacan defines the two terms as follows: Metonymy 
indicates “that it is the signifier­to­signifier connection that allows 
for the elision by which the signifier instates lack of being in the 
object­relation, using signification’s referral value to invest it 
with the desire aiming at the lack that it supports” (Lacan 2006, 
428). Metonymy, therefore, refers to the replacement of one term 
for another: it defers meaning, but in itself cannot explain the 
process of a sign gaining meaning. Lacan follows de Saussure in 
understanding language as not referring to reality but rather as 
a system in which there are no positive terms, only differences 
between signs. Metonymy thus characterizes the process of 
signification in language.
Yet, on the basis of metonymy alone language would not have 
any meaning: every sign would be replaced by another, in a con­
tinuous process. Metaphor for Lacan is then – surprisingly, and 
according to some inconsistently – the mechanism that explains 
the creation of a specific meaning. Metaphor indicates “that it 
is in the substitution of signifier for signifier that a signification 
effect is produced that is poetic or creative, in other words, 
that brings the signification in question into existence” (429). 
Metaphor refers to the process of substitution between signifiers 
that in themselves do not have a fixed, “natural” meaning. It 
forms, in other words, a momentary stop in the incessant gliding 
of signifiers, but a stop that is always unexpected and not predes­
tined in the signifier.
Although critical of Lacan, the notions of metaphor and 
metonymy in French feminist philosophy come to play a part in 
the context of rewriting the (phallic) symbolic in order to create 
more possibilities for women to articulate their subjectivity. 
Irigaray’s strategy of mimesis, for instance, in her early works, 
that aim at subversion of the phallogocentric discourse, can be 
seen as a metonymic strategy. Figurations named above, such as 
the two lips and the mucous, are part of this mimetic strategy. 
Irigaray herself writes that mimesis includes copying “anything 
at all, anyone at all, … receiv[ing] all impressions, without 
83appropriating them to oneself, and without adding any” (Irigaray 
1985, 151). Margaret Whitford accordingly interprets Irigaray’s 
philosophy as rejecting metaphor, because it fixes and puts the 
signifying process to a halt, while metonymy “allows for process” 
(Whitford 1991, 180). Irigaray, in Whitford’s interpretation,  
would suggest a maternal genealogy based upon metonymic 
identification, instead of the paternal (Lacanian) genealogy 
based upon paternal metaphorization. Morny Joy, in contrast, 
names Irigaray’s strategy one of displacement of the metonymy/
metaphor scheme. Irigaray, instead of alluding to metonymy, 
would aim at metamorphosis. Her new verbalizations of the 
female body “realign the terms of reference regarding sameness 
and otherness” ( Joy 2013, 78). Yet, as Judith Butler writes in Bodies 
That Matter, one can also ask whether Irigaray’s strategy does 
not lead to a renewed consolidation of the place of the feminine, 
albeit as “the irruptive chora, that which cannot be figured, but 
which is necessary for any figuration” (Butler 1993, 48). Does the 
feminine in this interpretation not figure as the nonidentical, 
and is it not miming the excluding violence of the phallogocen­
tric discourse, repeating it once again? Read as such, Irigaray’s 
strategy would remain close to Lacan’s metaphorization. On 
the other hand, however, naming the nonidentical metaphor­
ically, identifying it as that which cannot be figured (“a volume 
without contours,” as Irigaray writes in Speculum), seems to blow 
up the entire process of metaphorization in itself. The critical 
engagements with metaphor in feminist theory as such continue 
its operations.
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Parrhesia
Kári Driscoll 
Red Peter, the protagonist of Franz Kafka’s “A Report for an 
Academy” has been summoned by the titular learned society to 
give an account of himself, or rather of his “previous life as an 
ape [äffisches Vorleben]” (Kafka 2007, 76). As he is quick to point 
out to the “esteemed gentlemen,” however, it is also their, i.e., 
mankind’s, simian prehistory: 
To speak frankly [offen gesprochen], as much as I like to 
employ figurative images for these things, to speak frankly 
[offen]: Your apedom [Affentum], gentlemen, to the extent 
that you have something of the sort behind you, cannot be 
more remote from you than mine is from me. (77) 
Whereas Red Peter had described his transition from ape to 
man in the form of an elaborate, extended metaphor of human 
evolution as a horserace, now that he has reached the finish line, 
so to speak, it is important to speak frankly, lest the assembled 
scholars abrogate his hard­won post­simian status. In order 
to justify his inability to acquiesce to the Academy’s request, 
he thus explicitly sets aside metaphor, and hence rhetorical 
embellishment, and instead stylises himself as someone who can 
– is able and permitted to – speak frankly or openly.
Red Peter is thus making use of parrhesia, the ancient Greek 
practice of frank speech, whereby the speaker, addressing an 
86 authority figure, issues a critique in the form of the unadorned 
truth about himself or another, at significant personal risk. 
Because the parrhesiastes is always in an inferior position to 
his interlocutor, who may be hurt or angered by the truth, 
parrhesia must be predicated on a sort of agreement or “con­
tract,” whereby the sovereign, “who has power but lacks the 
truth” (Foucault 2001, 32), promises not to punish the speaker, 
who does not, strictly speaking, have the authority to speak 
the truth with impunity, unless the sovereign grants it to him. 
There is always a risk that the sovereign will renege on this 
agreement, however, in which case he reveals himself to be a 
tyrant. Parrhesia is thus always a “game” (17) between the one 
who speaks the truth and the one who has the power to punish. 
Hence, in the most extreme case, parrhesia is a “‘game’ of life 
or death” (16). Thus, although parrhesia is cast as antithetical to 
rhetorical persuasion (12), and Red Peter constantly disavows any 
rhetorical embellishment in his speech, the report is rhetorical 
through and through, precisely in the way in which it establishes 
the speaker as a subject and demands that the sovereign body to 
whom the report is addressed recognise him as such. This per­
formative aspect of this parrhesiastic contract is clearly evident 
when Red Peter, following his demurral, begins the account of 
his transition from ape to man by recalling his first lesson: “The 
first thing that I learned was to shake hands; the handshake 
signifies openness [Offenheit]. Now, today, at the high point of 
my career, let frank speech [das offene Wort] be coupled with 
that first handshake” (Kafka 2007, 77). The emphatic repetition 
of “offen” finds an echo in the ascription of “Affentum” to the 
gentlemen of the Academy – a phonetic contagion that recurs 
thematically later on when Red Peter mentions, as an aside, that 
one of his first teachers had become apelike even as he himself 
was learning to become human (83). Thus, Red Peter’s transition 
from animal to human is figured by a vocalic shift from A to O, 
“Affentum” to “Offenheit,” but in laying claim to openness in this 
privileged sense, his ape(n)ness (animality) begins to haunt the 
text, attaching itself metaphorically to everyone else: from the 
87members of the Academy, whose “apedom” Red Peter invokes in 
his own defence, to the “monkey” who gave him his “repulsive” 
name (78), and the hack journalist [Windhund, lit. whippet] who 
had dared to question whether Red Peter’s “ape­nature” is truly 
fully “suppressed” (78), citing the latter’s habit of pulling down his 
trousers to reveal the wound he suffered during his capture. The 
parrhesiastes not only tells the truth about himself and others, 
he also shows himself “in his natural nakedness” (Foucault 2010, 
287). This nakedness is linked to a valorisation of animality, 
which is “taken up as a challenge, practiced as an exercise, and 
thrown in the face of others as a scandal” (Foucault 2011, 265). In 
exposing himself, the parrhesiastes challenges others to do the 
same, and to consider their own relationship to the truth. In the 
case of Red Peter, this is especially evident in his insistence that “I 
have the right to lower my pants in front of anyone I like; there is 
nothing to see there … Everything is open and above board; there 
is nothing to hide; where it is a question of truth, every large­
minded person casts off the fanciest manners” (Kafka 2007, 78).
Etymologically, parrhesia derives from pan, meaning “everything” 
and rhema or rhesis, “word, statement, or utterance,” and means 
“to say everything.” Hence, the parrhesiastes is “someone who 
says everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but 
opens his heart and mind completely to other people through his 
discourse … The word parrhesia, then, refers to a type of relation­
ship between the speaker and what he says” (Foucault 2001, 12). 
This relationship is characterised by a series of correspondences, 
first and foremost between the speaker’s life (bios) and his words 
(logos). Parrhesia is thus linked to the art of living and the care 
of the self, of constructing a “straight life” (Foucault 2011, 265) 
or bios philosophikos in which bios is in complete harmony with 
logos – almost to the point of the radical honesty and openness 
attributed to the non­linguistic animal, which “conceals nothing 
and at every instant appears wholly as what it is” (Nietzsche 
1997, 61). In the context of Red Peter’s report, it is interesting 
to note that the first element in the word parrhesia, i.e., pan 
88 (“everything”), is also the name of the Greek god of nature, Pan, 
who is typically depicted as half­human, half­beast, and it is for 
this reason that “Pan” is also the name of the taxonomic genus 
that includes chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan 
paniscus) (see Tyler 2006). Hence, given the taxonomic confusion 
at work in Kafka’s text, one might be so bold as to read parrhesia 
(Pan­rhesis) as “chimp­speak.” This is particularly important given 
the link between parrhesia as self­care and as a response to the 
Delphic imperative to “know thyself” – which, as Giorgio Agamben 
notes, was the original species marker for man in Linnaeus’s Sys-
tema naturae. The “knowledge” implied in Homo sapiens is thus a 
veiled imperative: “man is the animal that must recognize itself as 
human to be human” (Agamben 2004, 26). In asking the members 
of the Academy to recognise him as one of their own, Red Peter 
effectively hijacks the “anthropological machine” – which is a 
device for producing the recognition of the human through the 
inclusionary exclusion of the animal (33–38).
Parrhesia forms a nexus for the three fundamental axes of 
Foucault’s philosophical endeavour, namely truth, power, and 
the subject. Furthermore, it stands at the root of the “critical 
tradition” (Foucault 2001, 170), precisely because it calls the sub­
ject into question, and, in this respect, represents one of the 
arts of “not being governed quite so much” which Foucault (2007, 
29) defines as the basic gesture of the critical attitude (45). This 
is linked to “virtue” (43) – telling the truth, about oneself and 
about others, and specifically having the courage to position 
oneself as someone who tells the truth, is a virtuous (and in this 
sense critical) act of “desubjugation” (47), which does not imply 
total freedom from any coercion, but rather a critical re­assess­
ment of the fundamental question of what I can become, given 
the “contemporary order of being” (Butler 2005, 30). This is why 
Red Peter is so adamant about the critical distinction between 
“freedom” and a “way out” (Kafka 2007, 79–80): in seeking a “way 
out” of his confinement, the best he can hope for is not to be 
governed “like that, not for that, not by them” etc. (Foucault 2007, 
8944). In this sense, parrhesia represents a critical repositioning or 
reconstitution of the self within the reigning discourse of power, 
which, in turn calls that discourse into question. Hence, parrhesia 
involves “problematisation” (Foucault 2001, 170), and, conversely, 
new opportunities for frank speech become available in moments 
of crisis, when certain forms of knowledge/power/subjectivity 
have become problematic, as was the case with the category of 
the human as the zoon logon echon at the time when Kafka wrote 
this text. In having Red Peter assert his ability and right to speak 
openly, the text in turn opens up an indeterminacy about who 
can speak in the first place – an indeterminacy which is of course 
inherent in the very history of parrhesia, since the freedom of 
speech it originally granted applied only to natural born male 
citizens; not women, children, immigrants, and certainly not 
animals. This is why it is impossible to separate parrhesia from 
rhetoric and performativity, since in claiming the right to speak 
freely, one presupposes the ability to speak and be heard, and, 
what is more, one obliges, by means of the parrhesiastic contract, 
the sovereign (in this case, man), to listen. The “risk” thus reveals 
the inherent precarity of everyone’s right to speech – not only 
that of the parrhesiastes, the “beast,” but that of the sovereign as 
well. 
References
Agamben, Giorgio. 2004. The Open: Man and Animal. Translated by Kevin Attell. Stan­
ford: Stanford University Press.
Butler, Judith. 2005. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University 
Press.
Foucault, Michel. 2001. Fearless Speech. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e).
Foucault, Michel. 2007. “What Is Critique?”, translated by Lysa Hochroth. In The Pol-
itics of Truth, edited by Sylvère Lotringer, 23–81. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Foucault, Michel. 2010. The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1982–1983. Edited by Frédéric Gros and translated by Graham Burchell. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Foucault, Michel. 2011. The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1983–1984. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by 
Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
90 Kafka, Franz. 2007. Kafka’s Selected Stories. Translated and edited by Stanley 
Corngold. New York: W. W. Norton.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1997. Untimely Meditations. Edited by Daniel Breazeale. Trans­
lated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tyler, Tom. 2006. “Four Hands Good, Two Hands Bad.” Parallax 12 (1): 69–80.
Perspective
Esther Peeren
What is the perspective of critique? This question not only asks 
from what perspective (point of view or standpoint) practices 
of critique are developed, but also what perspective (outlook 
or prospect) such practices offer. The Kantian notion of critique 
saw it emerging from an externalized, superior view presumed 
to be universal and comprehensive, and offering disinterested 
judgment. In today’s condition of global entanglement – “being 
twisted together or entwined, involved with” (Nuttall 2009, 1) – 
the claims to completeness and objectivity that inhere in this 
notion of critique are more problematic than ever. At the same 
time, concluding that such entanglement renders perspective 
as a particularized point of view or standpoint irrelevant and 
perspective as outlook or prospect impossible would play into 
neoliberal discourses that present globalization as an ungras­
pable process for the excesses of which no responsibility can be 
assigned and to which there is no alternative.
While perspective as point of view or standpoint remains rele­
vant to mark the embodied situatedness of critique, it needs 
to be redefined from a stable point of view that preexists and 
remains separate from what it perceives to something dynamic 
that enters into a reciprocal relationship with what it perceives 
and is therefore subject to constant feedback and re­vision. As 
outlook or prospect, moreover, it should be seen as speculative 
92 and open rather than as offering a determinate vision of what 
will be. No perspective can oversee global entanglement to 
obtain a full, independent picture of its present status or future, 
but at the same time global entanglement is not undifferentiated. 
There are perspectives of entanglement – human and nonhuman 
– that mark differences, distances, possibilities, and tensions 
within it. Perspective also shifts as soon as matters move and is 
always multiple: global entanglement appears differently from 
the Global South than from the Global North, even if these per­
spectives only emerge in their “intra­action” (Barad 2007, 33).  
A text that marks the importance of acknowledging differences in 
perspective as catalysts for immanent critique in a particularly 
clear and forceful manner is Virginia Woolf’s epistolary essay 
Three Guineas (1938), which stages a feminist, pacifist, and (to 
some extent) anti­colonial intervention in the context of the 
unfolding Spanish Civil War and the looming threat of German 
and Italian fascism. Woolf begins by insisting to her interlocutor, 
introduced as “an educated man” who had written her asking 
for a donation to help prevent war, that “though we look at the 
same things, we see them differently” (Woolf 1996, 109 and 
111). This statement, which summarily rejects the possibility 
of absolute judgment or complete consensus, resonates with 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s phenomenological contention that, because 
two people cannot be situated in exactly the same place at the 
same time, “there are as many different worlds of the event as 
there are individual centers of answerability, i.e., unique par­
ticipative (unindifferent) selves” (Bakhtin 1993, 45). At the same 
time, it ties these worlds or “faces” of the event (45) to collective 
social positions, which Woolf proceeds to elaborate in terms of 
structural gender inequality. 
Thus, she has the “educated man’s daughter,” having obtained 
her own income (“the sacred coin”), ask herself: “What shall I do 
with it? What do I see with it?” (Woolf 1996, 123). In answering 
this question – “Through that light we may guess everything she 
saw looked different” (111) – Woolf initially envisions perspective 
93as something separate from the eye, interfering with what it 
registers. However, the rest of “Three Guineas,” especially in its 
recurring references to several photographs she has received 
portraying dead bodies from the Spanish Civil War, suggests 
that it is not a question of choosing or being made to see the 
world through a certain light that is, as it were, added onto a 
universal way of seeing. Instead, it is a question of one’s way of 
seeing emerging as a particular light on the world due to one’s 
entanglement in gender, class, and colonial relations. Such a 
perspective can be expressed and brought into negotiation with 
other perspectives, but it cannot simply be transferred or relin­
quished. In Bakhtin’s terms, since it emerges from an active par­
ticipation in “Being­as­event,” one is bound to this perspective by 
a fundamental answerability or “non-alibi-in-Being” (Bakhtin 1993, 
31 and 40). It is, then, not merely that everything looks different to 
the educated man’s daughter after she secures “the sacred coin,” 
but that, as an educated man’s daughter, she already participated 
in and thus saw the world differently from others.
When Woolf first describes the Spanish Civil War photographs 
(which, significantly, are not reproduced in the text), she notes 
that “photographs, of course, are not arguments addressed to 
the reason; they are simply statements of fact addressed to the 
eye” (Woolf 1996, 117). She continues to detail how, when looking 
at the photographs, via the physiological trajectory that connects 
eye to brain to nervous system, “some fusion takes place within 
us; however different the education, the traditions behind us, our 
sensations are the same; and they are violent” (118). Four aspects, 
however, immediately disrupt the alleged facticity of the photo­
graphs and their supposedly unitary and unifying interpretation 
through the universally shared physiology of human sight. First, 
the rhetorical overkill of the interjection “of course,” more than 
confirming the validity of Woolf’s statement, incites the reader to 
question it. Second, her remark that it is the Spanish Government 
that sends these photographs “with patient pertinacity about 
twice a week” invests them with a particular, partial perspective 
94 on – or “face” of – the Civil War (117). Third, the speculative 
description of one of the photographs – “This morning’s collection 
contains the photograph of what might be a man’s body, or a 
woman’s; it is so mutilated that it might, on the other hand, be 
the body of a pig” (117, emphasis added) – installs doubt as to 
photography’s objective nature. Finally, there is the formulation 
of the last sentence of the photographs’ first textual appearance: 
“For now at last we are looking at the same picture; we are seeing 
with you the same dead bodies, the same ruined houses” (118). 
This makes explicit the temporal dimension that inhabits the 
fusion of perspectives that is said to take place; seeing the same 
thing in a photograph is not a self­evident consequence of the 
medium, but an interpretative process involving the echoing of 
the other’s words whose end­point – “at last” – is unstable – “for 
now.”
The fusion that is really a delayed echoing of another’s per­
spective becomes subject to fission – splitting – as alternative 
connections are “brought out” between the dead, mutilated 
bodies in the photographs and the “prostituted culture and 
intellectual slavery” (213) of women. These connections are not 
visibly present in the photographs, but emerge as a result of a 
sustained engagement between them and the perspective or 
“face” brought to bear on it. Illuminated by the light of Woolf’s 
way of seeing as an educated man’s daughter, the photographs 
are made to show more than they previously did and become 
critical tools, no longer statements of fact, but openings for dis­
cussion and dissent. 
Accordingly, the final appearance of the Spanish Civil War photo­
graph with the dead bodies reveals it as no longer showing the 
same: “as this letter has gone on, adding fact to fact, another 
picture has imposed itself upon the foreground” (266). The dead 
bodies and ruined houses have been superimposed by “the 
figure of a man” or even “Man himself” – “called in German and 
Italian Führer or Duce; in our own language Tyrant or Dictator” 
(266). The connections unearthed by looking at the world from 
95the perspective of the daughters of educated men, a perspective 
that claims difference and validity, materialize in the photograph, 
which now “suggests” (a notably nonfactual term) “that we are 
not passive spectators doomed to unresisting obedience but 
by our thoughts and actions can ourselves change that figure. A 
common interest unites us; it is one world, one life. How essential 
it is that we should realize that unity the dead bodies, the ruined 
houses prove” (267).  
There is indeed a common interest, but this interest is not served 
by the fusion of perspectives or by an insistence on the photo­
graph’s unequivocal factuality. As Woolf notes, “opinions differ” 
on the man (Hitler? Mussolini?) who has invaded the pictorial 
plane and she only has her addressee’s letter “to prove that to 
you the picture is the picture of evil” (267, emphasis added). Even 
if they could agree that what the photograph shows is indeed evil 
and that this evil must be destroyed, their ways of going about 
this may be – must be – different, as they arrive at their critical 
perspective (as point of view or standpoint) and at the per­
spective (as outlook or prospect) it yields with regard to how to 
prevent war in the future from differently situated entanglements 
that also make them answerable in divergent ways.
This brief reading of “Three Guineas” shows how accepting 
that “critique is always of the world, it is always situated and 
expressed from within worldly engagements – and as such also 
always itself an expression of the world” (Kaiser, Thiele, and Bunz 
2014) does not do away with the question of the perspective of 
critique, but makes it more urgent. Critique is an expression of 
the world, yet emerges from a particular position and moment 
within this world’s becoming. Recognizing, with Bakhtin, that the 
events through which this becoming unfolds always have many 
“faces” that may yield different critiques and answerabilities 
is imperative, especially as it has become clear that even in a 
world widely recognized as globally entangled, certain of these 
“faces” continue to be privileged and dominant, while others are 
obscured, overlooked, or disavowed.  
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Plastic/ity
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor
In an essay entitled “Plastic,” appearing in his seminal collection, 
Mythologies (1957), cultural philosopher Roland Barthes takes 
a hard look at what he presciently recognizes as the visible 
form of the modern death drive: plastic. This bold claim might 
seem incommensurate with both the brevity of his essay 
(barely four pages) and with its celebratory, even triumphalist 
tone. But irony lies just below the rhetorical surface. Barthes’s 
essay is at once a celebration and a condemnation of this 
artificial material, invented a century before, but suitable for 
use as a consumer product material only after World War II. 
By the mid­1950s the petroleum, chemical, and manufacturing 
industries, foreseeing unprecedented profits, promoted plastic 
as the signature material of modernity, and enlisted the genius 
of the bourgeoning advertising industry to tell the story of this 
remarkably versatile, durable, “miraculous” substance (Barthes 
1957, 193). 
This story, as much as the substance itself, is Barthes’s subject: 
the myth, in short, of plastic. It is at once an origin myth of a 
consumer imperium, and a cultural myth of manifest destiny. 
The philosopher’s interest in “mythologies” resides, however, in 
the way such narratives disguise a barer reality. Obscured by the 
symbolic economy of a “plasticized” (195) world of consumers, 
buoyed by innovation and so­called convenience, Barthes sees a 
98 toxic underside: a world of users with an instrumentalist attitude 
toward other human beings, toward nature, toward life itself. 
It is not just the aesthetics of plastic that Barthes rejects. While 
he clearly does dislike things made of plastic – cheap, lifeless, 
fake copies of things once made with natural material – at stake 
is clearly something more abstract: the “conceptual matter” of 
plastic, which is to say the plasticity, of the individual and the 
social mind, in the post­war, modern age. Barthes apprehends 
that plastic and plasticity can reveal a great deal about freedom 
and unfreedom in a modern mass culture. Intending, as he says, 
to “live to the full the contradiction of my time” (xii), Barthes’s 
examination of plastic as at once miraculous and utterly banal 
is exemplary of “myth today,” which will always, upon scrutiny, 
“give the lie” to ideological rhetoric. Acknowledging there is no 
complete escape from ideology, Barthes can at least hold out his 
project as a kind of embodied critique. 
Fifty years on, philosopher Catherine Malabou is producing a 
series of studies concerning plasticity grounded in her earliest 
work on Hegel. Her research into neuroplasticity is laid out in 
What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2004) and its sequel, Ontology 
of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity (2009). Malabou 
rarely speaks of plastic products per se, with the exception of 
the explosive plastique, as a counter­figure to plastic’s flexibility. 
In her essay “The Living Room: Plasticity and Hospitality” (2013), 
though, she does point toward the “range of meanings” the words 
plasticity and plastic can embrace, including “all the various 
forms of ‘plastic’ in our world [from the ‘plastic arts’ to plastic 
wood, plastic money, plastic explosives]” (n.p.). She acknowledges 
Barthes’s warning that “plastic’s ability to become anything at all 
may reduce anything to nothing by dissolving all differences…. 
Because plastic never presents itself without form, plastic is 
always thought as a factor of identification, standardisation, glob­
alisation, and never as a possible welcome of the other” (n.p.). 
Both philosophers see in the unique materiality of plastic a visual 
metaphor for the ontological paradox of plasticity. While of 
99different generations in French philosophical thought, Barthes 
and Malabou face a common enemy: late­capitalist universalism. 
This universalism realizes itself through replication of the same, 
rather than through (re)production of the same with­a­difference 
(in Kantian terms, the difference between a reproductive and 
productive imagination). Malabou also follows Barthes in 
associating plastic’s economic and political dimensions to a 
certain form of corporatized aesthetic, expressed in the “goods” 
of the market, and in the market’s drive for “more and better” 
(Atwood 2003, 296). More and better stuff engendering more 
and better consumers is the contemporary dream of a consumer 
utopia – its microcosm materialized in each and every super­
market (the bigger and cheaper, the better). All this Barthes dis­
cerns already in his essay’s closing remarks, which posit that “the 
world” of nonhuman things, including the domain of nature, “can 
be plasticized” (Barthes 2011, 195); speaking of more and better, 
“even life itself” (195), with the invention, in the 1950s, of plastic 
aortas. A world with a hard plastic heart.
Barthes’s description of plastic’s mythic vitality and “quick­
change talent” (194) heralds Jane Bennett’s characterization of 
“the enchantment of modern life” (Bennett 2010, xi–xii). Barthes 
would have understood Bennett’s emphasis on the power of such 
“enchantment” to turn us in two directions: “The first toward the 
humans who feel enchanted and whose agentic capacities may be 
thereby strengthened” (Bennett, xii). Think of the powerful pull 
of “pride of ownership” among owners of luxury products (even 
plastic ones). Luxury consumers or not, the urge for owning the 
latest model, the valuing of novelty and replacement is part of the 
magic. Here is Barthes: 
Thus, more than a substance, plastic is the very idea of 
its infinite transformation…. Plastic remains completely 
impregnated by this astonishment: it is less an object than 
the trace of a movement. And since this movement is here 
virtually infinite … plastic is, ultimately, a spectacle to be 
deciphered. (1957, 193) 
100 The “idea of [plastic’s] infinite transformation” (193) is our 
enchantment with ourselves, astonished by our capacity to trans­
form, as if alchemically, the natural into the manmade. Barthes 
illuminates, over fifty years before Bennett, the entanglement of 
what Bennett calls “fantasies of a human uniqueness … of escape 
from materiality, or of mastery of nature” with a “philosophical 
project of naming where subjectivity begins and ends” (Bennett, 
ix). The second direction Bennett indicates is “toward the agency 
of the things that produce (helpful, harmful) effects in human and 
other bodies” (xii). The overall pessimism of “Plastic” and one or 
two related Mythologies pieces may derive from Barthes’s under­
developed notion of material agency, which both Malabou and 
Bennett strive to provide. Without a notion of material agency, 
where can Barthes look for hope that our culture would get past 
the specter of modernity’s instrumentalized usage of the earth, 
its universal dis­regard of the nonhuman? Wherein would lie an 
elemental force of critique, beyond mere words?
Malabou theorizes being itself – life – as plastic. This may sound 
metaphorical but it is not. Malabou’s philosophical project 
materializes the vital agency of “gray matter” in its resistance to 
negative plasticity – that is, of hardened forms. Neuroscience 
reveals the brain’s positive plasticity in its capacity for repair and 
resiliency. Neuroplasticity means, Malabou can claim without 
irony, that plasticity is life. Brain plasticity and the faculty of 
imagination must be co­constitutive; hospitality, the welcoming 
of the other, depends upon both. With the advantage of science 
that Barthes did not have, Malabou elucidates his ironical 
presentation of the “alchemical” (thus magical, mystical, myth­
ical) essence of plastic/ity as the idea of transformation. Because 
the concept of plasticity embraces the work of making meaning 
(in the process of taking form) and of resisting meaning (in the 
potentiality for deforming, reforming), Malabou locates firmer 
ground for critique. Plasticity does not motivate but does allow 
for, make space for, criticality. 
101Barthes’s language of magic and myth metaphorizes what 
Malabou would make as literal as possible: the paradox of plas­
ticity as at once informing and deforming, as well as reforming 
and transforming. Recognizing the social dimension of this 
analysis of plasticity, Malabou can address cultural remediation 
quite specifically, throwing down “the plastic challenge” (2004, 
82) in contemporary terms. Her work thus extends Barthes’ 
sublimated perceptions of a plastic future that is not a capitalist 
caricature of utopia, or any other vision of a perfect(ed) and thus 
permanent ideological hegemony. This is not what our brain 
wants. “Between the upsurge and the explosion of form, sub­
jectivity issues the plastic challenge,” Malabou says, “to do what 
they undoubtedly have never done: construct and entertain a relation 
with their brain as the image of a world to come” (82, emphasis 
added). Nor is it, Bennett proposes, what “the world” wants. “The 
world” – or matter – has agency as well, a vitalism that resists 
humanity’s “earth­destroying fantasies of conquest and con­
sumption” (2010, ix), which is so blatantly figured in our toxic love 
affair with plastic (Freinkel 2011). 
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Play
Sybrandt van Keulen
What does it take to apprehend how playing goes? Playing games 
seems to be about the only way to find out how even language 
games go, yet it is a mistake to think that the dynamics of 
inventing and performing play can be understood purely through 
doing games. Moreover, philosophy of play is anything but game 
theory. 
Immanuel Kant’s famous conception of play might function as 
an opening gambit. Distancing himself from the tradition of the 
je ne sais quoi, a tradition emerging from Gottfried W. Leibniz’s 
Monadology and revolving around the epistemological status of 
so­called confused perceptions and ideas (see also Kaiser 2011, 
17), Kant argues the following: Although it is not of the order of 
knowing what sets our powers of cognition into play, the related 
state of mind has everything to do with an undeniable “feeling of 
life” (Lebensgefühl; Kant 2000, § 1). To understand how this force 
touches us, we should not so much heed what exactly affects us 
but rather perceive that this “élan” (Belebung; § 9) is an effect of 
a particular “relation between those powers to each other” (§ 
9). With this “free play of the powers of representation” (§ 9) a 
specific reciprocal relationship is meant: a relationship in which 
powers are brought to swing and thus play with each other. 
104 To be able to weigh Kant’s words “free” and “power,” it should be 
pointed out that we are not dealing in any case with a power­free 
relationship. However, the way those powers or forces inter­
act with each other could be called free of domination, with the 
specification that “free” does not mean an absence but rather 
a certain dynamical distribution of dominance: None of those 
powers should dominate in a static, autocratic sense; they are 
engaged in a complex drama and, until the final showdown, so to 
speak, they should remain evenly matched. This implies that the 
particular feeling the action of playing brings about is intertwined 
with duration, that it is not similar to an immediate affect, more­
over, that it is not controlled by any particular instant profit. It 
may be noted that the energy that nourishes the playful élan for 
a significant extent, is drawn from the deferral of a final closure. 
One could speak of a successfully executed process of unbalance 
and rebalance, as long as pleasure lingers.
Now I have touched upon some dynamical aspects of playing, 
attention could be given to a few characteristics of the force that 
sets up the playground. In one way or another we talk about a 
force that establishes the necessary confines to let that specific 
élan happen, or which operates as supervisory authority of con­
stitutive contours. In this respect the words “free” and “power” 
acquire their full meaning. In Kantian parlance the idea of a 
well­tempered free play can only take place within the limits of 
an arena carefully designed by the supervisory power of reason. 
This Kantian use of “free” comes close to the English meaning of 
“fair”: free from self­interest, prejudice, or favoritism (Merriam­
Webster dictionary). 
Free play and the limiting force of reason are two sides of the 
same coin. According to Kant playing any game can only be 
pleasurable – that is, rewarding in the lively activity itself – if 
the intended relationship is not determined by any partiality. 
The implied supervision of reason resides in her assumed 
exclusive arbitral power to keep the actions of the playing parties 
within required limits. This could be called the condition of 
105unconditionality, with reason as its sole superintendent. Free 
play has to do with a state of affairs that cannot be effectuated in 
one go, which is perhaps why reason cannot do anything else but 
meticulously repeat itself in her limitative activity. However, play 
equals the sense of going on without end, animation forever. 
Kant has a keen eye for a variety of powers, such as intuition, 
productive imagination, and spirit (Geist, esprit), producing the 
wealth of life, yet he also strongly suggests that he is terrified 
of those powers embodied in one source named genius that 
sets free a poetico­metaphorical overabundance; a confusing 
waver, perhaps for Kant’s feeling even potentially a threatening 
power – like a swarm of bees – that requires censorship and 
containment. As soon as the reasonable Self fears no longer 
being able to maintain his lofty arbitral position, being as it 
appears overwhelmingly surrounded by at least equally powerful 
forces, the sharing game needs to end. The power of genius 
turns out to give Kant the impression of a dangerous, because 
unsubduable, anarchistic source of “lawless freedom, nothing 
but nonsense”; it therefore should be brought “in line with the 
understanding” by “clipping its wings and making it well behaved 
or polished”; hence, “if anything must be sacrificed in the con­
flict of the two properties in one product, it must rather be on 
the side of genius” (§ 50). In the end genius seems to impel the 
fellow player from before, so­called understanding (with the 
power of reason in the background, because the collaboration 
of understanding and reason goes per definition without play) 
to a unilateral, eliminatory intervention. That is to say, a crucial 
proof of incapacity with regard to the power of reason seems to 
be that reason itself is unable to take part in a reciprocal, playful 
relationship without end or purpose. Playing according the rules 
of reason – so the command seems – and not playing with them. 
Gradually framed by reason’s drive for mastery, the character 
or persona called genius is endowed with a subordinate role in a 
logocentric configuration – finally genius is stripped of any access 
(which is an excess in Kant’s perspective) to political ruling power. 
106 To what end? What else could there be in and beyond the game of 
reason? 
Michel Foucault’s analysis of the agonistic structure of the clas­
sical Greek erotics of the fourth century B.C.E. provide the terms 
required to problematize the consequences outlined above. 
Foucault’s aim is not forging universally valid imperatives in 
order to curtail efflorescent unilateral power, he rather wants 
to provide an understanding of the stakes of “the purposeful 
art of a freedom perceived as a power game” (1990, 253). The 
complexity of this game is based on the reciprocal dynamics of 
an “elliptical configuration” (203) comprising two parties that 
are both becoming the centers of a “possible conversion – an 
ethically necessary and socially useful one – of the bond of love 
(doomed to disappear) into a relation of friendship, of philia” 
(201). The purpose of this rocking game seems apparently not 
a state of dominance of one party over the other but rather a 
permanent exercise in self­mastery combined with a certain 
care for the other. The principle of regulation should be sought 
in the relation itself, in “a sharing of thoughts and existence, 
mutual benevolence,” culminating in “cultivation of indestructible 
friendship” (201). The point at issue can clearly be understood as 
critical towards the Kantian framework of reason, because it is 
not “… the sense of measure that one brings to one’s own power, 
but the best way to measure one’s strength against the power of 
others while ensuring one’s own mastery over oneself …” (212). 
Foucault’s findings imply a critical stance in particular with regard 
to Kant’s unilateral view on political power: In Foucault’s mind 
good governance up to the highest level should take the shape of 
elliptical relationships. 
As appealing Foucault’s ideal of indestructible friendship might 
be, it is at the same time only a fraction less problematic as Kant’s 
lofty game of reason. In order to understand any friendship as 
deconstructable, two questions of Derrida in his reading of Kant 
– also with regard to the consensus between reason and genius I 
already referred to above – seem relevant: 
107What can deeply bind the two opposing parties and procure 
for them a neutral ground of reconciliation for speaking 
together again in a fitting tone? In other words, what do they 
together exclude as the inadmissible itself? (Derrida 1999, 
142).
In the case of the Greek friendship the inadmissible is evidently 
feminine: women did not have access to political govern­
ance. Yet in order to preserve the value of the notion of “con­
figuration,” this binding structure could be critically understood 
as a relationship without one end, referring to both hetero­ and 
homosexual relations, and relations from another nature, yet 
unknown to us. The critical impulse, which gets hegemonic 
power relations at play, cannot be single – neither exclusively 
human, nor miraculous or accidental. Thus the sense of the 
notion of end comes to the fore as an opportunity to problem­
atize the difference between closure and end. The activity of play 
could effectively happen under the condition that the so­called 
“neutral” playground can never be regarded as a fait accompli. 
Hence, a play without cognitive certainty, a friendship without 
a determined goal, and admiration without one eschatological 
end: an “end without end” (168). The immediate art historical 
association could be l’art pour l’art or Dada, yet an extension of 
this association would be purposiveness in its daring multiplicity. 
The telos of deconstruction, assumed that there is one, would 
be then to both instigate and welcome divining configurations 
of perhaps even hazard games between so­called secular and 
religious players, to effectuate instances of timely and untimely 
suspension.
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Power
Leonard Lawlor
It seems that there are two senses to the word “power.” The first 
sense consists in having the force to oppress and repress others. 
Here, as indicated by the verb “have,” power is a possession, and 
it aims at possession. If critique aims its weapons at anything, 
it is this sort of possessive power. As we shall see, repressive 
and possessive power appears to be a reaction to what in power 
cannot be controlled, predicted, and programmed in advance, 
like freedom.
Indeed, repressive power always implies some modicum of 
freedom; no one exercises power over another unless the other 
has possibilities of action (Foucault 2000, 342). There is no reason 
to repress and possess, unless the other is able to do something 
arbitrarily. Because all human and nonhuman animals have at 
least a modicum of freedom, we are very familiar with regimes 
of power that repress. However, thanks to Foucault, we know 
that forces do not only repress (1977, 27). The very same forces 
are able to produce. Through a kind of technique, these forces 
are able to make forms of subjectivity, they make an interior life 
or a soul, through which a person represses his own powers. 
These are techniques of habituation. These techniques can 
be so powerful that the habits they form, including habits of 
thinking, work upon us almost unconsciously. Through the 
idea of habituation techniques, Foucault famously reverses the 
110 traditional relation of the body and the soul (30). Under a regime 
of productive power (an educational system, for example), it is 
not the body that is the prison of the soul. It is the soul that is 
the prison of the body, of what the body can do. For Foucault, 
both repressive and productive powers require a kind of “micro­
analysis” (or genealogy), which would disclose the complex 
relations through which power passes; it would disclose a whole 
“microphysics” of power (29).
Through the productive side of repressive power, we come 
to power’s second sense. The second sense of “power” is 
potentiality. We must not immediately associate the word 
“potentiality” to the Aristotelian schema of potentiality­actuality. 
Of course, like Aristotle, we must speak of the actualization of 
power. However, in this sense of power, the actualization is not 
teleological. Because actualization is not aimed at a determinate 
purpose, Gilles Deleuze, for instance, calls actualization “counter­
actualization” (1990, 148–153). Counter­actualization outstrips any 
possibility we are able to imagine (148–153). The non­teleological 
nature of counter­actualization gives the word “power” a 
profound sense. To understand this more profound sense, we 
must turn to Sigmund Freud.
“Power” is not part of Freud’s psychoanalytic lexicon ( Jean 
Laplanche and Jean­Bertrand Pontalis do not list “power” in their 
account of Freud’s vocabulary [1973]). Instead, Freud speaks of 
drives (Triebe, a term also translated into English as “instincts”) 
and “forces” (Kräfte) (Freud 1997, 83–103). Freud shows how 
unconscious drives and their force set up barriers but also break 
through the barriers (128–134). These forces are unconscious, 
that is, they are not given to consciousness. They never present 
themselves as such in visibility. Never present as such, the forces 
grant us access to them only through their effects. Our access to 
them is only ever mediated. Because our access to the forces is 
only ever mediated, we cannot control them. Out of our control, 
the forces seem to run on their own. Here, we can appropriate 
dream experience, which, for Freud, is the crucial example of our 
111access to these forces. In dreams, of course, the images that are 
produced come from elsewhere; we cannot make or consciously 
will dream images to come to our minds while asleep. In addition, 
the images that do appear in dream never fail to surprise us. The 
forces that produce dream images seem to be like technologies 
– especially our contemporary technologies –, which all too 
frequently run against our conscious desires and will, producing 
effects we could have never predicted. Power in the sense of 
potentiality, therefore, produces effects that we can neither con­
trol nor predict.
The potentiality sense of power produces effects that go 
beyond our own forces and powers. The effects that the above­
mentioned technologies automatically produce are like texts 
that continue to produce readings that the author cannot control 
and could not have predicted. As Derrida would say, like writing, 
power, in the sense of potentiality (a kind of “archi­writing”), 
effectuates or actualizes itself; and, it actualizes itself without a 
purpose and never entirely (2011, 73). Like the machines that run 
without human intervention, potentiality always has a reserve of 
virtual effects. Therefore, we can see now that the second sense 
of power involves two components.
On the one hand, there is the automatic component; on the other, 
there is the unpredictability component. Potentiality happens 
on its own, and it happens in unforeseen ways. Happening on its 
own, potentiality, when it is experienced, forces us to ask what 
happened. And, happening unpredictably, potentiality makes us 
ask the question of what is going to happen. But we do not know 
with certainty the answer to these two questions. What “might 
be” is a question that remains unanswered and unanswerable 
in any definitive way. With its sense of chance, “perhaps” is the 
only answer we can formulate. In fact, in order to have even a 
sense of the potentiality sense of power, we must, with Derrida, 
imagine that what remains virtual in power is something that is 
impossible. The impossible within the possible is the meaning 
of the word “peut-être” for Derrida (1997, 28–29). Therefore, 
112 including the possibility of what is impossible, power seems to 
be even more powerful than a collection of pre­formed pos­
sibilities simply waiting for realization. We come now to one 
of the most important conclusions of the analysis in which we 
have been engaged: through its automaticity and through its 
unpredictability, the experience of potentiality is at once both 
the experience of power and the experience of powerlessness. 
It is the experience of power because when one produces a 
repeatable form (as in writing), one knows that it will produce 
unforeseen events; it is the experience of powerlessness because 
the events, being unforeseeable, cannot be controlled. Power­
lessness in the face of unpredictable power is power’s most 
profound sense.
If the potentiality sense of power is really powerlessness, then 
one question becomes pressing. What sorts of reaction are pos­
sible to the experience of that which we cannot dominate and 
predict? This question is the question of critique. As we have 
seen already, one reaction is the negative reaction of repres­
sion. It strives to control, predict, and program in advance that 
which cannot be controlled, predicted, and programmed. This 
negative reaction is a sort of counter­actualization. But here 
the word “counter” is taken in its most destructive sense. It is a 
reaction of hatred. Thankfully, there is another reaction, which is 
affirmative.
The affirmative reaction looks like this: the work of critique 
consists in unearthing or deterritorializing the unconscious 
techniques that function in us. They must be made thinkable, 
even if only in a mediated mode. We must bring to light the ways 
we have been controlled, how we have been made to control 
ourselves, and especially how we have compromised with the 
forces of destruction. Through this process of deterritorializing, 
we experience pain, anguish, or perhaps shame. In fact, there is 
no deconstruction without the experience of pain. Pain is even 
perhaps the sign of a “successful” deconstruction. Then, as con­
scious or at least semi­conscious, the techniques themselves 
113must be investigated. We must investigate them in order to 
bring to light what still lies potential or virtual within them. For 
example, any natural language contains possibilities of speaking, 
which are latent within the taught and imposed forms of the 
language. As Deleuze and Guattari have shown, a major and 
dominant language like English must not be treated in terms of 
constants and universals. It must be treated in terms of variables 
and variations (1987, 75–110). When we expose latent possibilities 
of variation, when we make a language “stutter,” as Deleuze and 
Guattari would say, we experience the variations as beyond our 
control. When we experience this powerlessness, we must not 
repress the possibilities; we must release them and let them 
go as far as they are able to, farther than any possibility we can 
imagine. “Perhaps,” they will go so far as to actualize the impos­
sible, producing a counter­actualization.
Like the repression of the forces, the liberation of them is a 
counter­actualization. But here the sense of “counter” is not 
that of repression but of “up against.” We must make ourselves 
be exposed, and come to be as close as possible to what the 
techniques are able to produce. We must put ourselves in the 
closest proximity to the possibilities as possible – in order to 
release them and let them be free. Letting the forces be free is 
the true meaning of affirmation. And it might be the true meaning 
of responsibility.
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Process
Melanie Sehgal
Critique strives for change, which classically has been thought 
of in terms of radical disruption. Today, hope for a revolution, 
for changing everything at once, seems in blatant mismatch 
with a world of tightly interlocked processes that traverse the 
political and natural, the individual and collective. One could 
say that critique in its modern face presupposed a particular 
spatiotemporal constellation that no longer seems to hold: a 
static world in which it was possible to practice critique in the 
sense of krinein – to separate and select, to discern between good 
and bad, to dispute, to judge (see Symptomatology). Critique in 
this sense implies a position that is distinct from, outside of the 
situation it is looking at. Only from this position is it possible to 
effect, in an all­encompassing move, radical change. Rethinking 
critique beyond modern parameters implies rethinking this 
spatiotemporal constellation – it implies a metaphysics of process 
instead of a metaphysics of static and simple location. It is thus 
necessary to reconsider the notion of process itself. 
To conceptualize process was always a difficult task for 
philosophy from antiquity onwards. Within modern habits of 
thought an implicit generalization of Newtonian physics rein­
forced a privilege of the static over process. Matter, following 
Newton, is self­identical and simply located, it is in one place 
at one moment. The most fundamental and concrete aspect of 
116 nature is considered to be devoid of process. Such a metaphysics 
of simple location and its spatio­temporal coordinates inform 
modern strategies of critique: experience – which implies 
movement – is separated from reality itself, and this reality can 
then only be disclosed by knowledge. The movement of critique 
in this sense disqualifies experiential knowledge in favor of what 
conditions it and what, from this perspective, is “really real.”
The turn of the twentieth century, however, saw radical 
challenges to the Newtonian framework, most notably by 
quantum physics. In consequence, new philosophical attempts at 
thinking process have been made, for example, by Henri Bergson 
and Georges Canguilhem, by the German Lebensphilosophien, and 
the American Pragmatists. At the core of these attempts lies the 
problem whether and how conceptual knowledge of processes 
is actually possible. Do concepts necessarily fail to capture the 
time­bound, fleeting nature of processes, fixating what is in flux 
and hence missing the essential feature they wish to represent? 
It seems that thinking about processes automatically implies 
an anti­intellectualist stance. The mind is, following Bergson’s 
famous metaphor, like a cinematograph that takes stills of the 
flow of reality, but – in its attempt to piece them together after 
the fact – is bound to fail. It is due to this nature of the mind, that 
we need to “invert our accustomed habits of thought” in order to 
adequately represent reality as it is: in process. Bergson does not 
question two central presuppositions, however, that are implicit 
to his argument: The assumption that reality is something that 
needs to be represented as well as that it is simply given, rather 
than something that within a theoretical construction needs to be 
posited.
Can we conceive of process without falling into such a con­
stitutional anti­intellectualism? Can we think of it not as “radical 
change” or “disruption,” but in terms that are more adequate to 
the interlocked processes we experience today, and in terms that 
also give us tools to make use of these processes – in order to 
actively shape them and give them the directions we desire? 
117When rethinking critique as a situated practice, we need to think 
about different ways of conceptualizing process as well as to 
reconsider the status and function of conceptual knowledge, its 
procedures and givens. In other words, the question of “process” 
implies an ontological and a methodological dimension. Alfred 
North Whitehead, as a reader of Bergson and in contrast to him, 
develops a speculative notion of process that also opens up a 
possibility of a non­modern practice of critique. According to 
Whitehead “there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity 
of becoming” (1985, 35). Process in the sense of continuity, in a 
speculative vein, is not a given. It cannot be taken for granted as 
in the Bergsonian durée. Process is made, it has to be made, bit 
by bit. And not all processes are equal – some create continuity, 
some disruption. If there is continuity, from the perspective of 
the one that desired it, it is an achievement. In order to con­
ceptualize process in this way, Whitehead invents a concept: 
the actual entity. Actual entities are “the final real things the 
world is made up of” (18). They designate the concrete, just as 
the Newtonian concept of matter did. In contrast to it, however, 
actual entities are not devoid of temporality. Actual entities 
become – but their temporality is not a continuous but an “atomic” 
one. It is only through their concatenations that processes with 
a duration and a common pattern are formed. It is in this sense 
that the concept of the actual entity is speculative: actual entities 
are not experienced as such, but designate what is presupposed 
by experience, the experience of processes and interlocked 
societies. Processes are formed through the intertwining “intra­
actions” (to borrow a concept from Karen Barad) on the micro­
level of actual entities. Processes are not given, they have to be 
made, on the level of actual entities, that is: bit by bit. 
Such a speculative concept of process is crucial for situated 
practices of critique, because it shows how change firstly 
happens on the micro­level of the actual entity; the actual entity 
constitutes the real and on its level “decisions” – a Whiteheadian 
term which doesn’t imply consciousness – are being made. 
118 Through the way in which actual entities “prehend” one another, 
continuity and commonality is constructed. Change can never be 
abrupt, or happen in a stroke. Change on the experiental macro­
level needs to build up, as many actual entities need to “decide” 
to change their way of becoming. 
Speaking of the speculative nature of the concept of actual 
entities then leads to the second, but not less crucial 
methodological dimension of the attempt to rethink process. 
Here it becomes apparent that to speak of macro­ and micro­
levels of processes could be misleading. “Actual entities” are 
speculative, precisely because we cannot experience them. They 
are not part of experience, not even on an imagined micro­level, 
but conceptually required in order to conceive of a becoming of 
continuity. This is how they avoid an anti­intellectualist stance. 
Introducing this speculative dimension implies a pragmatic image 
of thought that does not attempt to represent reality but rather 
invites process and speculation into its very construction. It 
means taking the situated aspect of critical thinking into account: 
theory itself is part of the construction of changing realities. 
In Whitehead’s metaphysics novelty (and thus real change and 
process) depends on what he terms “conceptual feeling” – the 
prehension of eternal objects, the realm of pure potentiality – as 
well as on “propositions,” the realm of an “impure potentiality” 
that is already entangled with a specific historical actuality. Were 
actual entities only to prehend one another – that is past and 
present experiences – this would entail a world of processes 
which simply reproduce the same in different combinations 
but cannot foster any real change. By means of selecting from 
these potentials, the actual entity decides how it inherits its past. 
Here, propositions should not merely be considered in the usual 
linguistic sense of the term and in respect to the possibility of 
being judged. For Whitehead, they are a category of existences 
whose primary function is entertainment. Propositions, like 
all entities, need to manifest themselves in experience; they 
need to be embodied. This is why “in the real world it is more 
119important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true” 
(Whitehead 1985, 259). Hence the importance of false and “non­
conformal” propositions. Despite the strong “pull,” however, a 
proposition might exert, being a “lure for feeling,” even it cannot 
determine, decide the way it is taken up. The truthfulness of a 
proposition is not immanent; it rather depends on the deter­
minate actual entities from which it is an incomplete abstraction. 
Depending on them to prehend them, a proposition “is a datum 
for feeling, awaiting a subject to feel it“ (259). It is as such a 
datum that a proposition has “relevance to the actual world” 
(259). The efficacy of propositions is thus a suggestive one: They 
elicit interest, divert attention and propose a way something 
is taken into account and what is likewise eliminated. In this 
way, they account for difference and divergence in the various 
processes of intra­action and thus are crucial for a speculative 
notion of critique. Different subjects – in the metaphysical, non­
humanist sense of the actual entity – will feel and respond to a 
proposition differently. Thus, it is the social environment, the 
historical and experiential world, which decides on its relevance. 
Propositions have an empiricist bias. Always told after the fact, 
propositions take up the past of certain actual entities and divert 
their trajectory. As “the tales that perhaps might be told about 
particular actualities“ (256, emphasis added), they are one pos­
sible way of making sense of a situation, and at the same time 
they lure it into a new becoming. Propositions entail a speculative 
notion of critique because they divert accustomed processes, 
all the while taking their inheritance into account, and introduce 
difference and change. Operating on the speculative level of the 
actual entity, they eventually affect experiential processes. By 
means of the lures of propositions, processes might change their 
conformal continuity into a different kind of becoming.
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Regard
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor
Susan Sontag loved the word regard for its multivalent res­
onance. It is a noun, and it is a verb. As a noun it describes is a 
kind of attention, a kind of looking; it is also a kind of love or care, 
or a kind of esteem, admiration. To regard is to look “intensively”: 
etymologically the word derives from re­, intensive prefix, + O.Fr. 
garder “to look, heed”; garder corresponds to Frankish *wardon, 
which refers to a “collective sense of ‘a keeping, a custody,’” and 
gives us our word ward (as in, a ward of the state). The word 
evolves in English to connote “consideration, appearance, kindly 
feeling,” and a kind of “esteem, affection” (Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary). Behind this shift is a valuation that becomes 
clear when we remember that the words regard, guard, and 
guardian are closely related. One guards only what one “regards” 
as valuable. No wonder Sontag, an admirer by constitution and 
indeed by profession, was attracted to the word. Her lifework as 
a critic was devoted to regarding those writers, artists, and film­
makers whose work she valued most. There was no point in her 
writing otherwise. The title of Nancy Kates’s 2015 documentary of 
Sontag is pitch­perfect: Regarding Susan Sontag.
Regard is a particular form of attention: intensive, evaluative, 
care­ful. It might be, as Jane Bennett puts it in a slightly different 
(but not unrelated) context, a perceptual style (5). “To hold in 
regard” connotes not just a “holding close,” a protecting from 
122 harm but also a holding out as exemplary. Regard links the 
individual and the collective in an affective economy which 
frankly disregards the economy of profit and financial accounting. 
Regard is thus related to an aesthetic, a sensibility (certainly for 
Sontag), a “sensible cognition” (Largier 2010, 536) that gives shape 
to value(s). Regard enables us to recognize objects, people, ideas, 
and concepts that are exemplary, not just “held close” but “held 
out” to view, for others. But exemplary of what? An aesthetic, in 
the sense of the beautiful or the good? Or, more artlessly, in the 
sense of touching and being touched? 
We can regard forms of evil, particularly when such forms 
become visible by expression or act; indeed sometimes we 
cannot help but see, or are even forced to look. But regard cannot 
be forced in those ways. Regard requires intention, a willing­
ness to look carefully, with patience, toward a critical estimation 
of that expression or act. In that sense, holding something in 
regard need not suggest “esteem”; “estimation” is more apt. 
Holding something “in regard” can mean holding it in esteem, 
but our evaluation may change, or be forced to be reconsidered, 
reestimated, revalued, according to terms that are unstable. 
As Margaret Atwood’s reluctant heroine, Offred, puts it in The 
Handmaid’s Tale, “context is all” (1985, 190). Offred, a prisoner of 
a modern theocracy, should know. When one can only see the 
world through glimpses, without either the time or the space for 
sustained attention and for understanding relationships of self to 
other or of here to elsewhere, regard is impossible. 
In Terra Critica each of us shares a commitment to relationality, 
which calls for perceiving, describing, advocating for, and 
dwelling in difference, particularly with regard to our selves 
and others. Which calls, in other words, for critique. In a critical 
context, regard, as an embodied, sensible cognition, is not only 
aesthetic work but political and ethical work as well, for all these 
world­perspectives feed into the processes of estimation. 
Regard thus engages us in a visual ethics. Kaja Silverman proposes 
(in The Threshold of the Visible World) that an ethics of vision is “an 
123active gift of love” conferred by the eye “upon bodies which have 
long been accustomed to neglect and disdain” (1996, 219). Regard 
is, as Silverman proposes, a gesture of generosity. Only in the 
performance of these gestures – small and large, individual or 
national or international – do we even think of making productive 
“a human society that wasn’t just disgust” (180), as Jeanette 
Winterson puts it in The Stone Gods. Disgust is a kind of embodied 
opposition to regard; it makes us turn away from the sight, even 
from the presence of the object of disgust. A human society that 
“wasn’t just disgust” is one that is committed to turning toward 
one another. Similarly, Hélène Cixous also wonders “what a com­
pletely different couple relationship would be like, what a love 
that was more than merely a cover for, a veil of, war would be like” 
(1981, 44).  
This “love,” or what I prefer to call “imaginative sympathy,” is the 
relational incentive of regard, and it might even be the ethical 
core of the “work” in the active sense, of art. As Sontag writes, 
a work of art must be “an extension of my sympathies to other 
selves, other domains, other dreams, other wor[l]ds, other 
territories” (2007, 147). I and Thou. By acknowledging, welcoming, 
and regarding the differences, “the strange(r)” even, in ourselves 
and in others, we can think again about an economy of regard, a 
moral economy that assumes the possibility of relationality, not 
the likelihood of division. Regard points toward the importance 
of response-ability. As Mieke Bal observes, looking is “also a 
mediation between collective and individual, between culture 
and subject” – a “form of socialization” (1997, 61). Regard is that 
and more: the recognition and visualizing of something exem­
plary to be shared.  
In his work on heterotopias, Tobin Siebers extends Cixous’s 
speculation, imagining such a community as “[rivaling] any 
worldly republic … that can be realized on the strength of the 
desire for community inspired by its very imagination. It is not 
a pure community – one purified of conflicting interests – but 
a community with many different stories” (1995, 19–20). The 
124 willingness to listen to these stories is, itself, a gesture of regard, 
opening social relationships to the kind of hospitality that 
welcomes community based on difference rather than sameness, 
conversation rather than compliance. Toni Morrison calls this an  
“endless work” (1997, 316): of dwelling among networks of affili­
ations; of extending hospitality toward a vision of community 
that becomes itself a kind of living, desiring entity; a corporation 
based not on an economy of calculation but an economy of 
regard. An economy of regard is related not to mastery and the 
production of sameness, but to the play of difference, diversity, 
and heterogeneity. Not a simple transaction of one thing for 
another, but an inter­action, an engagement, between equal 
(equally regarded) agents. Such a moral economy drives the 
(hetero)utopian vision of community and citizenship that Siebers 
pursues. We can also associate this economy with care ethics 
theory that “views the self as a being immersed in a network of 
relationships with others” (Benhabib 1992, 149).
Finally, this definition of regard invites us to extend our regard 
to the nonhuman, the “object” of general disregard. An economy 
of regard must be also ecological, an extended relationality that, 
too, is maintained through generous gestures of (self­)critique 
and care that come from seeing the other. Attending to what we 
see, regarding it, allows us to “articulate the psychic and aesthetic 
conditions under which we might be carried away from both 
ideality and the self, and situated in an identificatory relation 
to despised bodies” (Silverman 1996, 2). Through this “sensible 
cognition,” which involves the body’s and the brain’s critical 
faculties, we might approach an economy of regard in which 
ecosystems might profit. An economy of regard frankly contra­
dicts the dominant economy of profit and financial accounts. An 
economy of regard would require a different accounting. Not of 
simple “exchange,” but of much more complex transaction, its 
currency, as noted above, in the generous gesture. Regard is a 
sustained commitment to the kind of critique that intensifies 
sensible cognition interacting with imaginative sympathy, which 
125is necessary (but not sufficient) for co­creating conditions for 
moral maturity. As Sontag observed at her acceptance speech for 
The Jerusalem Prize (2000), “I think there is no culture (using the 
term normatively) without a standard of altruism, of regard for 
others” (2007, 147).
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Responsibility
Leonard Lawlor
The most tangible reason that philosophers in the twentieth 
century have devoted themselves to the reformulation of the 
concept of responsibility lies in the extreme violence of the con­
temporary world. A piece of evidence for this claim lies in the 
fact that Emmanuel Levinas dedicates his Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence “to the memory of those who were closest to the 
six million assassinated by the National Socialists” (1981). Levinas 
is not alone in attempting to rethink responsibility. Jacques 
Derrida and Gilles Deleuze have also devoted a lot of their 
thinking to the problem of responsibility (Derrida 1998, 26; Del­
euze 1983, 85; Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 108–109). When these 
philosophers criticize contemporary political and philosophical 
ideas, the critique frequently calls for others to be responsible, 
and more responsible. Critique is done in the name of an 
increased responsibility, perhaps a hyperbolic responsibility.
If we think of tangible suffering, we are able to formulate one 
principle for the brief investigation into responsibility that 
follows: what is fundamentally at stake in all recent, philosophical 
discourses on responsibility is empathy. In fact, empathy is at 
the root of all the recent, philosophical discourses on alterity. 
Since Edmund Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation, no philosopher 
has been able to speak of the phenomenon of the other (any 
sentient being) without relying on the idea of empathy (Husserl 
128 1977, 108–120). Empathy is not sympathy. While sympathy is the 
conscious feeling of the pains of others, empathy is the vir­
tually unconscious feeling of being “paired,” as Husserl says, 
with others. Empathy is something like an unconscious form of 
compassion. Even though Husserl is a twentieth century Des­
cartes in regard to the unity of the “I think,” he still places nearly 
unconscious empathy at the fundamental level of all experience. 
It is this fundamental empathy that requires us to formulate a 
new or different concept of responsibility, one that is different 
from the traditional one that we find, for example, in Kant. We 
shall turn to the distinction between the new and the traditional 
concepts of responsibility in a moment. But we should note now 
that critique done in the name of an increased responsibility 
intensifies the experience of empathy.
The traditional concept of responsibility revolves around the 
primary, everyday sense of the word “responsibility.” The 
primary, everyday sense consists in being responsible, that is, 
taking responsibility for one’s actions. The everyday sense of 
responsibility appears when we chastise our children, saying, 
“You made this mess. Who else could be responsible for it?” The 
everyday sense of “responsibility” essentially depends on the 
freedom of oneself. In other words, it depends on the Kantian 
idea of autonomy. Therefore, being responsible for oneself 
assumes that the subject of responsibility is unified and the self­
identical, like the Cartesian “I think.” Only if one is self­identical is 
one capable of receiving praise or blame for an action. However, 
with this conception of the self as self­identical, we can see that 
there is no alterity here, and we can wonder if there could ever 
be any empathy. So, following so many critiques of the subject 
in the twentieth century, we must abandon this alterity­less sub­
jectivity, and with it the traditional concept of responsibility. Now, 
the new concept of responsibility that we are about to outline 
includes three components: first, a “responsibility to” (others in 
general); second, a “responsibility for” (others in general); and 
third, a “responsibility before” (others in general) (Derrida 1997, 
129250–252). It is “responsibility before” that will return us to the idea 
of being responsible for oneself, and therefore we shall conclude 
with a few words on guilt.
There are two paths into being “responsible to” others. On the 
one hand, there is the path of a “deconstruction” of interior 
monologue (see Inner Voice). To simplify what the word “decon­
struction” means, one could say that, in deconstruction, one 
needs to pay attention to what lies under or is implicit in our dis­
course. Or, one could say that one has to crack open the words of 
our discourse. In this case, we would need to split open the words 
of our interior monologue. If one is able to crack open the words, 
then one hears that the words one uses in all discourse and in 
particular in interior monologue are words of a natural language, 
like English, French, or Mandarin Chinese. As words of a language 
that everyone shares and no one invented, the words refer to 
other uses of the words and therefore to others. Cracking the 
words open a little more, one hears the phonemes or the sounds 
of the words. One hears their arbitrariness and therefore their 
kinship with animal sounds and even with the rustling of leaves in 
the wind. In short, one must pay attention to the murmur within 
or below one’s interior monologue, turning that monologue into 
a true dialogue. This turns auto­affection into hetero­affection. If 
one is able to crack the words open this far, then one has to say 
that the other (even trees), the “hetero,” is in me, in my “auto.” 
The other in me is a specter from which I am unable to avoid or 
run away from; my very freedom is in jeopardy. The cries in me 
demand – like a police interrogation – that I respond to them. They 
call out to me and put me in question (Levinas 1969, 178–179, 244).
The other way into the obligation of “responsibility to” others 
(and to nonhuman animals, for example) takes place through the 
experience of fascination (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 239–254). 
In this case, with fascination, one finds oneself unable to stop 
looking at, say, a pack of animals. The fascination with the pack 
even leads this person to become fascinated with one of the 
animals in the pack. The fascination is always with an animal that 
130 stands a bit apart from the pack, as its leader or stray member. 
This stray animal is not abnormal; it is the anomalous, that is, it is 
that which remains at the border of the pack, outside the pack’s 
nomos or order. When the fascinated self finds this anomalous 
figure in the pack, the anomalous animal infects the self. It is as 
if the one who is fascinated comes to be demonically possessed 
by the anomalous animal. One is infected with this animal, and, 
in a word, one has become the animal. When I have become the 
animal, I cannot avoid feeling the need to respond to the animal. 
Therefore, something like Kantian autonomy is at work here, 
but autonomy now fused with heteronomy: the animal inside of 
me, the animal that therefore I am, commands me or gives me an 
imperative to which I must respond.
With the component of “responsibility to” in place, we can turn 
to the conceptual component of “responsibility for.” As we just 
transformed Kantian autonomy, we must also transform the 
traditional idea of being responsible for someone else. The idea 
of being “responsible for” that must be pushed aside is the 
idea in which we think the word “for” means that we represent 
others. But if “responsibility for” means representation, then it 
is clear that we have homogenized others down to a generality. 
If we think of the word “animality,” for example, we see one 
obvious fact. The word “animality” homogenizes all the millions 
of forms of animal life down to one kind. How is it possible that 
elephants and amoeba could be compared to one another? In 
order not to insult the multiplicity of animal life, and of others 
in general, “responsibility for” must be conceived without any 
generalizing representation. The role of the anomalous already 
helped us to see that the other in me is singular not general: a 
singularity “blocks” all general concepts (Deleuze 1994, 12–13; see 
Singularization). However, in order to see what “responsibility 
for” means positively, we need to make use of a French expres­
sion. Of course, the relationship expressed in “responsibility 
for” makes use of the English word “for”; in German it would be 
“für,” and in French the word is “pour.” However, in French one 
131can form the expression “pour que” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
109). A literal English translation of “pour que” would be “for that.” 
But native English speakers say nothing like that. The standard 
English translation is “so that.” Now if we can retain the idea of 
“pour que” and especially retain the “pour” or “for” within it, we 
can argue the following. Responsibility for others amounts not to 
representing them, which performs a kind of conceptual violence 
on them. “Responsibility for” really means responding to the 
others with which I am fascinated, this demon, or to the other 
within me, this specter – pour que (so that) the other might be 
able to become otherwise. Demonology or spectrality is always 
responsibility for the other’s escape or flight from its misery. 
“Responsibility for” always means letting the other be free. And 
we could say that in genuine responsibility the freedom of the 
other must always come first.
Finally, we come to “responsibility before.” In order to under­
stand “responsibility before” others, one has to think 
phenomenologically again. But even more so, one has to reverse 
the phenomenological location of the gaze in the perceiver 
and place the gaze in the perceived – as if I, as the perceiver, 
experience myself under a gaze. Here, it is as if, in my fascination 
with others, I find myself before or in front of the ones with 
whom I am fascinated. They look back at me. And I experience 
this reversed gaze as a gaze of accusation. It is as if the others 
have laid down the law, and I am responsible before the law. 
“Responsibility before” means the experience of standing 
before others as if one is standing trial. Here we see the role of 
“responsibility,” yet not “for others,” but “for oneself.” As we saw 
through the analysis of “responsibility to,” the idea of a self­
identical subject does not withstand any sort of deconstruction. 
However, here in being “responsible before,” we must see that 
still, even as deconstructed, there is something like a self here, 
the very one put in question by others. It is this interrogated “I” 
that is on trial.
132 If I am standing trial before others, then at least I have been 
accused. More likely, I am guilty. Indeed, even if I have never 
made animals suffer, for example, I am complicit in the world­
wide suffering inflicted on animal life in the name of food and 
fuel production. Certainly, I cannot escape the charge of a con­
ceptual violence against others since I would be able neither to 
speak of them nor to speak to them without using general terms 
and concepts, without using representations, which violate the 
singularity of every single other. The experience of responsibility 
before others is therefore the experience of a conscience that 
is never at rest. Standing before the suffering of others, in front 
of their accusatory gaze, I suffer too – from guilt or, perhaps 
better, shame. Shame is the intensification of the empathy with 
which we started. Only under the condition of the feeling of 
shame is genuine responsibility possible. But we cannot stop 
here. This suffering that I undergo must be exaggerated. It must 
be exaggerated to the point that the experience of a disturbed 
conscience approximates either madness or the sublime. This 
exaggeration is infinite responsibility (Levinas 1969, 244). Thus, 
if we criticize contemporary philosophical and political ideas in 
the name of responsibility, we find that our demand for increased 
responsibility can never be complete.
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Risk
Rosemarie Buikema
Cultural critique emerges from the need to face the entan-
glements of the cultural and geopolitical risks and dangers 
which surround us. At the same time cultural critique in a glob­
alized and neoliberal world has become a practice in which the 
inherent intertextuality of every symbolic act implies a willing­
ness to account for unforeseen and uncontrollable effects. 
Critical inquiries therefore require an attitude or willingness to 
take a chance, to be challenging, to be risky – to be convincing 
whilst neither searching for the ultimate truth, nor striving for 
objectivity. Cultural critique is thus a balancing act by implication, 
an exercise in the praxis of negotiation, response-ability and 
accountability. This is particularly true for cultural critique which 
addresses feminist and postcolonial agendas. Since Virginia 
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929) and Three Guineas (1938) 
foregrounded the issue that the first wave feminist struggle for 
first­class citizenship unavoidably included the risk of becoming 
complicit in the dark sides of that first class citizen’s national his­
tories (that is: imperialism, colonialism, and war) and since critical 
race and critical whiteness studies have elaborated on this kind of 
intersectional analysis avant la lettre ever since, the interrelated­
ness of these discourses can hardly be ignored again. 
However, the almost innately claimed necessity of thinking 
through the interrelated legacies of raced and gendered 
136 violence notwithstanding, the effective analysis of the raced 
and gendered entanglements of inclusion and exclusion at 
empirical, symbolical, and institutional levels is still easier to 
claim as a manifesto for cultural critique than to effectively 
enact. Practicing the feminist mantras of diversity, solidarity, 
and democracy has become an increasingly risky enterprise in a 
geopolitical context in which feminism is consequently framed 
as the combined achievement of Western post­World War II 
emancipatory narratives, cultural, and social developments and 
liberation movements. In the last two decades, feminist critique 
has been increasingly equated with the achievements and the 
core values of Western civilization whilst that same civilization is 
very reluctantly coming to terms with its different pre­World War 
II histories of violence, imperialism, and colonialism. As such, the 
feminist project now seems hijacked by both the neoliberal and 
the post­secular as well as emerging contemporary anti­Muslim 
discourse. 
The task of twenty­first­century feminist and postcolonial cul­
tural critique is therefore to face the risk that the achievements 
of the movement for women’s liberation at large threaten to 
become disconnected from its initial manifestations of equality 
for all, understood as transnational solidarity. It has to think 
through the possible danger that the outcome of two feminist 
waves mainly serve neoliberal capitalism, patriarchy, and racism 
and the concomitant individualization and marketing of the 
process of emancipation and social participation (Scott 2011). 
As Nancy Fraser suggests, this risk of female empowerment 
becoming the handmaiden of global neoliberal capitalism might 
have been implicated in the movement from the start. Virginia 
Woolf’s brilliant first wave example notwithstanding, Western 
second wave feminist goals and strategies in the end seem to 
have been ambivalent and thus susceptible for two different 
elaborations. The initial, deeply political commitment to partici­
patory democracy and social justice for all included goals which, 
in hindsight, simultaneously served the neoliberal vocabulary of 
137autonomy, choice, and meritocratic advancement (Fraser 2013). 
Contrary to the feminist postcolonial and post­socialist project, 
which situates the female subject as submitted to patriarchal, 
racist, and capitalist structures, neoliberal feminisms seem to 
promote participation in both capitalism and patriarchy and show 
a striking neglect for either structural or intersectional analysis. 
Contemporary feminism is therefore at risk of being the servant 
of the neoliberal status quo and, in that process, helping to 
reduce subjects to economic actors, to servants of capital, 
encouraged to invest in their own individual liberation and auto­
nomy instead of striving for social justice for all (Brown 2013). 
Further to this, when the neoliberal definition of freedom and 
emancipation happens to get framed as the achievement and 
even core value of Western civilization as is happening in populist 
political analysis, any feminist form of self reflexivity and critical 
thinking is in danger of being perceived as betraying one’s own 
political or national community. 
This is exactly what recently happened in the Netherlands when 
a young female daily newspaper journalist started a discus­
sion concerning the deployment of half naked female bodies 
in lingerie advertisements displayed on billboards in the public 
space. She aimed to unravel the question of whether the use of 
non­stereotypical, nearly naked female bodies (i.e., non­white 
bodies, non skinny­bodies, bodies with scars) in commercials for 
ladies’ underwear would serve the liberation of women. For that 
purpose, she interviewed women from several corners of the 
feminist enterprise in the Netherlands and reported their views. 
Addressing the issue of the representation of the female body in 
advertisements in a newspaper article meant that three “good 
old” feminist issues were put center stage at the same time and 
implicitly or explicitly also popped up in the online discussion 
following the publication of the article. In the first place, the 
overdetermined sign of the female nude as subject of feminist 
cultural critique became the subject of online and offline debates 
138 again. In the second place, the campaign’s alleged attempt to 
open up stereotypical representations of the female body as 
smooth, skinny, and white was recognized and pointed out as 
the problematization of the hegemonic beauty myth. Thirdly, 
the deployment of the female body as an object of exchange in 
a capi tal driven imagery has been central to the feminist agenda 
ever since Gayle Rubin’s influential essay “Traffic in Women: Notes 
on the Political Economy of Sex” (1975) and  triggered feminist 
public attention again. The controversy following the implicit 
re­entry of these topics into the contemporary feminist agenda 
not only served to provide an interesting insight in the mantras 
of both neoliberal feminist critique and radical feminist and 
postcolonial critical theories today; it also happened to brilliantly 
illustrate the fact that the mantras of neoliberal feminism risk 
being hijacked by populist and even ethnocentric discourses. 
Please allow me to unravel this conundrum by analyzing the 
implications of liberal, radical and postcolonial feminist critique.
What Nancy Frazer would label as a neoliberal feminist take on 
the issue of the female nude unsurprisingly came down to the 
claim that it is every woman’s free choice to be portrayed half 
naked on a billboard and it is everybody’s free choice to resent 
this or not (see http://stellingdames.nl/). Self­proclaimed fem­
inist women claimed it to be their right to wear miniskirts and/
or to play with their sexuality and stated they were unprepared 
to give in on that acclaimed freedom of expression. Men who 
joined the debate repeated the mantra that Western civilization 
equates emancipation and liberation of women. Radical feminist 
critiques informed by, for example, the feminist analyses of Joan 
Scott and Frazer, immediately pointed at the fact that notwith­
standing the laudable attempt to counter the stereotypical rep­
resentation of female bodies and thus the attempt to deconstruct 
the racist and sexist beauty myth, the advertisements did not 
offer an alternative to the sexist tradition of deploying female 
bodies in order to stimulate consumerism. The essence of the 
radical feminist claim thus reads: white or black, skinny or not so 
139skinny, smooth or scarred, the female body in the imagery of so­
called innovative advertisements is still serving as a metaphor 
for the circulation of capital. The postcolonial feminist’s take 
on the matter concurred with the critique of radical feminism, 
emphasizing moreover the ethnocentrism of the Western 
compulsion to decorate the public space with images of naked 
female bodies and consequently claim this to be freedom of 
expression. They highlighted research exposing the phenomenon 
that the pornification of Western society inspires certain groups 
of women to increasingly cover themselves, not as a sign of 
religious commitment but rather as a sign of cultural critique 
(Buikema 2015). Postcolonial radical feminists emphasized the 
need for a new imagery that would be more fitting for a multicul­
tural and post­sexist society (Smit 2015). 
In the fierce online and offline discussions summarized above 
the good old feminist critique, that the framed image of a female 
body is an icon of Western culture, a symbol of civilization and 
accomplishment (Nead 1992) was abundantly illustrated by both 
male and female participants in the debate. In particular in 
those posts which pushed the postcolonial link between fem­
inism and multiculturalism in the context of the 2016 refugee 
crises, the online discussions got overtly violent and turned into 
torrents of hate mail aimed at the defenders of postcolonial 
feminism. The suggestion that alternatives to the pornification 
of Western culture ought to be considered, because this imagery 
might be unpleasant for both women and people with different 
cultural values, was equated with collaborating: “You are a dis­
grace to this country” was an often articulated comment to the 
postcolonial radical feminists who had made that argument. In 
such a polarized context it proved to be very hard to get back to 
the initial cornerstones and structural analysis of feminist theory 
without getting entangled in a heated controversy concerning 
the unconditional freedom of expression as the core value of 
Western civilization. 
140 In light of this exemplary case, the challenge for twenty first 
century feminist and postcolonial critique is to develop and 
practice a form of critique which continues to truly connect the 
local and the global, the private and the public, the personal and 
the political, the empirical and the symbolical. To parry the risk 
of being perceived as a traitor of Western democratic practices 
when turning to structural analysis of the sexist and racist risks 
and dangers which are surrounding us, twenty first century 
feminist and postcolonial critique should embark on a return to 
the history of feminism and a re­location of the definitions of 
emancipation, liberation, and solidarity. Inspirational texts of first 
and second wave feminism – most notably Simone de Beauvoir’s 
The Second Sex ([1949] 1989) and bell hooks’s Ain’t I a Woman (1981), 
for example – already theorized liberation as a concept which not 
only referred to the individual but also to the simultaneous desire 
for a freedom for the other(s). This ethical­political second wave 
nuance – one geared towards justice for all rather than merely to 
equality and individual emancipation – needs to be reactivated 
and practiced in the context of twenty first century feminist 
critique and activism; what we need is a return to the envisioned 
futures of the past in order not to risk being disconnected from 
our rich and critical potential.
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Semi-agency
Birgit Mara Kaiser
Unlike other terms in this vocabulary, semi­agency is not an 
established expression with a critical heritage. It is not even listed 
in the Oxford English Dictionary – and, hence, is not really an Eng­
lish word. Regardless, it cropped up in Terra Critica ’s discussions 
(see Kaiser 2012) and therefore made its way into this volume. 
What does feature in the OED is the prefix “semi­” meaning 
in common use “half, partly, partially, to some extent.” When 
coupled with “agency” here and with the perspective of critical 
practice in mind, however, the prefix points to something else 
than merely a quantitative halving. This entry explores both sides 
of the term – “semi” and “agency” – with recourse to feminist 
theory, to argue that “semi­agency” signals not so much “half of 
something” but rather a kind of (boundary) articulation, always 
entangled with the affective, material, circumstantial forces it 
emerges from.
Let us begin with Toril Moi’s description of Hélène Cixous’s 
work, especially Cixous’s poetico­theoretical writings from the 
mid­1970s, as “theoretical (or semi­theoretical)” (Moi 1985, 102). 
The hesitation that Moi’s proviso in parenthesis seems to betray 
is that Cixous’s work is not “really” theoretical but something 
slightly different. And indeed, in the course of her argument, 
Moi is highly critical of Cixous’s theoretical work and she thus 
indeed employs “semi­theoretical” to signal a deficiency. Moi 
144 judges Cixous’s work to be marred by its “lack of reference to 
recognizable social structures as by its biologism” (126) – a mis­
reading of Cixous’s project, as Peggy Kamuf has shown. Moi 
dismisses Cixous’s project as a less than theoretical “textual 
jungle” (1985, 102) in which style and poetry stand in the way of 
real theoretical – that is, for Moi also always politically effective – 
work, which makes references to “recognizable social structures.” 
When Kamuf zooms in on Moi’s use of “semi­theoretical” in 
regard to Cixous ten years later, she points out that, used in Moi’s 
way, the prefix “semi­” adheres to an unquestioned “familiar set 
of distinctions that includes expression vs. thought, style vs. 
substance, metaphoric vs. literal, and poetic vs. theoretical” 
(Kamuf 1995, 73; bold added). Moi uses “semi­” to express indeed 
a diminishing (a halving) of the desirable faculties of thought that 
promise political empowerment. What might we gain, Kamuf 
asks, if we run with Moi’s assertion of a “semi­theoretical” work 
but were instead to treat the nomination in less conventional 
and depreciative ways? Is not “theory” in its distinction from 
and critique of the traditions of Western metaphysics the very 
assertion that acts of thinking “uncontaminated by contingency, 
particularity, or experiential differences” (73) are impossible? 
Thus, is theory not by definition semi­theory? Is it not, Kamuf 
suggest, the very affirmation that affective, material, circum­
stancial, existential factors cannot be sidelined as irrelevant to 
thought and that thought cannot be kept uncontaminated by 
those forces? If this is the case,
then there is no telling absolutely when and where the semi­
theoretical and semi­political may shade off into the semi­
poetic or semi­fictional or some other semi­recognizable 
mode since such distinctions are rendered rather dubious by 
the contaminating non­category of the “semi­.” (74)
It is these contaminations that Moi finds politically, feminis­
tically unproductive – and that, on the contrary, Kamuf (with 
Cixous) affirms as precisely politically, feministically productive. 
145Importantly, the consequence of the possible multiplication of 
“semi­”modes of thinking and of their blurry distinctions Kamuf 
points to (and something that Cixous’s writings indeed enact) 
does not repudiate the effectiveness of these modes nor is it a 
surrender to their murkiness. Rather, they are openings “onto 
a responsibility to that which is only glimpsed beneath the 
effacement of the prefix semi- on all names and general con­
cepts” (74). Thus, if we follow Kamuf, prefixing a name or concept 
with “semi­” can signal something that is “not altogether there, 
it does not name a presence, nothing that is; rather, it calls for 
something to present itself otherwise” (74). In this sense, Kamuf 
precisely affirms Cixous as a semi­theoretician, whose work 
calls for “theory” and “thinking” to present themselves (always 
again) otherwise, and otherwise than in the traditions of Western 
metaphysics and the Cartesian subject.
It is from this angle, that “semi­” is attached here to agency. 
If we were to start from the conventional understanding of 
agency as the “ability or capacity to act or exert power” (OED), 
then semi­agency is not half of that capacity; that would retain 
implicitly either the desire for the full capacity, or the acceptance 
of a diminished part of it, with the full capacity still as a yard­
stick. Both of these options continue to adhere to a metaphysics 
of presence. Following the angle described by Kamuf instead, 
the non­category of “semi­” calls for agency “to present itself 
otherwise” (1995, 74) than within a logic of presence. Here, semi­
agency is closer to the other (in fact: the first) definition of agency 
that the OED gives, namely that of “a person or organization 
acting on behalf of another.” I is another, we might say, to echo 
Arthur Rimbaud’s countering of the Cartesian idea of a willful, 
self­transparent subject in his Lettres du Voyant already in 1871. 
With this in mind, let us then return to critical discourse, where 
agency as a term has surfaced over the past decades, especially 
in work that questions subjectivity as sovereign consciousness. 
In this vein, for example, Judith Butler speaks from a social con­
structivist perspective about subjectless, performative agency 
146 that is bound to the discursive formations in which it emerges. 
We can locate agency, she writes already in Gender Trouble, 
“within the possibility of a variation on that repetition” (Butler 
1990, 145) upon which any identity understood as practice is 
based; that is, within the difference permitted by the iterability 
of signs, an iterability upon which any signification depends. 
And later, in Excitable Speech, Butler explains that agency and 
sovereignty must not be confused: “[a]gency begins where sov­
ereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not the same as the 
sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is 
constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic 
field of enabling constraints from the outset” (1997, 16). Agency, 
therefore, has purchase in contemporary critical discourse 
precisely to the extent that it questions and reroutes conceptions 
of sovereign intentionality, and that it foregrounds praxis, action, 
and reiteration within discursive fields as inscribing difference 
and inventing “new” habits. It would, however, not be wise to 
abandon agency for action altogether, as Tim Ingold suggests in 
The Life of Lines. 
Worried that agency continues to “separat[e] the doer from the 
deed” (Ingold 2015, 145) and thus adheres to traditional forms 
of the sovereign Subject (a worry that seems to ignore precisely 
the work feminist theory has done on the term), Ingold wants to 
let go of it. He suggests focusing on “action without agency” (145) 
instead in order to stress what he calls “the doing­in­undergoing 
of humanifying” (152). What we risk losing in such a move, 
though, are the enabling constraints (Butler) agency addresses, or 
– from a (new) materialist perspective – the “agential cuts” (Barad 
2007, 175) crucial to any emergence of difference. Put otherwise, 
what we risk losing in the move Ingold suggests is the critical 
transformation that Butler, Karen Barad, and others foreground 
with agency or agential. Certainly, action is “doing­in­undergoing” 
as Ingold suggests, and the stale opposition of subject/object 
as well as the sovereign Subject are obsolete. But on the basis 
of a performative, quantum universe (which also underlies 
147Ingold’s work), we also need to assess what comes to matter as 
a non­linearily­causal consequence of action. Crucially, as Barad 
stresses, “[d]ifferent agential cuts produce different phenomena” 
(2007, 175). What action is directed at­for and where action 
orients itself within­toward is therefore critical (in the sense of 
being decisive and interventionist). Agency permits precisely the 
pursual of this: what is effected, what is shifted and what is de/
re­stabilized in the course of the actors’ constitutive operations in 
discursive fields? In that way, action as intra­action remains tied 
to performative, material­discursive forms of agency, which are 
themselves a productive, creative mode of critical practice.
Agency is a matter of intra­acting; it is an enactment, not 
something that someone or something has. Agency cannot 
be designated as an attribute of subjects or objects (as they 
do not preexist as such). Agency is a matter of making iterative 
changes to particular practices through the dynamics of intra-
activity … Agency is about the possibilities and accountability 
entailed in reconfiguring material­discursive apparatuses of 
bodily production, including the boundary articulations and 
exclusions that are marked by those practices. (Barad 2007, 
214; emphasis added)
From this perspective, agency is not an attribute. Instead, the 
intra­actions and cuts create specific phenomena and practices 
and not others: “cutting together­apart” (Barad 2012, 46). Severing 
agency from action, as Ingold suggests, would loose this precision 
and the investment in rerouting practices and exclusions. 
Ultimately, agency is then always already semi­agency, namely 
“nothing that is; [but that] calls for something to present itself 
otherwise” (Kamuf 1995, 74): a form of (boundary) articulation 
entangled with the affective, material, circumstantial forces that 
drive all intra­action; a form of enactment of world that makes 
a difference, that effects a change; the practice of acting within 
enabling constraints (Butler) or as intra­acting with­in a material­
discursive field (Barad). 
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Sensibility
Timothy O’Leary
In Daybreak (1997, 103), Nietzsche explains that he denies both 
morality and immorality, not because morality is a sham and a 
self­deception, but because even though people genuinely feel 
they act morally and immorally, this feeling is not justified. Hence, 
he concludes, “We have to learn to think differently — in order at 
last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.” 
Gilles Deleuze expands this point to a general characterization of 
Nietzschean critique: “The point of critique is not justification but 
a different way of feeling: another sensibility” (Deleuze 1983, 194). 
We can formalize these themes as the claim that critique is the 
transformative engagement with the (moral) sensibilities of our 
time. How far can we push this idea, by considering such simple 
examples as our changing feelings about plastic bags – and the 
TV series Mad Men?
One way of explaining the pleasure that many viewers experience 
while watching Mad Men is that the form of life it portrays is 
so close to our own and yet so distant. Unlike a series such as 
Downton Abbey, for example, Mad Men represents a world that 
many of us were born into and yet it seems to be significantly 
alien in many ways. That difference is one that could be described 
in terms of sensibility, and in particular of moral sensibility. It is 
not just a matter of our sensibility as the audience; that is, the 
ways in which we perceive, judge, praise, and condemn the social 
150 mores of the early 1960s. It is also the unavoidable sense we 
get that their experience of their own world is radically different 
from what our experience of it would be if we returned to it now. 
In other words, the series confronts us with an important fact: 
moral sensibility has a history, and that history is subject to quite 
rapid transformation. 
The idea that we can identify the sensibility of an individual, a 
sub­culture, or even a whole era, and then track the transfor­
mations it may undergo, is not particularly new. It has appeared 
in different forms in literary studies, history, anthropology, 
cultural studies, and also in certain strands of philosophy (most 
notably in eighteenth­century and some contemporary moral 
theory). However, despite this long and varied tradition of 
thought (and perhaps because it is so long and varied), one could 
be forgiven for suspecting that the concept of sensibility has 
become so vague and inchoate that it creates as many confusions 
as it hopes to dispel. Hence, although it might seem acceptable to 
use it when casually discussing popular entertainment, as I have 
just done, one might question whether it is advisable to use it in 
a philosophically informed investigation of our contemporary 
ethical terrain, which is what I propose to do. 
In this brief overview, I will try to show that the concept can 
indeed be useful in such an investigation. I will suggest that 
thinking in terms of moral sensibility allows us to understand 
important aspects of the relation between ethics, history, and 
critique that many philosophical approaches are incapable of 
taking into account. I will begin by proposing a rough, preliminary 
definition of the concept. 
Sensibility is a concept that encompasses three elements: modes 
of feeling, perceiving, and valuing. All three must be given their 
place; and it must be recognized that all three are in constant 
mutual interaction. Sensibility, therefore, comprises: a) sensation 
and emotion; b) systems and practices of knowledge; c) moral 
and aesthetic appraisals. At every level, sensibility is profoundly 
151historical. It is probably not necessary here to establish this 
claim with respect to b) systems of knowledge and c) modes of 
appraisal, but what about a) sensation and emotion? Surely the 
human sensations and emotions are constant – at least in the 
historical, if not in the evolutionary, sense. But even here, there 
has been a great deal of scholarly work in the fields of history 
and anthropology of the senses and the emotions that seems to 
firmly establish the case for continuous historical change in the 
way the human body engages with and experiences its environ­
ment. Sensibility, therefore, denotes constantly changing modes 
of receptivity and sensitivity towards the world. But it is not 
simply passive; it is also an active ability. It betokens an active 
engagement with the world: it is a set of abilities to perceive, dis­
cern, judge, and experience. 
In 1966, in The Order of Things, Foucault pointed out that “At any 
given instant, the structure proper to individual experience finds 
a certain number of possible choices (and of excluded pos­
sibilities) in the systems of the society; inversely, at each of their 
points of choice the social structures encounter a certain number 
of possible individuals (and others who are not)” (2002, 415). In 
other words, at each particular place and time there is a certain 
range of subjective experience that is made more or less likely 
by the social structures of that time. And, as the social structures 
change, so too does the range of possible human experience. 
What this gives rise to, as Ian Hacking has pointed out, is the pos­
sibility of studying the historical transformations that open up 
and close off potential human experiences (2002, 23). And, if we 
do that in the domain of moral experience, we will be engaging in 
a critique of moral sensibility. 
Let’s take a simple and banal example from the increasing 
moralization of everyday consumption in many advanced 
economies around the world. Consider the way that the use of 
plastic shopping bags has come to be seen, and experienced, 
as an immoral form of behavior. How did it come about that the 
choice of a shopping bag could engage the moral sensibility of 
152 so many people today? I would suggest that this experience of 
buying the plastic bag is identifiable as ethical not only because 
it involves the practical application of previously accepted moral 
principles but also because it activates a whole range of con­
cerns and practices relating to self­formation. These concerns 
and practices are activated within a broader framework that 
includes forms of knowledge about climate change and also an 
emerging set of norms of behavior that cajole us into “environ­
mentally responsible” actions. At a basic level, therefore, we are 
being cajoled into becoming particular kinds of people: informed 
consumers who are guided by a new twenty­first century moral 
sensibility. The act of buying the plastic bag is not intrinsically 
moral in nature; hence, it is simply that recent shifts in moral 
sensibility have made it more likely that the experience will crys­
tallize, or come into focus, as having a strong moral component. 
What can we say about these observations, if we take moral 
sensibility as comprising the three elements identified above: a) 
sensation and emotion; b) systems and practices of knowledge; 
c) moral and aesthetic appraisals. In relation to the first element, 
we can ask how is the experience of, and our emotional response 
to, plastic transforming in contemporary societies? And, how do 
different forces, such as environmental activism and government 
policy, propel, and guide this transformation? In relation to the 
second element, what modes of knowledge (of varying degrees 
of scientific “certainty”) inform our moral responses? What is the 
history of these knowledges, of their formation, dissemination, 
and, perhaps, contestation? In relation to the third element, what 
is the nature of the value judgments that are being made, how 
do the judgments of others relate to corresponding judgments 
of oneself, and how do moral and aesthetic elements intertwine 
in these judgments? What changes are these modes of judgment 
undergoing at the present?
Taking this perspective on our contemporary ethical terrain 
opens up the possibility of a new critical task: to investigate what 
we can now call the conduct of moral sensibility. The conduct 
153of moral sensibility has two senses: first, the ways in which our 
sensibility is guided, formed, developed, expanded, narrowed, 
refined, and blunted, by a whole range of forces in the world 
and in ourselves; and second, the ways our conduct, that is, our 
behavior, is guided by the modes of moral sensibility we embody. 
These two aspects are in constant, mutual interaction. The inves­
tigation of this conduct gives us the basis for understanding the 
contemporary contest of moral sensibilities. In other words, it 
makes possible a genealogy of the moralizing and de­moralizing 
of the world, a critical, transformative engagement with the moral 
sensibilities of our time. Having learned to think our present 
differently, we might then come to meet Nietzsche’s challenge – 
to feel differently. 
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Singularization
Birgit Mara Kaiser
Singularization is the processual emergence of entities. It is, 
as Félix Guattari uses the term, always a re­singularization: 
a response to and redirecting of standardized, entrenched 
habits towards new, different modes of living. When thinking 
about (re)singularization, it is important to keep this per-
spective in mind, because the term singularity (and the related 
singularization) can also give rise to very different approaches 
and stakes. Therefore, first a brief word on singularity.
Singularity is an over­determined and contested concept, with 
a wide range of meanings and diverse theoretical and political 
investments. Apart from its mathematical usage, singularity 
has recently become a prominent term in fields ranging from 
philosophy (Badiou 2004; Derrida 1998; Deleuze 1990; Guattari 
1996; Nancy 2000), literary and cultural studies (Attridge 2004; 
Clark 2005; Hallward 2002; Jameson 2002) to science and tech­
nology studies (Eden, Moor, et al 2012; Kurzweil 2005), with 
widely diverging implications. These span an understanding of 
singularity as uniform oneness (the singular as single in Fredric 
Jameson, or as non­relational absolute in Peter Hallward, who 
draws on Alain Badiou’s [2004, 146–147] use of the singular as 
universal in his second thesis on the universal), as singularities 
in the sense of nonhuman forces constitutive of any process of 
individuation (Deleuze 1990), as well as a technological “event or 
156 phase that will radically change human civilization” (Eden, Moor, 
et al. 2012, 1) in techno­scientific or transhumanist debates, which 
aim to overcome human limitations by artificial intelligence.
Let us now zoom in on singularization, a term that has, in its 
stress on the process of emergence, closest ties to the Deleuze­
Guattarian use of the term singularity. For Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, singularization brings into focus the formation of 
objects and subjects, or the (trans)formation of entities – unlike 
individuality or specificity, which are terms geared toward the 
classification of differences (as species or genres) that are already 
formed on a molar level. Contrary to this, Deleuze and Guattari 
interest in singularity and singularization lies in the terms’ 
capacity to consider the transversal emergence of entities as the 
result of a relation of forces. For its critical potential, especially 
Guattari’s use of (re­)singularization is of interest here.
In “Microphysics of Power/Micropolitics of Desire,” Guattari 
discusses in this vein that – much like Deleuze’s recourse to 
(Simondonian) individuation – the aim of Foucault’s Archae-
ology of Knowledge (and other projects) is to move from “things,” 
traditionally considered as anterior to discourse, to the for­
mation of “entities” or “statements,” which are “immersed in an 
enunciative field” (1996, 180). Singularization is, thus, not about 
the single, the (liberal) individual or the unique object, but about 
material­semiotic processes (to borrow Donna Haraway’s term). 
Singularization describes the emergence of entities, and con­
sequentially also the processes that undo (or deterritorialize) 
existing stratifications and in turn congeal (or reterritorialize) new 
modes of being. In that sense, Guattari employs the term in The 
Three Ecologies ([1989] 2008). 
Guattari’s argument in The Three Ecologies is anchored in a two­
fold critique. On the one hand, as an analyst at La Borde (1955–
1992), he is discontent with Lacanian structuralist psychoanalysis, 
which uses Freudian models of analysis focused on childhood 
experience and parental­familial structures. On the other hand, 
157as a political activist, he is concerned about two socio­political 
developments observed at the time of writing: First, the “extreme 
complexification of social, economic and international con­
texts” (2008, 21) resulting from a decline of the dualist opposition 
USA–USSR in the late 1980s and what he calls “Integrated World 
Capitalism.”1 Second, the standardization of ways of life and a 
homogenizing of desires, largely promoted by the media (at the 
time, television as the prevailing medium). Guattari sees the 
“intoxicating and anaesthezising” (34) effects of (state­sponsored) 
media as intimately bound up with the production of signs and 
subjectivity, which he perceives as modus operandi of IWC. His 
hopeful excitement about new media and the Internet as possible 
openings are on the horizon of this critique in the late 1980s. 
Singularization for Guattari is a counter­force to these for­
mations, as it facilitates “new social and aesthetic practices, 
new practices of the Self” (45). In regard to his intervention into 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, he illustrates singularization in Chaos-
mosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (1995) with the example of 
a patient whose therapy got stuck and who was “going round 
in circles, and coming up against a wall” (17). Ultimately, the 
therapy moved forward not due to a Lacanian “symbolic her­
meneutic centered on childhood” (18) but because of a schizo­
analytic encouragement of unexpected, transversal practices: 
the patient suddenly desired to take up driving. This new habit 
fostered different fields of vision and enabled him to divert 
his problem into new directions. The driving lessons produced 
“active, processual ruptures within semiotically structured, 
significational and denotative networks” (19) and set into action 
different “existential operators capable of acquiring consistence 
and persistence,” making possible new “existential orches­
trations, until now unheard and unknown” (19). Concerned about 
analytic practice, Guattari holds that Freud’s unconscious has 
1 For Guattari, IWC is the post­industrial capitalism that moves from the 
production of goods to the production of signs and subjectivity, marked by 
its equally complexified effect on more than purely economic realms.
158 become an institution itself and in its “structuralist version, has 
been recentered on the analysis of the self, its adaptation to 
society, and its conformity with a signifying order” (10). It has 
lost its teeth, while schizoanalysis and ecosophy counter this 
reification to open up new passages, not only for analysis and 
“its theoretical scaffolding” (Guattari 2008, 27) but also for the 
socio­political problems that The Three Ecologies perceives. The 
real processes that set into motion such new “vectors of sub­
jectification” (25), which are not directed at conformity with an 
established signifying order, is what Guattari calls singularization. 
The enactment, encouragement, and affirmation of such 
processes is in itself a critical practice.
The inventions of new “vectors of subjectification” are intimately 
bound up with Guattari’s concern about contemporary forms of 
capitalist power.
[C]apitalist power has become delocalized and deterritoria­
lized, both in extension, by extending its influence of the 
whole social, economic and cultural life of the planet, and in 
“intension,” by infiltrating the most unconscious subjective 
strata. In doing this it is no longer possible to claim to be 
opposed to capitalist power only from the outside, through 
trade unions and traditional politics. (33)
Given increasingly decentralized sites of power in neoliberal 
capitalism and the “introjection of repressive power by the 
oppressed” (32) that goes with it, the question arises how to 
modify or redirect the effects of such power. Or, in Guattarian 
terms: How to re­route desires that have come to turn in circles? 
How to activate “catalysts of existential change” (30)? Partly, 
Guattari’s response is to note that – since an opposition only from 
the outside is not sufficient or feasible – it is “equally imperative 
to confront capitalism’s effects in the domain of mental ecology 
in everyday life: individual, domestic, material, neighbourly, 
creative or one’s personal ethics” (33). Therefore, “it will be a 
question in the future of cultivating a dissensus and the singular 
159production of existence” (33), the singularization of desires and 
modes of living.
Importantly, processes of singularization and new subjectivities 
are approached from an ecosophical perspective, inspired 
by Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind ([1972] 2000). 
“Ecology” (of which human subjectivity is one of Guattari’s 
three ecologies, alongside social relations and the environment) 
stresses that these existential modes are capable of morphing 
or being “cultivated.” They can “bifurcat[e] into stratified and 
deathly repetitions or … open … up processually from a praxis” 
(2008, 35), they can be constrained or opened (de­ and re­
territorialized). Given Guattari’s analysis of IWC as a stratification 
and homogenization of existence for profit, the de­stratification 
and differentiation of existence is key to any critical intervention 
into these conditions. Dissensus is not articulated in the name of 
an alternative general project; rather, it serves to re­singularize 
existences (or proliferate difference) without presupposing a 
telos. The subjective domain – human subjectivity – is viewed 
neither (prescriptively) on the basis of structure (unconscious, 
language, law) nor as possessing directionality or end (self­con­
sciousness, normativity, consensus). It is rather phrased as the 
affirmation of creatively cultivating new existential refrains, the 
desire for a “subjectivity of resingularization” (44) which exploits 
“a­signifying points of rupture” (37) to care into existence hitherto 
unimagined vectors, desires, and phantasms.
Literature plays a crucial role for Guattari in this: as a practice 
that can explore symptoms and incidents outside the norm, 
and mobilize vectors of subjectification that elude the mastery 
of the self to work for a re­routing of refrains (in a similar way, 
Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty ([1967] 1991) makes use of the 
literary analyses of sadism and masochism, linking the critical 
and clinical). For this reason Guattari pleads for tapping the 
“cartographies of the psyche” (2008, 25) that poetic-literary texts 
offer. The critical and clinical work go hand in hand here, with 
literary texts seen as critical manifestos “for effective practices of 
160 experimentation” (24) to “bring into being other worlds” (44–45, 
bold added) and to critically intervene into and transform oppres­
sive modes of living. 
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Skin
Asja Szafraniec
Critique today, in one aspect at least, forks out in two directions, 
differing with regard to the analyzed “object.” The first prong 
remains faithful to the transcendental focus inherited from 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, addressing the categories in 
which we lift the world out of chaos (the criteria, the dividing 
lines, the modalities of thought). The critique that is affirmative 
and nonetheless intervening is one which attends to the 
appropriateness of those dividing lines and the way in which they 
influence our understanding, in the hope of discovering spaces 
for adjustment, for creative supplementation, for emphasis, for 
affirmation. The second prong abandons the Kantian model as 
detracting our attention from the empirical and proposes to 
focus instead on the analysis of states of affairs. While its call for 
getting closer to the “matters of concern” – a renewed empiricism 
– is utterly convincing, it remains to be examined whether 
attention to “matters of concern” requires an abandoning of the 
transcendental inquiry (Latour 2004, 231).
This question becomes particularly urgent when it comes to 
categories of “things” (not necessarily the scientific “objects” 
examined by Bruno Latour) that seem to have the characteristics 
of “matters of concern,” but also function as categories in terms 
of which we perceive other “things.” Skin might be one example 
of such a “thing,” in which, on a micro­level, the critical tension 
162 between the empirical and the transcendental plays out. Skin is a 
bodily organ that distributes stimuli and protects the inside from 
the outside. But it is also a name for a set of mental constructs, 
each of which is a dispositif we use to regulate our relation to the 
outside world. At its most extreme, skin is a name for any surface 
that topologically produces sense by the sheer trajectory it traces 
(which makes it a condition of possibility of what it separates – 
constituting the in­ and outside) – a plane of immanence. Since 
the ways in which it is construed are multiple and complex and 
crucially impact our view of the world, skin must also be seen as 
a matter of concern. It is the figure for the most urgent political, 
ethical, and philosophical problems of our time: for our ethical 
and ecological relation to other beings endowed with (another, 
different) skin, for the political issues of integration or assim­
ilation, and finally for the understanding of the origin of human 
subjectivity and the nature of our relation to the world. As a 
surface on which an organism negotiates between the inside and 
the outside skin is also a figure for “work” as artistic production. 
On how we understand skin – its degrees of permeability, its 
capacity for affect, its interaction with its inside and outside – 
depends what we will be able to say about both the organism and 
the world. Often misunderstood in terms of a neutral partition 
separating an organism from its environment, skin remains 
on the outskirts of critical discourse. But this phenomenal and 
semantic region and the tensions that it hosts, might be said to 
respond in many ways to the objectives contemporary critique 
sets for itself: to find out “who ‘we’ might be” (Kaiser, Thiele, and 
Bunz 2014) (Are we contained inside our skins? Is the outside 
really outside?). Also, different conceptions of skin lead not only 
to different ideas about the need for, the manner, and the desired 
degree and trajectory of any possible intervention, affirmation, 
re­orientation, etc. but also to different ideas about the way 
in which affirmation is also intervention, about what precisely 
should be affirmed and where (by what affirming instance).
163Two currents of thought that critique draws on today refer to 
skin as a site of potentially affirmative receptivity: the French 
tradition (Deleuze, Derrida, Lacan) and a tradition influenced by 
a certain understanding of “Romanticism” (Wittgenstein, Cavell, 
Benjamin). They do so in seemingly opposed ways: on the one 
hand, the French investment in difference, on the other, the 
Romantic yearning for seamlessness. For the first current, skin 
is always an operator of difference, the place where difference 
is thematized, endorsed, and amplified. For the “Romantically” 
inflected philosophies, in contrast, skin, and analogous surfaces 
or textures are so many figures of yearning for effortless align­
ment with the world, the site of a desire for seamlessness, 
for the closing of the skeptical gap – in other words for a dis­
appearance or at least an attenuation of difference (Cavell 2002, 
61; Benjamin 1999, 590). Each of those approaches suggests a 
possible response to the problems of our relation to the world 
(and to the pervasive question: How do we change the world?). 
And each does so through its concern with receptivity and with 
the production of sense. The response of the French­inspired 
approaches has often been taken to be “through difference” – 
through differing from the world, distancing or some form of 
collective negation of some aspect of the world (an affirmation 
of one aspect is usually a negation of an other). Against this 
backdrop, the response of the “Romantic” approaches, in terms 
of perfect alignment with the world, might be taken to suggest a 
form of (political) quietism: the absorption of the world as it is in 
its entirety, without negation.
Jacques Lacan’s famous gloss on our embodiment, that we are 
“sacks of skin,” when not properly contextualized, might be 
taken to invite a reading in which skin is seen as a boundary 
between the self and the world, an individuating container in 
which something inner (and deeper) is encapsulated (Bernet 
2000). This initial interpretation of the sack’s relation to the world 
(and to other “sacks”) needs to be revised. Clearly, skin is not 
simply a continuous layer of tissue where impressions from the 
164 environment accumulate, but rather a selective barrier permitting 
economic exchange of information, including the emergence of 
information to the outside (pigment, wrinkles, sweat). But for 
some thinkers this “membranous” reading of skin in terms of 
transmission, recording, selection, and exchange also needs to 
be qualified: for Gilles Deleuze, skin is a transcendental surface 
(addressed by Deleuze’s appropriation of Paul Valéry’s state­
ment that “skin is the deepest” [Deleuze 1990, 103]). As opposed 
to the understanding of skin in terms of “economic exchange,” 
skin in this approach does not mediate between independently 
established entities (as in self and another self): instead, it con­
stitutes them topologically as such – it is the origin of their sense. 
In so defining skin, Deleuze makes it an empirical figure for all 
immanent lines of discernment, critical partitions, for all “critical” 
surfaces.
A somewhat different course is charted by the “Romantically” 
inflected philosophies of skin (Wittgenstein, Cavell, and 
Benjamin). Among those authors, skin stands for the way in 
which the affinity between the world and me, as a being endowed 
with skin, is construed, be it skeptically, phantasmatically, or 
ordinarily. Unfathomability of the inner (and thus also of the 
outer) feeds skepticism, so it ’s preferable to focus on surface 
instead of depth. “Wittgenstein wishes an acknowledgment of 
human limitation which does not leave us chafed by our own skin, 
by a sense of powerlessness to penetrate beyond the human 
conditions of knowledge” (Wittgenstein 2003, 71; 2012, 238; Cavell 
2002, 61). Consequently, the Romantics approach skin as a site 
of organic suture to the world, with the world conceived as the 
second skin, enveloping the first. This Romantic yearning for 
spiritual osmosis, being enfolded, seamlessness, and plasticity 
seems, on the one hand, the purest affirmation that we can have: 
it accepts that to our terran existence there is no alternative. 
But on the other hand, its potential for intervention seems to be 
attenuated – or at least an ethical rather than a political one.
165Two points of convergence suggest that these approaches can 
be reconciled and that the Romantic approach can regain its 
potential for intervention. In some of the approaches (on both 
the French and the Romantic side), skin is not conceived as a 
membrane or a biological epidermis but rather a fabric (see 
Walter Benjamin’s question whether it is to be seen as a “net” or 
a “mantle” [Benjamin 2006, 96] and Stanley Cavell’s injunction to 
“word the world together” [Cavell 1994, 126] – so that it doesn’t 
fall apart, so to speak), suggesting that affinity to the world 
comes from human actions and words, is fabricated or woven 
(see Benjamin’s figures of glove, sock, etui, etc.). That those 
approaches meet in their understanding of skin in terms of 
language and “fabric” offers possibilities for affirmative inter­
vention: “wording the world together” is not just letting it be as it 
is.
Another point of convergence between the two approaches that 
might contribute to the understanding of aspects of affirmation 
is their move away from thinking about skin as a border or a con­
tainer so as to focus on the figure of reversibility or alignment in 
the negative. Walter Benjamin pleads for recasting the opposition 
between inside and outside: an important figure in his work is 
the “turning inside out” (Friedlander 2012, 104) where the inside 
reveals itself as its opposite (see also Mondzain 2015). It would 
perhaps be more appropriate to say that for both traditions, 
rather than “sacks of skin” (Lacan 2006, 282), we are reversible 
folds of the world (so that the inner is as political as the outer). 
The figure of “turning inside out” speaks to Baruch de Spinoza’s 
question of “what a body might do.” Suggestive of an unmediated, 
privileged interaction – on the “inner side” – with each and every 
aspect of the world, but also of the potentially unlimited reach of 
the “merely individual,” it contests the opposition between the 
political and the ethical. It indicates that both the “we” of critique 
and its trajectory might need to be redefined.
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Specters
Esther Peeren
Affirmation as an ambiguous critical mode would entail “not 
to simply love everything, but rather to really turn around both 
sides (love and hate), to avert the immediate (perhaps) natural 
tendency that you want to reject something if you do not agree 
or dislike it, and instead, to try it the other way around – to 
exercise a non­negation until space – a different spacing – will 
open up” (Kaiser, Thiele, and Bunz 2014). This resonates with 
Jacques Derrida’s injunction that, when confronted with a ghost 
or specter (as a figure of radical alterity), we should not give in 
to the urge to exorcize it, but should instead learn to live with it 
(Derrida 1994, xxviii). Such living with, as the just way of dealing 
with a haunting, is not self­evident (hence the need to learn how 
to do it) or straightforward, for, in addition to not being negated, 
the specter should also not be forced to assimilate. Haunting 
is reconfigured as a relational dynamic of responsibility with 
unpredictable results and considerable risks that cannot be fully 
controlled by either party, as Hamlet and his father’s ghost find 
out at great cost in William Shakespeare’s tragedy, from which 
Derrida’s Specters of Marx (1994) takes off. 
Specters, then, put agency – as sovereign control over one’s 
actions and their consequences – into question. What we are 
left with is not so much agency circumscribed or agency to a 
lesser degree – as semi-agency, in its reference to a quantitative 
168 halving, seems to imply – but agency itself rendered as ambig­
uous and ephemeral as the specter. For, Derrida insists, a specter 
is not half­alive and half­dead, but something that, in full, exists 
in apparently mutually exclusive states, oscillating unpredictably 
between life and death, visibility and invisibility, materiality and 
immateriality, as well as the past, present, and future. Rather 
than dividing itself between these states, the specter exemplifies 
how each is divided from itself by its others, which do not remain 
separate from it, but are always already entangled with it. 
In Derrida’s terms, a spectral “living on [sur­vie]” appears as 
“a survival whose possibility in advance comes to disjoin or 
dis­adjust the identity to itself of the living present as well as 
of any effectivity” (Derrida 1994, xx). Effectivity – the ability to 
have effects that constitutes agency – comes apart not into 
quantifiable parts, but is undone in a more fundamental manner 
by the specter as “more than one/no more one [le plus d’un],” as 
simultaneously multiple and heterogeneous (xx). The specter, 
then, does not merely do something to temporality by putting 
time out of joint, and to being by transforming ontology into 
hauntology. It also does something to doing by making agency 
ambiguous and dynamic, causing it to wander in time, in space, 
and between what or who haunts, and what or whom is haunted. 
As a result, haunting manifests as an insistent following – in 
Dutch, aptly, it is translated as achtervolgd worden (being 
followed) – that also indicates a fundamental dependency: 
as popular culture teaches, ghosts haunt because they need 
something from the living (revenge, justice, reparation, assis­
tance) and, conversely, the living conjure ghosts because they 
want them to provide access to the past or to other worlds. In 
itself, following already combines the active and the passive 
as a deliberate, insistent, and insidious action that does not 
determine its own course. Thus, haunting can be said to stage an 
“entangled state of agencies” (Barad 2007, 23) where power and 
dependency are not clearly distinguishable. In the depersonalized 
form of the German es spukt (“it haunts”), moreover, which lacks 
169an identifiable haunting agent or force, what appears is “an 
unnameable and neutral power, that is, undecidable, neither 
active nor passive, an an­identity that, without doing anything, 
invisibly occupies places belonging finally neither to us nor to 
it” (Derrida 1994, 172). Without being or doing anything deter­
minable, the es spukt nevertheless constitutes a force that affects 
its surroundings and can make something happen.
The Derridean specter also figures the condition of being impli­
cated, as it is impossible not to be haunted, even for ghosts. Thus, 
Karl Marx is not only seen to haunt us but is himself conceived 
as haunted, together with Max Stirner, by Hegel. According to 
Derrida, it is impossible not to receive inheritances from the 
past and such inheritances cannot be refused, even if they can 
also never completely be known and appropriated. Something 
must be done with these spectral inheritances in order to live 
with them, and this something marks a site of critical agency: 
“‘One must’ means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort 
out several different possibles that inhabit the same injunction” 
(16). That the spectral inheritance has the power to make one act 
does not divest such compelled acts from agency altogether, but 
redefines the latter as entangled and ambiguous – as spectral 
agency (Peeren 2014, 16–24).
While ghosts appear to wield considerable power – including 
in Derrida’s account, which ascribes to them the intimidating 
visor effect (the ability to see without being seen) as well as the 
ability to put time out of joint and to hand down injunctions – 
their dependency on being acknowledged by the living ensures 
that they are never all­powerful. At the same time, they are also 
never powerless, not even when their ghostliness marks extreme 
dispossession and vulnerability to exploitation rather than a 
haunting ability to instill fear and fascination, as is the case for 
those inhabiting the necropolitical death­worlds of the colonial, 
postcolonial, and neocolonial regimes described by Achille 
Mbembe: “My concern is those forms of sovereignty whose cen­
tral project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized 
170 instrumentalization of human existence and the material 
destruction of human bodies and populations” (Mbembe 2003b, 
14). Even these “living­dead (ghosts)” are capable of making 
something happen, not necessarily deliberately or efficiently, 
but by the very condition of constant wandering and transfor-
mation that defines their spectral existence, which renders them 
simultaneously vulnerable and elusive (Mbembe 2003a, 1).
Antonio Negri, in his response to Specters of Marx, complains that 
Derrida’s theory and the “new spectrality” of postindustrial labor 
renders spectrality so pervasive that nothing solid, not even the 
worker’s body, can be set against it: 
The new spectrality is here – and we’re entirely within this 
real illusion … There’s no longer an outside, neither a nos­
talgic one, nor a mythic one, nor any urgency or reason to 
disengage us from the spectrality of the real … The subject 
is therefore unlocatable in a world that has lost all measure, 
because in this spectral reality no measure is perceived or 
perceptible. (Negri 1999, 9)
For Negri, the fact that spectrality now fully encompasses the 
worker removes any capacity to act: if the subject cannot even 
be located and is of the same ephemeral quality as the cap­
italist system, how can it do anything to challenge it? He links the 
inability to act with spectrality, even though he also describes 
the capitalist system as highly effective in establishing a “ghostly 
dominion” (10). Yet, if there can be a spectrality that signifies 
dominion (and thus, surely, a form of agency), might the spec­
tralized subject not also partake of it? This is exactly what Derrida 
proposes. The ambivalent force of es spukt, invisible yet not 
beyond being perceived, potentially allows spectralized subjects 
– the living­dead – to struggle against the spectralizing system by 
which they are produced as exploitable and expendable. As the 
familiar horror film scenario shows, the ghost can indeed come 
to haunt or possess its conjurer, but it can do so only as a ghost 
171and not by laying claim to an unambiguous visibility, materiality, 
presence, and aliveness.
Spectral agency can refer to ghostly acts or to acts in the face 
of ghosts. For Derrida, as noted, the latter ought to be aimed at 
living with specters rather than at their exorcism or assimilation. 
If not exactly advocating a caring for specters, in the double 
sense of taking care of and having affinity with, this does imply 
an affirmative relationality and responsibility that might also be 
a criticality. The specter, conceived as a haunting entity, con­
firms our implicatedness in the world, our inability to separate 
ourselves from our multiple and complex entanglements with it, 
but at the same time it also stresses the element of “one must.” 
We may not be able to choose what or whom we must care for or 
about, as ghosts and their spectral inheritances press themselves 
upon us. Yet critical force may reside in how we give shape to our 
living with them.
References
Barad, Karen. 2007. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entan-
glement of Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke University Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1994. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & 
the New International. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge.
Kaiser, Birgit Mara, Kathrin Thiele, and Mercedes Bunz. 2014. “What is Critique in the 
21st Century? Discussing Terra Critica: A Conversation between Birgit Mara Kaiser, 
Kathrin Thiele and Mercedes Bunz.” terracritica.net. Accessed May 2015. http://
terracritica.net/interview/.
Mbembe, Achille. 2003a. “Life, Sovereignty, and Terror in the Fiction of Amos 
Tutuola.” Research in African Literatures 34 (4): 1–26.
Mbembe, Achille. 2003b. “Necropolitics,” translated by Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 
15 (1): 11–40.
Negri, Antonio. 1999. “The Specter’s Smile.” In Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium 
on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, edited by Michael Sprinker, 5–16. London: 
Verso.
Peeren, Esther. 2014. The Spectral Metaphor: Living Ghosts and the Agency of Invis-
ibility. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Speculation 
Melanie Sehgal
Philosophically, speculation seems to be the antidote to critical 
thinking ­ striving for absolutes, for truths beyond the realm of 
experience, beyond historicity and finite perspectives. Thus, 
with the birth of critique, speculative thought became subject 
to critique. One could say that speculation was the first object 
of critique – if one understands speculation as metaphysical 
speculation about objects beyond experience, beyond what 
one can safely know and critique in the sense inaugurated by 
Immanuel Kant. In this perspective, critique historically replaced 
speculation. This replacement of metaphysical speculation 
by the Kantian reversion to the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge marks the beginning of modern thought, it even mark 
its modernity. Even if the Kantian conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge have now been replaced by linguistic or cultural 
conditions, the movement of critique, its practice, still follows the 
Kantian turn: It is a move away from what is given in experience 
to its conditions. Thus, if we stick to the classical philosophical 
understandings of both terms, the relation between critique and 
speculation has been a difficult, even antagonistic one. However, 
rethinking both terms, critique and speculation, enables a 
different perspective. 
From this perspective, speculation becomes a new form of 
critique, a method of critical thinking. Speculation then is not 
174 defined by its objects – objects beyond experience pertaining to 
the absolute as it has been the case throughout the history of 
philosophy as well as in current re­actualizations of speculation 
(for example within the context of so­called speculative realism). 
Instead, speculation is to be defined by its practice and to be 
understood as a method. How does this method work? And 
in what way is this focus on the practice of theory exhibiting 
speculation as a critical method? 
This question reverberates with the crucial stake of rethinking 
critique today. Why critique matters is not because it enables 
judgment. Taking sides has in some cases become impossible, 
while in others it is simply redundant, because every one agrees 
in theory anyways. The crucial aspect in rethinking critique today 
seems to be about method, about the practice of theory itself: 
How do we do theory? How does theory position itself towards 
experience, including its present and its past, its predecessors? 
If the desire to relate to the world we live in, to be relevant to it, 
is at the core of critical thinking, then how do we conceive of the 
mode of functioning, the efficacy, or performativity of theory 
towards its outside? In other words, how do we think of the 
relation of theory to practice, given that theory itself is a form of 
practice? What does it mean practically to think critically?  
Bruno Latour famously concluded that “critique has run out of 
steam” (Latour 2004) as traditionally critique is leading away 
from experience, away from the world towards its conditions. 
But Latour also emphasized the necessity to renew, to recon­
struct the notion and, above all, the very practice of critique. For 
him, rather than a “critique of critique” there is “[t]he practical 
problem … to associate the word criticism with a whole set of 
new positive metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee­jerk reactions, 
habits of thoughts“ (Latour 2004, 247). What might these new 
critical metaphors, gestures, attitudes, and habits of thought look 
like?
175In the first place, as Latour says, they are positive, they are 
affirmative – and this is a point in method concerning the situ­
ated practice of theory itself. New critical gestures start out from 
the simple observation that whatever becomes subject to critique 
is repeated, given space, time and weight and thus is affirmed 
– simply by means of one’s own theoretical practice. From this 
perspective, even the most judgmental and negative critique 
implicitly starts out from an affirmation. A reconstructed form 
of critical thinking thus begins with a simple gesture: it takes this 
primary affirmation into account methodologically. It forms the 
necessary starting point for speculation insofar as it posits its 
factual starting point in its theoretical practice rather than taking 
it as a given. And such a reconstructed practice of critical thinking 
lets this unavoidable affirmation guide its choice of subject, its 
way of constructing a problem. 
This leads to the second aspect of a speculative practice of critical 
thinking: It is engaged in the very construction of the problem. 
As Henri Bergson emphasized, the task of philosophy at large is 
not simply to find solutions for given problems. Its first task is to 
find the problem and challenge its current formulations, and to 
eventually recompose it.1 A speculative approach to a problem 
is to start out from a particular issue, this issue being what situ­
ates thinking, what pertains to the world and forces to think. But 
this does not imply taking the formulation of the problem for 
granted according to the immediate way in which the problem 
seems to present itself. Rather, a speculative practice of critical 
thinking actively creates an indetermination, so that a solution 
doesn’t necessarily follow from the way the problem has been 
posed. Thus, as Isabelle Stengers puts it, actively creating an 
indetermination “requires the transformation of what announced 
itself as a foundation, authorizing a position and providing its 
banner to a cause, into a constraint, which the solution will have 
1 “But the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of 
finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more then of 
solving it”  (Bergson 2007, 36). 
176 to respect but to which it may, if necessary, confer a somewhat 
unexpected signification” (2011, 15). Defining a problem does not 
determine its solution, rather the problem is a constraint for con­
structing a solution critically and speculatively.
Thirdly, a speculative practice of critique constructs responses to 
a problem with regard to their consequences. In view of sketching 
out speculation as a form of critical thinking, I have implicitly 
been drawing on a lineage of thought that ranges from Deleuze 
and Stengers to the early pragmatists. For William James or 
Charles Sanders Peirce pragmatism was “a method only” ( James 
1975, 31) and – despite of the prejudices against pragmatism 
that have been predominant within critical theory – I would like 
to argue that pragmatism is essentially a critical method. In the 
first place, the pragmatic method is a method of evaluation: The 
meaning of a concept is to be searched for in its consequences 
in experience, not in its reference to some idea or abstract truth. 
Thus, while critique in a classical, Kantian or even post­Kantian 
sense implies a movement backwards towards conditions, be 
they understood as a priori or linguistic or cultural, speculation 
leaps forward. It evaluates a concept, an idea, a response to 
a problem in terms of its imagined consequences in future 
experience, in terms of what the idea might lead to.2 These 
consequences lie in the future and can thus only be imagined 
they are inherently speculative. And because this speculation 
2 This implies or presupposes a certain idea of knowledge, one that builds on 
the changes within physics from a Newtonian framework to one of relativity 
and quantum physics and on enquiries into the physiology and psychology 
of knowledge processes. From this perspective, knowledge can never be 
certain. If one looks at the way knowledge is constructed concretely, in a 
scientific experiment, for example, knowledge, partly because of its time­
bound nature, is inherently speculative. There first is a hypothesis, an idea, 
that then needs to be verified. In addition, constructing the solution to a 
problem implies the belief that some solution is actually possible. Without 
this belief no solution can be found – thus this or more generally: a belief 
precedes the verification. In this way, from a pragmatic point of view, which 
builds on twentieth century physics and psychology, knowledge is per force 
inherently speculative.
177is grounded in the experience it starts out from, it isn’t “mere 
speculation.” The pragmatic method combines speculation 
with immanence – remaining within the flat ontology of a 
philosophy of immanence and radical experience –, and it does 
so methodologically: It avoids a representionalist, dualist stance 
in its own method, its own practice. There is no transcendent 
viewpoint from which a claim to absolute truth can be made; 
instead, there is only the stream of radical experience to follow, 
through the consequences a hypothesis generates. 
This is why the pragmatic method is not restricted to evaluating 
already existing ideas and concepts. It can also be used as a 
method of constructing new ideas, new concepts (see Lapoujade 
1997, 10). It can be put to work in the construction of different 
kinds of concepts, putting ideas to the test in view of possible 
outcomes and effects in experience. What would this idea, this 
response to a problem lead to? How could this concept guide 
our experience, our action in this particular situation? How does 
this idea address its recipients? Who is included by it, who is 
excluded? Could this idea change the way a situation is taking 
its course? What if we would think about this situation, or that 
problem in other terms? These are pragmatic questions and 
pragmatic questions can only be answered speculatively: by 
imagining future outcomes and consequences. Thus, speculation 
pragmatically understood is an art of consequences, of effects 
and such speculation is never certain, but always situated. It is 
grounded in its claims without creating new foundations. It starts 
out from what is given in experience, a problem, a situation that 
forces one to think, then tries to actively change the terms of this 
problem or situation, in order to change the course of its con­
sequences: What if this problem was answered in this way? What 
would this lead to? 
Critical thinking understood speculatively thus involves 
three dimensions: it implies starting out from a practical, 
methodological affirmation of what is given in experience, simply 
by means of one’s own theoretical practice. It implies actively 
178 constructing the problem and only then formulating responses, 
constructing new ideas, or putting forth concepts that are then 
to be evaluated by their consequences, by what they might lead 
to in experience. Borrowing a term from Alfred North White­
head, critical speculation formulates, constructs “propositions”. 
Propositions, understood pragmatically and speculatively, are 
not jugdments or statements about what is; they are “lures for 
feeling” this world – otherwise. 
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Stutter
Esther Peeren
In everyday life, stuttering – clinically defined as “a speech dis­
order that involves frequent and significant problems with the 
normal fluency and flow of speech”1 – garners sympathy but 
is also seen as something aberrant that ought to be overcome 
for everyone’s benefit. Keeping stutterers from communicating 
clearly and efficiently, their halting speech is considered a burden 
on their interlocutors, who may “respond with embarrassment” 
or even “experience a kind of pain” (Gunn and Rice 2009, 217). 
At the same time, stuttering interferes with views of the subject 
as autonomous and fully in control of itself by at once impairing 
voluntary action (what it intends to say is not what is uttered) and 
constituting involuntary action (words or parts of words come 
out altered or repeatedly).
The connection between stuttering and a lack of sovereignty is lit­
eralized in the 2010 Oscar­winning film The King’s Speech (directed 
by Tom Hooper), which follows the struggle of King George VI 
(1895–1952) to overcome his speech impediment in order to 
give a radio address worthy of a king after – it is suggested – 
having embarrassed himself and the monarchy at an earlier 
public speaking engagement. Helped by Lionel Logue, a speech 
1 http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases­conditions/stuttering/basics/
definition/con­20032854.
180 therapist who uses a combination of physical exercises and 
psychoanalysis, the king ends up conquering his stutter to deliver 
a rousing radio address on the occasion of the British declaration 
of war on Germany. The implication is that his position as ruler 
of the British Empire is cemented not so much by what he says, 
but by the fact that he is able to say it fluently. In 2013, an episode 
of Educating Yorkshire, a Channel 4 reality television show set in 
a secondary school, went viral after featuring a pupil, Musharaf, 
who was helped to overcome his severe stutter for his oral 
exam by his English teacher; the latter used the same method 
employed by Logue of having the stutterer listen to music while 
reciting a poem. Here, too, overcoming a stutter is framed as 
gaining control of oneself and as facilitating unconstrained, 
effective communication, even when, as in The King’s Speech, what 
is achieved is not a speaking with but a speaking to (an address 
rather than a dialogue) that is also a speaking to a script (and thus 
not autonomous). In both cases, moreover, the disappearance 
of the stutter indicates a return to and affirmation of the norms 
regarding what constitutes “normal” speech and proper social 
and political organization: Musharaf can participate in the oral 
exam without questions having to be raised about its exclusion 
of those with speech impediments and George VI shores up the 
British monarchy after it had been brought into crisis by the 
abdication of Edward VIII.
With stuttering, as a speech disorder, marking non­normative 
communication and, etymologically, indicating that which 
forcefully comes up against something else – “stutter” has the 
same Old High German root (stôƺen) as the modern German 
stossen, meaning “to knock, strike against, collide” (see Oxford 
English Dictionary, stutter, v. and stut, v.) – it is not surprising that 
it has been taken up metaphorically to configure a more general 
disruptive and potentially critical force. Most notably, Deleuze, 
in “He Stuttered,” extends the stutter beyond speech by arguing 
that, by stuttering in language, authors like Herman Melville, 
Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett, Gherasim Luca, and Charles Péguy 
181make language itself stutter. Through various techniques – the 
use of inclusive disjunctions, asignifying particles or repeated 
substantives – the language system is made to strike against 
or collide with itself, rendering it “affective and intensive,” and 
putting it “in perpetual disequilibrium or bifurcation” (Deleuze 
1997, 107, 108; bold added). For Deleuze, the creative stutter is 
a figure of immanence; it is not a vacillation between or mix of 
different languages but operates within a singular language to 
modulate or “minorize” it (109). Rather than adding something 
external, it expands, rhizomatically, from within: “Every word 
is divided, but into itself (pas-rats, passions-rations); and every 
word is combined, but with itself (pas-passe-passion)” (110). The 
critical potential of this immanence is signaled by the parallel 
Deleuze draws between the way stuttering takes language to its 
limit, putting it in touch with its outside and with silence, and the 
“state of boom, close to a crash” that creates space for radical new 
insight in “pure science” (109).
This line of thinking has been taken up by Isabel Stengers, who 
invokes the stutter as that which, in science, can disrupt and 
destabilize “matters of fact” and “consensus” (Stengers 2005, 154, 
158). Her reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy? 
(1994) conjures an image of stuttering minorities. Their stutters, 
if not dismissed or taken as an affliction to be cured, but con­
sidered as symptoms of systemic problems, may go from being 
interruptions to staging interventions. The stutter then becomes 
a “counter­effectuation” that produces “active divergence” 
(Stengers 2005, 163) and thus a mode of critique. From a similar 
Deleuzian perspective, Simon O’Sullivan conceives of the stutter, 
which he equates to the glitch, as both breaking a world and 
making a world, as simultaneous negation and affirmation: “The 
glitch is then a moment of critique, a moment of negation – but 
182 also a moment of creation and of affirmation” (O’Sullivan 2009, 
251).2
Returning to stuttering as a speech disorder, it may be seen as 
inducing slowness and retardation through excess, expanding in 
time through a form of repetition that, instead of reconfirming 
meaning, moves beyond making immediate sense into ostensible 
redundancy. In the face of this, “the listener – or spectator – 
must respond to the glitch, the affective­event, as an event, as 
the bearer of the potentiality of something else” (249). Such a 
response can only reproduce the hesitation of what it responds 
to and, hence, should proceed slowly, thoughtfully, patiently. 
In a similar vein to the arrest of stupidity that Giorgio Agamben 
argues is the scholar’s permanent condition (Pollard 2012, 125), 
stuttering may well be what the scholar in our age of advanced 
globalization – marked by relentless acceleration and neoliberal 
capitalism’s cult of 24/7 (Crary 2014) – should respond to, as well 
as the form this response should take and the effect it should 
have.
Conceiving of stuttering as at once the object, form, and effect of 
critique radicalizes Geoffrey Hartman’s notion of literary criticism 
as inducing a stutter in the text:
Criticism as a kind of hermeneutics is disconcerting; like logic 
but without the latter’s motive of absolute internal consis­
tency, it reveals contradictions and equivocations, and so 
makes fiction interpretable by making it less readable. The 
fluency of the reader is affected by a kind of stutter: the 
critic’s response becomes deliberately hesitant. (quoted in 
Sprinker 1980, 221)
2 The stutter’s and the glitch’s modes of disruption can be differentiated. As 
a “surge of current or a spurious electrical signal … ; also, in extended use, 
a sudden short­lived irregularity in behaviour,” a glitch is a less sustained, 
singular event lacking the stutter’s association with repetition, frag­
mentation, and excess (see Oxford English Dictionary, glitch, n.).
183Here, rather than inhabiting language, making it “trembl[e] from 
head to toe” (Deleuze 1997, 109), the stutter is primarily an effect 
of criticism, produced through it and imposed on the text. It may 
reveal contradictions and equivocations in the text, but only in 
the service of interpretation; there is no pushing of “language as 
a whole to its limit, to its outside, to its silence” (113). As a form 
of critique, the stutter is seemingly reduced to the delayed but 
systematic interpretation of hermeneutics that is never outside 
the critic’s control – its hesitancy is deliberate, a sign of eloquence 
rather than of inarticulacy or uncertainty. It is the smoothness 
and comfort of the reader’s experience that is interrupted by this 
display of expertise.
Hartman’s stutter appears sterile. It leaves aside the stutter’s 
exposure of the difficulties of enunciation and address, and 
locates the discomfort and frustration experienced by stutterers 
like George VI and Musharaf exclusively in the reader. In contrast, 
conceiving of stuttering as object, form, and effect of critique in 
the current planetary condition would emphasize and distribute 
these aspects. In addition, it would stress the “entanglement 
between body and language” (Gunn and Rice 2009, 218; bold 
added) that renders stuttering a material, embodied experience 
of ineffectiveness, indeterminacy, uncertainty, and risk. Scholarly 
stuttering should not be an affectation or something we seek 
to grow out of, but an unavoidable part of our critical practices. 
Recognizing this is particularly important at a time when the 
neoliberalization of academia and its preoccupation with 
quantifiable productivity and efficiency pushes us to speed up 
and to smooth over (or to avoid altogether) the meandering and 
halting that, as Deleuze suggests, is often precisely what opens 
up new ways of making sense.
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Symptomatology
Birgit Mara Kaiser
Symptomatology is generally understood as a branch of 
pathology, studying the indications of illness and disease in order 
to treat the illness that these symptoms manifest. Symptoms are, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “a (bodily or mental) 
phenomenon, circumstance, or change of condition arising from 
and accompanying a disease or affection, and constituting an 
indication or evidence of it.” In the modern medical use of the 
term, symptoms – although signs of an illness – differ from signs 
in so far as they denote a subjective indication of affection or 
illness, one that is perceptible to the patient, “as opposed to an 
objective one or sign” (OED). Symptoms are, thus, perspectival 
and subjective. And while they require – very much like signs – 
to be interpreted, their interpretation always has to take into 
account the specific constellation in which they appear and to 
whom they appear; that is, they are not readable in isolation 
but only in constellation with other symptoms, and their mani­
festation and readability might differ according to the per­
spective from which they are interpreted. A set or convergence of 
symptoms, the “concurrence of several symptoms in a disease” 
(OED), is then, in medical discourse, called a syndrome. 
In critical discourse, symptomatology was prominently used by 
Gilles Deleuze, who built on this clinical usage as well as on the 
term’s associations in Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings. As such, the 
186 term first surfaced in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy ([1962] 
1983), most explicitly in the chapter entitled “Critique.” As Deleuze 
points out, symptomatology is one form of the “active science” 
(1983, 75) that Nietzsche sought to establish, alongside the two 
other forms typology and genealogy. In order to overcome the 
established passive or reactive science, which fails to examine 
the genealogy of forces underlying its objects of study, Nietzsche 
aspired to an active science capable of interpreting precisely 
these relations of forces. An example Deleuze uses to show 
this difference in perspective is Nietzsche’s turn to linguistics. 
While traditional linguistics places emphasis on the recipient of 
language, judging language “from the standpoint of the hearer” 
(74) and with an eye on the meaning inherent in words, Nietzsche 
strives for an “active philology,” which would pursue the relations 
of forces that an utterance sets in motion. “Active linguistics” 
abandons the “objective” study of words and instead 
… looks to discover who it is that speaks and names. “Who 
uses a particular word, what does he apply it to first of all; 
himself, someone else who listens, something else, and with 
what intention? What does he will by uttering a particular 
word?” The transformation of the sense of a word means 
that someone else (another force and another will) has taken 
possession of it and is applying it to another thing because 
he wants something else. (74–75) 
The task of Nietzsche’s active science is to pose these ques­
tions of power and pursue the relations of forces that become 
evident by asking them. They are the real and “subterranean 
differential mechanisms” (157) that shape phenomena, and a 
symptomatology, consequently, is that part of active science 
that “interprets phenomena, treating them as symptoms whose 
sense must be sought in the forces that produce them” (75). That 
Deleuze outlines symptomatology in a chapter entitled “Critique” 
is crucial: Symptomatology is used as a critical tool, an activity to 
distil the relations of forces underlying the currently congealed 
order of things. It thus displaces a notion of critique as judgment 
187and the search for conditions of possibility (Kant’s transcendental 
principles) and instead stresses critique (as symptomatology) 
as the analysis of the “genetic and plastic principles” (93, bold 
added) that form the becoming of things. Practiced as such, 
Deleuze writes, “[t]he point of critique is not justification but a 
different way of feeling: another sensibility” (94, bold added). 
In Coldness and Cruelty, his critical introduction of 1967 to the 
French translation of Leopold von Sacher­Masoch’s Venus in 
Furs, Deleuze then translates a Nietzschean symptomatology 
for the analyses of art. He demonstrates how Sacher­Masoch’s 
and the Marquis de Sade’s novels isolated two different desiring 
structures (masochism and sadism). These were, however, con­
flated as complimentary sexual “perversions” by Richard Freiherr 
von Krafft­Ebing as “sadomasochism,” a portmanteau formed 
from the two authors’ names. As Deleuze argues, Krafft­Ebing’s 
scientia sexualis and subsequently Freudian psychoanalysis 
erroneously united “very different disturbances under a mis­
begotten name, in a whole arbitrarily defined by nonspecific 
causes” (1989, 134). Therefore, by revisiting Sacher­Masoch and 
de Sade, he unravels how they described irreducibly specific 
symptoms of the different “disturbances” of sadism and mas­
ochism (giving a list of eleven symptoms for each). 
Two things happen here: First, instead of approaching writers 
as patients, Deleuze takes them as clinicians themselves, whose 
diagnoses have isolated or brought to light certain forms of 
desire. Rather than attribute an “illness” to the authors de Sade 
and Sacher­Masoch, to which their writings allegedly give expres­
sion (as Kraft­Ebbing and Freud did), their works are understood 
by Deleuze as a way to disentangle particular ways of feeling, 
taking literally the Greek root of critique – krinein – which is “to 
cut, rift, separate, discriminate, to decide” (see Hansen 2000, 
4; see Process). The works themselves thereby perform a 
symptomatological analysis. In The Logic of Sense (1968), a text 
that draws prominently on Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, 
Deleuze then explicitly holds that writers are “themselves 
188 astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists” (1990, 237). 
We find this approach throughout Deleuze’s engagement with 
literature and the arts right up to Essays Critical and Clinical 
(1993), where the very title signals the meeting­point of medical 
and artistic diagnoses in the sense outlined (see also Lambert). 
Second, Deleuze proposes a particular method of critical analysis 
– a method not only of literary works (in the double genitive as 
analysis done by and of literary works) but a method of analysis 
applicable to phenomena at large. Not taking phenomena at face 
value, Deleuze writes in Nietzsche and Philosophy: 
We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a 
biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not 
know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits 
it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A 
phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition 
but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing 
force. (3)
Symptomatology is therefore directed at the constellation of 
forces that form a certain phenomenon or way of existing. The 
specificity of this method, however, does not only lie in its being 
directed at the forces that a symptom signals but also in the way 
it proceeds. Such a procedure, which Nietzsche called “active” 
and Deleuze “creative,” differs from a reading of signs; it rather 
involves an interpretation of symptoms in their constellation 
and it is – in the course of this interpretation – a rearrangement 
or a new grouping of such a constellation. In The Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze explains: “There is always a great deal of art involved in 
the grouping of symptoms, in the organization of a table where 
a particular symptom is dissociated from another, juxtaposed 
to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness” (237, 
emphases added). As much as the doctor, the symptomatologist 
does not invent the disorder but she “isolates” it: by dis­
tinguishing and disentangling components that had so far been 
erroneously clustered together (“sadomasochism”), therefore 
by destroying the cluster that had falsely been taken as unity, by 
189specifying its components and subsequently regrouping them 
(“sadism” – “masochism”), by detecting the forces that form these 
new conditions. In the course of such a “differential diagnostics” 
(Smith, xviii) new figures emerge, disentangling a false cluster and 
bringing to light the new portrait of a desire, a way of feeling, a 
differently posed problem. 
Such a new figure comes about as a result of “creative” or active 
critique (Deleuze 1989, 134). In that sense, Deleuze remarks in 
Coldness and Cruelty, “[s]ymptomatology is always a question of 
art” (14). An art of reading the symptoms of our contemporary, 
planetary condition, which would involve cutting, rifting, sep­
arating (krinein) the apparent clusters and reordering them in 
ways that make different constellations appear, different degrees 
of freedom imaginable. Critique as symptomatology is in that 
sense a clinical and “interdisciplinary” endeavor – “located almost 
outside of medicine, at a neutral point, a zero point, where artists 
and philosophers and doctors and patients can come together” 
(Deleuze 2004, 134, translation modified). 
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Technology
Mercedes Bunz
Technologies make worlds appear. It is this capacity that has 
always interested the contemporary critic when turning to the 
concept of technology. In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt, 
for example, discusses the effect technologies have on “the very 
worldliness of the human artifice” (1958, 150). Samuel Weber 
(1996) makes the same point – that technologies are “Upsetting 
the Set­Up” – when thinking through Martin Heidegger, who 
before him had remarked: “Techné belongs to bringing­forth, to 
poiesis. It is something poietic” (Heidegger 1977, 12). By adding 
new objects, by varying the measurements, by changing the 
perspectives, by linking what had been disconnected and con­
necting what had been apart, by providing destructive powers, by 
confusing the boundaries, technologies allow new and different 
movements of thoughts, things, and bodies into the human 
artifice. 
Although all technologies have the forceful and fabulous capacity 
to create a different world, the worlds that appear do not 
automatically lead in any progressive direction. In other words, 
their technical realities are necessarily different, but not nec­
essarily “better.” Walter Benjamin’s circular glasses were among 
the first to come across this: in his famous essay “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” (1936), he 
discusses the divergent ways in which the new means of (re)
192 production – photography and cinema – are affecting the masses, 
an affecting that can be twofold as the “increasing proletari­
anization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses 
are two aspects of the same process” (Benjamin 1936, 120; emphasis 
added). Technologies can be employed to manipulate the masses 
in the interest of fascist capital, or they can be employed to 
allow masses meet themselves thereby helping them to under­
stand their own formation, and therefore their needs. As 
Benjamin makes clear in his essay, the actual appropriation, the 
usage decides which of those worlds will be created. To ensure 
an appearance of a world aligned against fascism, his essay 
introduces a specific take on the new technologies:
In what follows, the concepts which are introduced … are 
completely useless for the purposes of fascism. On the other 
hand, they are useful for the formulation of revolutionary 
demands. (102)
Here, Benjamin points out that technologies change the world 
that is in place. New technical realities “neutralize a number 
of traditional concepts – such as creativity and genius, eternal 
value and mystery” (101). As they “neutralize” the framework of 
the world in place, technologies create an opening that harbors 
a political moment. It is technology that makes this opening 
possible – a point Benjamin makes again in another text, where 
he describes “technical revolutions” as “fracture points”: “[I]t is 
there that the different political tendencies may be said to come 
to the surface” (1927, 17). Years later, in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 
Donna Haraway embraces technology for the same reason: 
“The frame for my sketch is set by the extent and importance of 
rearrangements in world­wide social relations tied to science and 
technology” (1991, 161).
If technology has the capacity to question the world in place and 
if it offers difference, as Benjamin and Haraway write, technology 
is in this world but not of this world: It is alien to its conditions. 
Benjamin writes: “In every new technical revolution, the political 
193tendency is transformed, as if by its own volition, from a con­
cealed element of art into a manifest one” (1927, 17; emphasis 
added). We certainly can work with technology and with the 
political tendencies it has created, but we can neither control 
nor predict technology and thus which tendencies it will create. 
Technology follows its own, alien logic. Even in the twenty­first 
century, in which prediction has become a paradigm, this is still 
the case: In a field as closely guarded as the digital economy, we 
are never certain what will be “the next big thing.” We cannot 
predict the future of the technology we have invented. Alien to 
us, technology has the capacity to set up a truly different frame, 
which makes a new world appear. 
Philosophical explorations of this frame tracing technology’s 
alien­ness have started. Against the assumption that algorithms 
are obstinate step­by­step procedures, Luciana Parisi (2013) dis­
cusses the blind spots of computers with Chaitin’s constant, for 
example, a number that is real but not computable. Parisi reads 
those alien logics of calculation as symptoms of algorithmic 
thought and uses them as a point of departure for an immanent 
critique of algorithmic practices and methods. Benjamin Bratton 
(2016), on the other hand, describes today’s planetary­scale 
computation as an alien political geography. Based on mineral 
sourcing, it links the earth, the user, and technology in new ways 
and is inhabited by meaningful users, “human and otherwise”: 
It is with vestigial stupidity that we police the human/animal 
divide in the way that we do, and it is equally misguided to 
insist that computing machines are ‘just tools’ and not also 
co­Users along with us. (Bratton 2016, 349)
The theoretical challenge, of course, is then not to think of 
them as “just subjects” either – a challenge we are not very 
well equipped for. As Bratton points out, “we lack adequate 
vocabularies to properly engage the operations of planetary­
scale computation” (xviii).
194 In our philosophical thinking of technology, the problem of 
vocabulary, however, has been central for quite a while – no 
lesser text than Heidegger’s forceful essay asking “The Ques­
tion Concerning Technology” (1954) is a good example of this. 
Although Heidegger aims “to experience the technological 
within its own bounds” (4), he leads out of those bounds looking 
for an answer by linking techné and poetry via classical Greek. 
Stating that “the essence of technology is by no means anything 
technological” (4), however, Heidegger might have sent us in the 
wrong direction – interestingly, this is exactly where Arendt turns 
the other way. Instead of finding an answer to technology in the 
human artifice, she points to the functioning of technology itself:
The discussion of the whole problem of technology, that 
is, of the transformation of life and world through the 
introduction of the machine, has been strangely led astray 
through an all­too­exclusive concentration upon the service 
or disservice the machines render to men. The assumption 
here is that every tool and implement is primarily designed 
to make human life easier and human labor less painful. 
Their instrumentality is understood exclusively in this 
anthropocentric sense. But the instrumentality of tools and 
implements is much more closely related to the object it is 
designed to produce. (1958, 151; emphasis added)
The technical object, according to Arendt, is misunderstood as a 
means to human ends. Its instrumentality is always more closely 
related to another object than to a human subject. In other 
words, the immanence of technology, its own, “alien” logic, is a 
force, which is driven by an immanent – “closer” – relation. 
At the very same time, Gilbert Simondon (1958) explores this 
immanence at work in his philosophical analysis On the Mode 
of Existence of Technical Objects. Studying steam­powered and 
combustion engines, cathodes, turbines, telephones, and other 
technical objects convinces the French philosopher of the same 
close, immanent relation, which he describes as a “processus de 
195concrétisation” or process of concretization (1958, 19), triggered 
by the specific relation of a technical object with its environment. 
Comparing the modern engine of his time of writing to an older 
one from 1910, Simondon points out that the newer one is not 
“better” but that it just functions better because it is more tightly 
related to the rest of the car. This tight relation has changed 
how the engine runs in and provides energy for the car, but it 
has also made the vehicle more dependent on its environment. 
The engine of 1910 is “plus autonome,” or more autonomous, (20); 
unlike the new one, it also functioned in fishing boats without 
breaking down. This and other examples lead Simondon to a 
number of interesting conclusions that today affect thinking 
far beyond technology. For example, that the transformation 
of matter (things, bodies, thoughts) is driven by concrétisations, 
which can be explained via concrete technical relations with 
their milieu, creating an immanent development, which is non­
directional. As Elizabeth Grosz points out:
Matter has a positive property immanent in any of its 
particular characteristics – it is capable of being modelled, 
formed. Matter has what Simondon understands as plas-
ticity, the capacity to become something other than what it 
is now, as its positivity, its openness, its orientation to trans­
formation. (2012, 45, bold added)
Here Grosz points out a political – open – moment that marks the 
start of something new. It marks, however, only the start. New 
technologies, alien to the existing human artifice, offer a forceful 
moment of upsetting the setup in unforeseen ways; this is why 
understanding technology is crucial to the contemporary critic, 
and this is the case more than ever in the technical realities that 
mark the twenty­first century. 
To understand the force of technology, however, means to 
differentiate the opening of technology from its actual inter­
pretation – too often technology gets blamed for capitalistic inter­
ests that hide in it all too well. It is, however, not the fault of the 
196 mobile phone that we feel the need to be available for work on 
the weekend (Berardi 2009, 193). Instead, the connection of what 
was once free time to capitalistic interests has been installed 
by a human boss who wants his workers to be always available 
(Bunz 2014, 32); others have set rules in place to avoid emailing 
after working hours. The mobile phone, for example, could also 
be interpreted as an emancipative weapon as it also allows one to 
remotely be there for someone who needs care, a dear friend, a 
child, an old parent, which eases the work of social availability, a 
role that in this world is still mostly carried out by women. 
While in this case technology has the force to change the set up 
of the human artifice – we all become potentially available – it 
does not dictate whose interests are put across. As Haraway once 
remarked: “Technology is not neutral. We’re inside of what we 
make, and it’s inside of us. We’re living in a world of connections – 
and it matters which ones get made and unmade” (cited in Kunzru 
1997). For this, we need to turn to technology, which starts 
with using and understanding it better and ends with coding or 
hacking it – different ways to appropriate it are possible and open 
to us all. Technology might be an alien force, but unsurprisingly 
we cannot sit back and let capitalism create the revolution. 
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Temporality
Yvonne Förster
The concept of temporality is closely linked to modernity, 
postmodernity, and the contemporary conditio humana. The term 
covers a variety of related concepts such as finitude, progress, 
future, memory, or acceleration, to name just a few. Only with 
the modern era, the concept of care for the future emerged (Dux 
1992). Temporality in its various aspects is a deeply historical 
concept. Though there is a more basic dimension of temporality 
at stake in the ontogenesis of time in living creatures, cultural 
aspects of time are dynamic and changing.
Postmodern concepts of time and temporality present a critique 
of modernity with its ideas of progress and homogeneous time. 
The idea that time is a universal flux from the past into the 
future or vice versa has long lost its credibility, with the horrors 
of the Second World War at the latest. That is the reason why 
the temporal concept of progress has been widely criticized in 
the humanities. Concepts of time, like the idea of a continuing 
progress of society or eschatological scenarios have always had 
an impact on culture and the value of life. With industrialization, 
urban life and the omnipresence of technology emerged. Within 
this historical atmosphere of the early twentieth century, time 
became more perceptible than before, because technology and 
industrial production produced new rhythms that structure 
life in different ways than before. Natural rhythms loose 
200 importance and technological rhythms became more important. 
Those technological concepts of time structure historical and 
biographical narratives as well as everyday life. Instead of a 
continuous flux of time, the twentieth and twenty­first centuries 
envision time as fragmented and perspectival. 
How can the concept of time then be a tool of critique? The 
way time is conceptualized influences narratives of history and 
individual identities. One very influential concept of time and 
temporal becoming is the arrow of time. In this image, time is a 
continuous and homogeneous flux that is future­oriented, with 
which constant progress in history is associated. This image 
has been widely criticized. One of the pioneers of this critique is 
Walter Benjamin. In his considerations in Theses on the Philosophy 
of History (1940), which he wrote facing the threats of the Second 
World War, he uses Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus to illustrate 
his critique of the concept of historical progress: 
A Klee painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel 
looking as though he is about to move away from something 
he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth 
is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where 
we perceive a chain of events, he sees a single catastrophe 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet. (1940, 257)
Benjamin’s famous interpretation of Klee’s work makes palpable 
how historical progress is a dangerous idea, oblivious of the 
catastrophes that human culture produces. His concept of 
dialectical materialism implies a concept of time that focuses 
on materiality and simultaneity. These features are absent 
in traditional concepts of time, as for example Immanuel 
Kant’s transcendental concept of time exemplifies, in which 
time is essentially non­materialistic (subjective and ideal) and 
homogeneous (an inner form of intuition, Kant 1997, 426/A 369). 
201Historical time for Benjamin is not “empty time, but time filled full 
by now­time [ Jetztzeit]” (Benjamin 1940, 261). 
The notion of empty time implies an abstract structure, which 
can be filled by projects and ideas. Empty time is an intellectual 
construct that is suited to modern ideas of human self­creation 
and perfection, of rationality and progress. Benjamin contrasts 
this notion of time with an image of material temporality. His idea 
is that the historical moment is a compound of past, present, and 
future within historical materiality. He compares history to the 
temporal aspects of fashion, which represents a form of historical 
materiality, a material phenomenon, which is in itself temporal: 
“The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome incarnate. It evoked 
ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past. 
Fashion has a flair for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the 
thickets of long ago; it is the tiger’s leap into the past” (261). This 
tiger’s leap suggests discontinuity as well as material simultaneity. 
Benjamin’s idea of historical time implies the simultaneous 
presence of different layers of time, all present in the actual 
moment. A historical chain of events appears as progress 
because these events are represented in a certain narrative 
that makes sense of the “piles of wreckage,” as Benjamin puts it. 
Benjamin’s aim is to show how the apparent ratio and continuity 
of history is a product of a narrative that links events causally. 
What historians ought to do, according to Benjamin, is to under­
stand the temporal constellations that events are made of and 
how the present comprises past times or “chips of messianic 
time” (263).
For another model of non­homogeneous temporality we might 
turn to cinematic time. Cinema experiments with various spatio­
temporal forms of representation, such as the French movement 
Nouvelle Vague did. This allows for a representation of different 
temporal and perceptual strata in one scene. These techniques 
of montage do not adhere to rules of narrativity anymore, 
but invent a form of temporal clustering, which represents 
a critique of linear narration. Gilles Deleuze (1985) presents 
202 two different conceptions of the cinematic image: One that is 
structured through movement (movement­image) and hence 
constitutes a continuous representation of the world; and one 
that is structured by time, what he then calls time­image. The 
time­image, according to Deleuze, is representative of precisely 
the cinema of his time, because techniques of cinematic rep­
resentation also changed with the Second World War. Similar 
to Benjamin, who criticized the conception of historical time 
that orders events along a continuous causal chain, Deleuze 
diagnoses a change that occurred in the production of images. 
New techniques of montage and camera­use create images, 
where time is not the measure of movement anymore. The time­
image is a compound of past, present, and future as well as a 
presentation of different modes of consciousness. The driving 
logic in those images is neither simple action, nor a causal chain 
of events that leads to a certain result, but rather it is time itself. 
Film becomes a critique of the logic of progress, and it furthers 
an idea of original production (primacy of non­propositional 
subconsciousness) as opposed to capitalistic production, which 
creates a sense of need, negativity, and estrangement. The 
time­image is constituted by means of montage­techniques 
and can simultaneously represent different times and modes of 
perception, such as a memory of the past within an image of the 
present or the co­presence of undiscernible layers of the actual 
and the virtual, such as Orson Welles’ The Lady from Shanghai 
(USA 1947). The time­image thus makes visible layers of time 
which are neither tantamount to the present moment nor do they 
simply represent the history that led to one individual moment 
in present time. Cinematic images become a medium that is able 
to make visible fragments of time and their intertwining. Not 
only past, present, and future, but also actuality and virtuality, 
reality, and possibility can be represented in their entanglement 
through techniques of montage. This way cinema becomes a 
critique of simple, progress­oriented ideas of time and history 
203and proposes a view of the temporal process, which integrates 
varying perspectives, fragmentation, plurality, and discontinuity.  
Within the twentieth and twenty­first centuries, the concept 
of time has been developed along the lines of cultural critique, 
where the above­mentioned aspects – plurality, discontinuity, 
and simultaneity – are central alongside a focus on temporal 
becoming and procedural ontology. The emphasis on becoming 
and the notion of process are the reasons for this entry ded­
icated to temporality. Contemporary concepts stress the dynamic 
and procedural aspects of time. This is what is captured by the 
term temporality. 
Contemporary theories as put forth by Bernhard Stiegler (1994) 
or Mark B. N. Hansen (2004) focus on a temporality constituted 
by technology. Hansen understands human perception of 
time as embedded or informed by machine time (Hansen 2004, 
235). That means that technologically constituted temporalities 
figure as ontological structures, which are not perceptible 
themselves but inform human perception of time. A plurality of 
temporalities is constituted by technology that does not nec­
essarily relate or adapt to human perception. Technology is 
seen as the formation of consciousness­independent layers of 
temporalities. Contemporary art and cinema use knowledge of 
neuroscience research on human perception and the impact of 
digital technologies to induce experiences that affect the viewers 
on a perceptual level (see Hansen 2004, Pisters 2012). The various 
technological temporalities within our contemporary digital 
culture are described as being fundamental to human perception, 
yet they are of heterogeneous origin and thus introduce a 
transcendent element into human perception. This ontological 
view can be seen as a prolonged critique of the Kantian definition 
of time as an inner form of intuition and hence as a category 
specific to the humanities.
204 References
Benjamin, Walter. (1940) 1969. “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” translated by 
Harry Zorn. In Illuminations, 253–264. New York: Schocken. 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1985. L’Image-temps: Cinéma 2. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Dux, Günter. 1992. Die Zeit in der Geschichte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Hansen, Mark B. N. 2004. New Philosophy for New Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by P. Guyer and A. Wood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pisters, Patricia. 2012. The Neuro-Image: A Deluezian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen 
Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Stiegler, Bernhard. 1994–2001. La Technique et le Temps, Tome 1–3. Paris: Galilée. 
Terra
Birgit Mara Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele
Terra, a feminine noun in Latin, refers to “earth; land, ground, soil; 
country; region” (Morwood 2012). It is used in English frequently 
in science fiction to designate planet earth, and appears in 
colloquial language mainly in composites, such as terra firma, 
terra nullius or terra incognita, and then usually in figurative 
speech. Terra incognita, as perhaps the most prominent example, 
has become the figurative expression for an unknown or unex­
plored region. In a similar vein, Sigmund Freud metaphorically 
referred to female sexuality as a “‘dark continent’ for psychology” 
(1959, 211). Both terra incognita and dark continent designate 
metaphorically the unknown. Yet, underneath their “mere” 
metaphoricity, the literal reference to geographical regions of 
the earth that are uncharted by Western explorers – that is: the 
terms’ colonial heritage – is audible in both cases. Freud’s implicit 
reference to a continent that Joseph Conrad had figured two 
and a half decades before as the Heart of Darkness (a novel in 
turn written in the wake of the Berlin Conference in 1884 and the 
ensuing European “scramble for Africa”); and – somewhat less 
immediately perceptible and temporally more remote – Captain 
John Smith’s introduction of the term terra incognita into the Eng­
lish language in his A Description of New England (1616). A soldier 
and explorer for the English crown, Smith endorsed the Virginia 
Company’s promotion of the colonization of New England and 
206 was famously involved with the founding of Jamestown, one of 
the first European settlements in the New World. His Description 
encouraged the founding of colonies by the British, since there 
were “such large Regions … yet vnknowne, as well in America, 
as in Affrica, and Asia, and Terra Incognita” ([1616] 2006, 45), the 
latter referring to territories occupied by Spain, but in a way a 
synecdoche for all of these “large regions yet unknown.” Since 
the vast, uncharted geographical expanses promised profits, the 
British should do as the Portuguese in Africa, for “had not the 
industrious Portugales ranged her vnknowne parts, who would 
haue sought for wealth among those fryed Regions of blacke 
brutish Negers” (21).
In her work on rewriting knowledges, the Jamaican philosopher 
Sylvia Wynter has powerfully traced the discursive and political 
shifts that different figurations of the earth have effected – 
shifts that were informed by empirical experiences of travel and 
trade, as well as bound up with changing cosmologies. The truth 
an epoch or a culture holds about the earth is of fundamental 
significance to that epoch’s, that culture’s, and that earth’s 
onto­epistemological, symbolical, economical and political make 
up. In her article “1492,” Wynter notes – much like Smith, but 
with reversed value – the unsettling effects that the Portuguese 
voyages to Africa had in this regard. The Portuguese rounded 
the “hitherto nonnavigable Cape Bojador on the bulge of West 
Africa” (1995, 9) in 1441 and established a trading fort at Elmina 
(present­day Ghana, a fort which Columbus was to visit) in about 
1482. This circumnavigation and the subsequent existence of 
the fort called into question the feudal, Christian, medieval 
geographic imagination of the earth as divided into inhabitable 
and uninhabitable zones. As Wynter explains, Cape Bojador 
“had been projected, in the accounts of the earth’s geography 
given by medieval Christian geographers, as being the nec plus 
ultra line and boundary marker between the habitable tem­
perate zone of Europe and the inhabitable [sic] torrid zones” 
(9). Such a projection was congruent with the cosmology of 
207Latin­Christian Europe, Wynter argues, and its “feudal image of a 
nonhomogenous earth” (25). The medieval Christian cosmology 
structured itself around a master code of “Spirit/Flesh” (see also 
Le Goff 1985) – a “represented nonhomogeneity of substance 
between the spiritual perfection of the heavens … as opposed to 
the sublunar realm of the Earth  … as the abode of a post­Adamic 
fallen mankind” (Wynter 2003, 278) – a master code which was 
equally projected onto the geography of the earth. In similar 
spirit/flesh (or life/death, elevated/fallen) terms, the earth was
divided up between, on the one hand, its temperate regions 
centered on Jerusalem – regions that, because held up above 
the element of water by God’s Providential Grace, were 
inhabitable – and, on the other, those realms that, because 
outside this Grace, had to be uninhabitable. (278–279)
This imagination of an “uninhabitable torrid zone” (Wynter 1995, 
22) south of Cape Bojador was ruined and slowly eroded as a 
result of the Portuguese landfall south of the line after 1441 (and 
a complementary set of onto­epistemological shifts including the 
emergent humanism), and once the Portuguese had rounded the 
cape and had – as Smith notes applaudingly – “ranged … [Africa’s] 
vnknowne parts.” Now, America had become possible, and what 
had been torrid zones, uninhabitable, became “large regions 
yet unknown” of a terra incognita: unknown, yet inhabitable and 
therefore exploitable.
In her work, Wynter traces these cosmological­geographical 
transformations, and with and through them the seismic 
philosophical, symbolical, and political transformations with 
which they are entangled. Wynter does so especially in view 
of the dominant notion of what it means to be human. For the 
notion of terra that is central here, and its critical purchase, the 
relevance of Wynter’s analysis is clear: Our cosmologies have 
geographical, spiritual, philosophical, political, epistemological, 
ontological, and ethical implications; they inform and delimit 
our conceptions of the earth and vice versa. As a consequence, 
208 then, the imagination and empirical experience “we” have of 
the earth – and it would be crucial to consider the plurality and 
differentiation of that “we” to which Jacques Derrida gestures 
at the end of his essay “The Ends of Man” by asking “But who, 
we?” (1982, 136; see also Wynter 2015, 23) – can be read as one 
symptom of the critical conditions of our times. Understanding 
in its entangled complexity how “we” imagine the earth is a step 
toward understanding the current order of things. It is part of a 
symptomatology of the present.
Today, the experience of the earth as divided into inhabitable 
and uninhabitable regions has lost traction – even as a vast 
expanse of lands that are unknown and out there to be explored 
and exploited, although the spirit of the latter still lives on in 
current practices of deep sea oil drilling, Antarctica mining 
projects, fracking and the like. Despite these very real specters 
of the earth as mere resource, “we” experience terra increasingly 
– and more or less globally (a more or less that is crucial to take 
into account as it signals fault lines of exclusion, responsibility, 
and power) – as a closely interwoven ecosystem, a finite planet 
whose climate is changing and whose natural resources have 
been nearly exhausted by the dominant habits of Western man. 
There are no longer any terras incognitas (beyond the merely eco­
nomic fantasies of subterranean chemical fossils), but there is a 
terra critica: one earth in critical economic, ecological, symbolic, 
socio­political, intra­species condition. As Félix Guattari puts 
this in The Three Ecologies, “[t]he Earth is undergoing a period of 
intense techno­scientific transformations. If no remedy is found, 
the ecological disequilibrium this has generated will ultimately 
threaten the continuation of life on the planet’s surface” (2000, 
19).
However, the critical purchase of terra, as the term is proposed 
here, lies slightly elsewhere than in the eco­critical investi­
gations of climate change or what has become known as “the 
Anthropocene” (e.g. Chakrabarty 2009; Cohen, Colebrook, and 
Miller 2016; Stengers 2015). Here, terra – unlike globe or planet 
209or even its English translation as earth – does not so much 
designate the geological body and ecosystem we inhabit, whose 
climate change and human grooving need to be examined. 
Rather, as exhibited here by tracing the historical shifts that 
Wynter points out and that Smith served to exemplify, terra (in 
its Latin garment) designates the imagination of the earth; the 
way “we” figure and narrate the earth, a figuration that is always 
crucially interwoven with empirical experiences of it. Since air­
planes reach the other side of the globe within the maximum of 
a day, families span distant geographical locations and virtual 
spaces enable us to connect across continents, these historical 
experiences give rise to imaginations that are quite different 
from feudal Christian Europe or the colonial period. As Édouard 
Glissant argues in Poetics of Relation (1997), five centuries of 
colonial domination, migration, deportation and slavery, cul­
tural contact, and genocide were not only nourished by the 
imagination of terra(s) incognita(s), but at the same time also made 
the imagination and praxis of “Relation” possible, and made it 
apparent as the (post)colonial condition of earthly existence. The 
plantation system, Glissant suggests, 
is one of the focal points for the development of present­day 
modes of Relation. Within this universe of domination and 
oppression, of silent and professed dehumanization, forms 
of humanity persisted. (1997, 65)
Its “always multilingual and frequently multiracial tangle” (71) 
counteracts the clear, linear, appropriative order of Western 
thought and narrative. What Glissant calls Tout-Monde (one 
world in relation) became possible through this; and what had 
been “large regions yet unknown” of a terra incognita are slowly 
becoming apparent as a terra critica. Acknowledging and keeping 
in mind the violence, exploitation, and asymmetry that are 
primary here, this critical condition of terra might be a locus from 
where to give rise to other imaginations of the earth.
210 Thus, for us, terra does not designate the geological object of 
investigation, but a perspective: it calls for the examination of 
these imaginations, their transformations and for the critical 
creation of new ones for a co­habitable – not merely inhabitable 
– earth. If after Elmina America became possible, what will have 
been possible after the Middle Passage, after Fukushima? New 
archipelagos of oppression or a drift to earthly gentleness?
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Terror
Jacques Lezra
Terror, from the Old French terreur, and conjecturally, through 
the Latin terrere, to an archaic Indo­European verb “to tremble.” 
The concept of terror stands today where any number of paths 
cross (Lezra 2010, also Derrida 2003, Redfield 2009). It stands 
between our everyday experience (who has not been terrified by 
one or another event?); the field of aesthetics (fear, horror, terror 
– all of these have a long history in the philosophy of art, from 
Aristotle to Jacques Rancière, passing through Immanuel Kant 
and Edmund Burke); and the practices and philosophy of politics 
(from Maximilien Robespierre’s coupling of virtue and terror in 
Revolutionary times to today’s so­called “war on terror,” various 
forms of separatist and fundamentalist violence, state terror). 
Terror’s sense in each of these domains seems uncontroversial: 
every society and every language furnish us with terror. To be 
terrified, to experience terror, seem to be experiences as uni­
versal as the events or circumstances that are said to cause them: 
we all will tremble at a sudden loss, at the unexpected, with pain 
or at the fear of pain, from the fear of death and dying. The value 
attached publicly to the concept is almost without exception neg­
ative. (The global film industry has a special relation to terror: it 
is the domain in which the experience is an explicitly commercial 
token.) The purpose of societies, it seems clear, should be to 
212 reduce as much as possible an individual’s exposure to threat, 
violence, abjection – to terror.
Indeed the first usage of terreur that the 1873–74 French Littré 
dictionary records, from Pierre Bercheure’s ca. 1350 trans­
lation of Livy, concerns “la chose publique,” the res-publica, the 
commonwealth: “Que il voulsissent de celles terreurs delivrer la 
chose publique. – That they should want to rid the commonwealth 
of these terrors” (Livius 1514; also Littré 1873–1874). Terror in this 
definition becomes “the essence of totalitarian domination,” as 
Hannah Arendt (1948, 464) and Adriana Cavarero (following her) 
put it, the “realization” and the “execution” of what Arendt calls 
the “law of movement” (464) – a tendency of thought expressed 
in fact in the bloody days of the Terror in revolutionary France 
(between ca. 1792 and August 1794), but characteristic of the 
great ideologies of the mid­nineteenth century, and consisting in 
“the refusal to view or accept anything ‘as it is’ and in the consis­
tent interpretation of everything as being only a stage of some 
future development” (598; see also Cavarero 2009).
Today, however, these terms and these definitions will no longer 
serve – not the sense of “society” or “politics” (summoning up the 
ghosts of polis and politeia will not exorcise other specters: other 
cities, other formations of the agora, other ways of construing the 
relation between representation and political value) and not the 
sense of the word the Arendtian tradition makes out to be their 
limit: the word terror. To the contrary, today terror must work 
as a founding, defective concept for political philosophy. Rather 
than seek to “rid the commonwealth” of terrors, modern political 
association depends upon producing forms of living and forms of 
governance or institutions that harbor and protect terror.
This is a deeply counterintuitive claim. Consider terrorism 
rather than terror. A terrorist strikes close to home. We know, or 
imagine, the neighborhoods where the attack occurred; we are 
familiar with the social and political situation that lead to it; can 
identify with the victims, who remind us of ourselves or of our 
213families; we may even on occasion have feelings of sympathy 
with the groups carrying out the attack (against, for instance, a 
state whose repression we deplore), but also a great distrust for 
immediate violent action of the sort represented by the attack. All 
of these are rather primitive, even adolescent feelings. Suppose 
we try to take account, in the first place, of the strange economy 
of the terrorist act: How is the value of the target calculated? 
Agreed upon? Understood? By whom? What is the target of a 
“terrorist” attack or act? The terrible consequences of the attacks 
lived since September 11, 2001, from New York to Syria to Paris – 
both the lives lost, and the resulting consolidation of a militarist 
and xenophobic ideology – make such questions pressing. We 
will want to take account, too, in the second place, of the strange 
identification that many intellectuals feel with the figure of the 
terrorist – one who can and does act directly, whose politics lie 
at the other extreme of the highly intellectualized world of the 
professional academic. The temptation of heroic immediacy – 
of the heroic immediacy of the pure act – should strike us as a 
residual romanticism that bears examining, historically as well as 
philosophically. Although the terrorist act is not in itself – for this 
second reason – a device on which one can establish any kind of 
politics suitable to the increasingly differentiated social demands 
of the twenty­first century, the first observation, the strange 
economy or an­economy, of terrorist acts, might provide a clue.
Moving (back) from terrorism to terror, we strike away from 
home. With terror, we enter a political, rather than a domestic, 
economy; we assume the uncanny force of the truly other’s 
claims. For “terrorism” is not terror, though what are vulgarly 
called “acts of terror” or “terrorism” can produce terror in the 
sense I intend it. Terror names the experience fundamental to 
democratic association in radically differentiated social spheres: 
the experience of facing another whose interests and whose 
claims cannot be defined in my language; who faces me in a 
way I cannot imagine or figure; whose being­other present itself 
to him or her in a way that may be entirely other to the way in 
214 which our being­other presents itself to me; an­other who does 
not recognize my home as such, or as mine. Terror registers any 
person’s incapacity to supply a concept, and indeed to supply a 
satisfactory concept of concept, that will bind his or her interests 
to another person’s. From this failure derives a class of unsatis­
factory, defective concepts that can be supplied in place of the 
classical concepts of political philosophy (“autonomy,” “freedom,” 
“individualism,” “citizenship”) – and these defective concepts 
and the ephemeral, transparent, and reversible institutions that 
they make possible can be arranged more or less systematically 
in a weak relation under the heading of what can be called the 
“modern republic,” la chose publique.
What, then, is this critical experience of terror? Step away from 
the dominant, Latinate tradition in which the word registers, 
from Pierre Bercheure to Robespierre to Jean Paulhan. Recall the 
dissonant chord that Sigmund Freud plays at the beginning of his 
1920 work Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The context is a discus­
sion of the relation between the neuroses that attend “severe 
mechanical concussions,” including war traumas – “shell­shock,” 
or what today we would call post­traumatic stress disorders 
provoked by accidents, the shock of war, sudden emergencies – 
and what Freud helpfully calls the “traumatic neuroses of peace” 
(Freud 1955, 12). The latter are characterized by their suddenness 
and by the surprise, fright, or terror (Schreck) that attend them. 
He continues:
Fright [Schreck], fear [Furcht] and anxiety [Angst] are 
improperly used as synonymous expressions; they are in 
fact capable of clear distinction in their relation to danger 
[Gefahr]. “Anxiety” describes a particular state of expecting 
the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an 
unknown one. “Fear” requires a definite object of which to 
be afraid. “Fright” (or terror), however, is the name we give 
to the state a person gets into when he has run into danger 
without being prepared for it; it emphasizes the factor of sur­
prise [betont das Moment der Überraschung]. (12–13)
215The term Schreck covers a range of senses, which run in Eng­
lish from horror to pleasant surprise. What most importantly 
distinguishes “fear” and “anxiety” from “fright” or “terror,” 
though, is the status of the object or circumstance that causes 
the affect. Fear is a state of mind caused by distinct objects; 
anxiety is caused by the apprehension of a particular temporal 
relation to a state of affairs. Finally, Schreck, “fright” or “terror,” is 
attached neither to a distinct object, nor to a particular state of 
affairs, nor to a particular apprehension of time. Freud’s terror 
attaches instead to the disconcerting encounter with something 
for which one was not prepared, whose “object­ness” or “state­
of­affairs­ness” is not given, defined, or established. Terror: I 
have suddenly encountered something – I don’t know what it is, 
and I don’t know what my encountering it means, and as a result 
I don’t know what this encounter then may signify for every 
other encounter I can imagine, which is to say that this surprise 
encounter may not be a surprising moment at all but may extend 
to all the other moments that make up what I remember and to 
all those that make up what I foresee for myself. In the absence 
of an object or an event that provokes terror, no provision can be 
made against it (since it ’s caused by an encounter that’s unfore­
seeable), and in the immediate instance no therapeutic means 
of overcoming terror present themselves. Terror’s effects cannot 
be assessed against my past or against the future outcome of my 
actions; the possibility of terror is itself, one might say, a source 
of anxiety. Once my fright is over in this or that instance, the 
terrifying circumstances interpreted, assimilated to a state of 
affairs, objectified, then I may say in retrospect that I feared this 
or that object or circumstance. But to be terrified is to lack both 
fear and anxiety: to be in terror is to be without an object one can 
reckon with and without a time one can assess. The terror of the 
encounter extends beyond the encounter; indeed, it threatens 
to become not an anomalous species of but the norm for every 
encounter, another name for the event.
216 Terror works otherwise than as a classic concept of association, 
and must be thought otherwise. It is not, as it is for Arendt or 
Cavarero, “the essence of totalitarian domination,” “the refusal 
to view or accept anything ‘as it is’ and in the consistent inter­
pretation of everything as being only a stage of some future 
development” (Arendt 1948, 464). For me to link myself to another 
today or to find myself bound to another person requires that I 
distribute responsibility for the survival of ethico­political life 
and that I attend to and guard the occurring of that distribution. 
Both of these are ethico­political tasks, roughly of a public and 
a private sort respectively; each is both a positive as well as a 
negative task, entered into both affirmatively and passively. The 
public task involves devising formal regimes that both recognize 
and distribute the exceptional positions of subject and sovereign 
across citizenship, that design and shelter a wounded and divided 
sovereignty.  The private task entails a different sort of work – 
hermeneutic, destructive, or rather, deconstructive, dispositional. 
Not cura sui, as Foucault would have it, but rather the cultivation 
of insecuritas sui.  
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Transformation
Sybrandt van Keulen
To get a grip on what is at stake concerning transformation, 
let us linger a few moments over the specific way in which 
Foucault recoins this concept in his essay What is Enlightenment? 
(Foucault 1984a). Foucault turns away from quasi­universalistic, 
global scenarios such as passages from one period of history to 
another (for example, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance) 
or projects that claim to be global or radical (such as the French 
Revolution), and he focuses on “work carried out by ourselves 
upon ourselves as free beings” (47, bold added), as “a patient 
labor giving form to our impatience for liberty” (50). It is likely 
that Foucault did not have one clearly defined practice in mind 
referring to ‘work’ and ‘labor’; he even suggests rather strongly 
that it concerns “undefined work” (46). Yet Foucault also explicitly 
states: “But that does not mean that no work can be done except 
in disorder and contingency” (47). This ambivalence seems to 
stand or fall with the fact that Foucault talks about a split practice 
“that simultaneously respects [modern] reality and violates it” 
(41).
Foucault defines transformative work as a task and an obligation 
to effectuate something, that is, “a change that he [‘man’] himself 
will bring about in himself” (35). In this respect Foucault gives 
Immanuel Kant full credit for having invented an “attitude of 
modernity” (38). Yet after having paid his tribute, Foucault’s 
220 text reads like instances of rephrasing this attitude. To be more 
precise, the afore­mentioned split affirms partly Kant’s progres­
sive ethos – and thus Foucault’s respect for modern reality – yet 
he ventures to problematize Kant’s claim to universality. With 
the help of Charles Baudelaire’s oeuvre the limitations of Enlight­
enment’s ethos should be made discernable, and in particular the 
Kantian version of it, stipulated in formulations such as “deter­
minations of my identical self” (Kant 2007, A 129).
A clear definition of the praxis of Baudelaire’s painter of modern 
life – that is, Baudelaire’s alter ego Constantin Guys – and of 
course also of the said work carried out upon ourselves, starts 
at the moment Foucault uses instead of “change” the word 
“transfiguration”:
… just when the whole world is falling asleep, he begins to 
work, and he transfigures that world. His transfiguration 
does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult inter­
play between the truth of what is real and the exercise of 
freedom. (Foucault 1984a, 41, emphasis added)
This is Foucault’s first rephrasing of the modern attitude, 
that is as a “difficult interplay” and an “exercise,” which can be 
understood as the counterpart or double of the Kantian “deter­
minations of my identical self.” The Baudelairean notion of 
freedom is not exercised by “the truth of what is real” nor as an 
alternative truth (an escape) but as a doubling of “the real” and a 
confrontation with it – which all in all seems to imply that at least 
two realities are involved, entangled in that difficult interplay. 
With regard to this transfigurative force (to which Baudelaire also 
refers as convalescence), the Baudelairean exercise of freedom 
seems to work critically on the Kantian identical self, powered by 
“a desperate eagerness to imagine” the “indissociable” Kantian 
self otherwise than it is (41). Baudelaire captured that eagerness 
in the following formula: “an ‘I’ with an insatiable appetite for the 
‘non­I’” (Baudelaire 2001, 10). Presumably this appetite leaves the 
“I” not unaffected. The provisional conclusion would then be: The 
221effect of transformation – as conceived by Foucault – is exercised 
by our Baudelairean work on our Kantian limits. 
At this point Foucault is able to rephrase the modern attitude 
as a “limit­attitude” (Foucault 1984a, 45), and subsequently 
the act of transforming (a form) into transgressing (a limit). 
Foucault’s voicing of the specific critical power that is at stake in 
his philosophical ethos gradually becomes louder and also more 
demanding, or even slightly compulsory: “we have to be at the 
frontiers” (45). Why should we?
Certainly, along with the transfiguration – transvaluation or 
recoining (Umwertung) in the Nietzschean sense – of the modern 
attitude into a limit­attitude, Foucault proclaims an adieu to the 
Kantian command (which demanded an identical self) and, at 
the same time – which seems part and parcel of the practice of 
difference – this limit­attitude enables to reinvent our selves 
while transgressing frontiers (or the other way around). But what 
else than transgressing frontiers, boundaries, or indeed limits, 
did Foucault have in mind?
Foucault did not refer to particular passages of the Critique of 
pure Reason, but he certainly must have had in mind at least 
this Kantian sentence about “the land of truth”: “This domain, 
however, is an island and enclosed by nature itself within limits 
that can never be altered” (Kant 2007, 251, B 294). Such “natural” 
limits Foucault very likely refers to when he calls for the trans­
formation of “the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation” (Foucault 1984a, 45). The power of the limit­attitude 
does not abolish or erase that limitation, it does not even need to 
transform limitation’s very shape; that attitude just happens to 
change the rigid modality of its own nature: a desire to transform 
a historically determined form of respect (for certain limits) into 
very own possibilities of transgression. Hence the next step to 
finalize his ethos into “a practical critique that takes the form of 
a possible transgression” (45). Foucault did not just change the 
Kantian limit­concept (Grenzbegriff; Kant 2007, B 310–311) into a 
222 limit­attitude, he installed an inventive self with a transgressive 
desire “to imagine it otherwise than it is” (Foucault 1984a, 41), 
swerving into “work done at the limits of ourselves” (46).
Perhaps Foucault did nothing more and nothing less than 
folding back Kant’s own insight of the third Critique into the epis­
temological and ethical realms of the first and second Critiques, 
not with the aim to destroy the Kantian definition of nature but 
to set our very own nature (of our self) free from the Kantian, 
logocentric imperatives. Indeed, Kant underestimated more 
or less the impact of his own thought that the “imagination (as 
a productive cognitive faculty) is … very powerful in creating, 
as it were, another nature” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
2000, §49, bold added). This second nature – and, in the Kantian 
phrasing, the second freedom – as Foucault, and also Deleuze 
knew, appears to be more important, maybe even more essential 
than the first: “In the ideal of beginning anew there is something 
that precedes the beginning itself, that takes it up to deepen it 
and delay it in the passage of time” (Deleuze 2004, 14). 
To recapitulate in a few words Foucault’s tour de force of 
envisioning a critical ontology, one can say that the concept of 
transformation turns out to mark an inventive split practice of 
giving form and transgressing limits, alternately or simultaneously. 
Distancing himself from Kant, Foucault emphasized the 
importance of historical (genealogical, archeological) inquiries 
“oriented toward the contemporary limits of the necessary, that 
is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the con­
stitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects” (Foucault 1984a, 
43). Yet those inquiries are not goals in themselves; their purpose 
and drive (“desperate eagerness”) is to invent the critical figures 
and orientations other than the ones that rule “naturally.” Indeed, 
the Foucauldian imperative is to perform historico­practical 
tests “of the limits that we may go beyond” (47; que nous pouvons 
franchir [Foucault 1984b, 575]). Franchir, here translated as 
“going beyond,” should be understood as transgressing a reality 
with the emphasis on, and steered by, the determined activity 
223of “producing” not some meta­physical afterworld as a purely 
negative realm of redemption but rather different assemblages, 
in the sense of different styles and affective ways of relating to 
each other (other than hegemonic relations). Practices that allow 
breaking the dominant everyday systemic veil that controls our 
“natural” selves.
Thus form changes into a limit, along with the strong suggestion 
that no limit should be treated as a thing in itself (Kant’s Ding an 
sich). Nonetheless, it is likely that a limit can be a hidden part of a 
bigger, encompassing form or frame with a machinic unconscious 
status, such as the formative entity of the nation­state. We don’t 
know where the borders of the nation­state within ourselves 
start or end. In everyday life some parts, particular disciplinary 
practices, of this so­called sovereign power (sovereign in the 
Hobbesian sense) can just happen to be felt as restrictive. This 
might be the reason why Foucault also speaks of “partial transfor­
mations” (Foucault 1984a, 47). Hence our work should consist at 
least in investigating the legitimacy of the institutional dominance 
of some limits and rules. Still this work cannot be done without 
resistance and inventive transgressive practices attired with the 
critical power to reveal that some rules are the remainders of 
temporary necessity, and that they can become a possibility again, 
or an arbitrary accessory, and even redundant.
However, Derrida’s adage il n’y a pas de hors-texte does indeed 
imply that a simple outside or, for that matter, a sheer inside­
the­frame, is not any longer a truth in and for itself, and perhaps 
has never been, which indeed does also imply that the analysis 
of resistances and the critique of frames, that is, the very ethos 
of inventing new conditions and possibilities, and splitting an old 
frame in two (three, etc.), entails translative acts between frames, 
emerging from what might be called a life in­between­frames – a 
singular way of living that has become perhaps even more urgent 
than ever.
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Translation
Jacques Lezra
In the age of its global reproducibility, the university becomes 
a conforming, converting, translating machine: a differentiated, 
rhizomatic, industry of industry­relevant forms of legitimation 
and recognition helping to unify the global information economy, 
forms of legitimation translatable universally and universally 
consumable. The age of the global reproducibility of the uni­
versity is the age in which the conception of “universality” 
tied to the ancient humanistic notion of the “university” has 
become primarily expressible in the lexicon of (economic and 
technological) “globality” (Lezra 2013). 
To propose that “translation” should, under a renewed defi­
nition of the term, stand at the heart of another university and 
another sense of the humanities is not to assume a reactionary 
position, to restore an “auratic” experience of the university, or 
of the humanities, nor to return to the pristine and enlightened 
days of humanist universalism – days which were not “pristine,” 
“universal,” “Enlightened,” or particularly “humanistic,” since they 
turned on principles of national, racial, economic, and religious 
exclusion.  To the contrary. A refigured “translation” allows us to 
envision a version of “universalism” and the “university,” a version 
of translation and translatability, and a version of humanism and 
of the humanities. It is “translation’s” violence – which is concep­
tually of an order quite different from the sorts of violences that 
226 did indeed characterize the old myth of humanist universalism 
– that I’d like to enroll for thought, against and within the “global” 
university and against global university systems.  
The coupling of “humanities” and “translation” echoes arcane 
debates regarding the differences between world literature, 
comparative literature, and literature taught in translation (Apter 
2013; Casanova 2015; Damrosch 2009 and 2014; Thomsen, D’Haen, 
and Domínguez 2013). The question of how humanists make the 
case for the value of their disciplines to others – legislators, the 
great public, friends, and so on – is a matter of translation. Those 
things that the humanities take to be their concerns, their objects 
of study, protocols, ends – all need translating into the technical­
commercial language ascendant in the era of austerity, eco­
nomic competitiveness, and systematic and ideologically driven 
defunding of non­STEM disciplines.
“Translation” is a term nested within the humanities also serving 
as a gatekeeper for the humanities. As to the first, the function 
of “translation” within the humanistic disciplines, we’re divided. 
Yes, absent some universal standard (the “human” as universal 
bearer of sense and value; as bearer of “universalism”) the 
question is open whether a work, an Edgar Degas nude, say, or a 
concept like political autonomy, will be understood and valued, 
to what degree, how, and to what end, in different moments and 
societies. Recall the Terentian doctrine that what is “human” 
about the human animal is its universality. Nil a me alienum 
puto, the human is human inasmuch as it contains multitudes, 
inasmuch as it is the summation or the end of all beings, even 
(Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s stronger claim, running in the 
contrary direction) inasmuch as it can be any being: I am not 
untranslatable into anything.  Every form of life can be translated 
into the human and the human animal can, qua human, assume 
the characteristics of any other, translate him or herself into the 
quality of any other thing.  Inasmuch as my end is not given, but 
lies in my potential translatability into any­being, whether animal, 
227angelic, or divine; or in the potential translatability of any­being 
into me – in this sense it is that I am human.
But on the other hand, we’ll want to say something like this: Yes, 
the quality of general translatability (“nothing is alien to me, I 
contain multitudes,” the shibboleths of humanist universalism) 
that makes me human cannot reciprocally, mutually, be trans­
lated back into every form of life. I share with other human 
animals, and with them alone, that undisseverable, primary 
quality: What we call a humanistic discipline is just what resists 
translation about the object. It ’s what makes that Degas sketch 
different from a universally understandable term, or a term in a 
formal language, or a mechanically­reproduced or – reproducible 
drawing, that I’ll be attending to: the auratic, the untranslatable. 
I’ll be inclined to say that I affect to call disciplines humanistic 
when, and only when, their object of study is to a degree untrans-
latable into other disciplinary frames and into other systems of 
value. Non­reproducible, because non­mechanical, non­machinic.
And now to the second side of my frame, the side that under­
stands “translation” to serve as a gatekeeper for the “humanities.” 
Here too we’re divided. The end of the humanistic disciplines, 
the neo­liberal economic model teaches us, is to convey cul­
tural value across linguistic, historical, and geographic borders. 
At the same time, whatever it is that is thus conveyed or trans­
lated moves across borders in the way that other products, 
other commodities, do as well, and is to be understood and 
valued by analogy to such products. (A cultural commodity is 
the translation of an economic commodity.) The humanities are 
thus both instruments of globalization, ancillary to the great 
value­producing machine of global capitalism; a set of devices 
and practices for producing and assessing the value of cultural 
commodities traded on global and local markets; and the product 
of (one part of) the global economic system. I set the borders 
and the value of the humanities, and of the objects that the 
humanistic disciplines produce and affect to study, according 
to these three, not­quite­coherent, ways of understanding the 
228 humanities as translating­machines and translatable­objects or 
commodities.
What results from the double status and the double value of 
“translation”? The term is at work within the humanistic dis­
ciplines and also at work outside these disciplines, as a principal 
device for designating and defining them, for drawing the edges 
and ends of their concept, for determining its use, for providing 
the index by means of which the value of the objects designated 
as “humanistic” are assessed. A peculiarly unstable, even violently 
unstable, term. Also, however, and in that same degree, an 
intellectually productive one, since the way in which the two ends 
of “translation” defeat, limit, and weaken one another will allow 
us to understand with some clarity what we mean by “value,” by 
the “humanities,” and by their relation.
We’ll call bare “translation,” the gate­keeper internal and external 
to the humanities and to the human animal, by a new name: 
“Machine translation.”
First let’s wrest the term from its old humanist home: just the 
domain of linguistic transformation, where we move, word­for­
word or sense­for­sense, from one natural language to another. 
Translation, for zoon logon echon, will disclose whatever is not 
accidental (historical, contingent, ephemeral, glottal, merely 
regional, merely an aspect of this or that human’s articulated 
speech, accentual) about our relation to the word (Heidegger 
2000; 1971). We maintain, generally, that this linguistic sense of 
translation is the philosophically densest and most compelling 
one, and also that it is (perhaps for that reason) the historical 
ground on which later declensions of “translation” stand, the 
literal term to future metaphorical usages, translations of “trans­
lation” into other improper or metaphorical domains. There’s 
ample historical precedent for this translation of translation, of 
course – the term and the practices it designates move around 
promiscuously in different cultures and at different times, des­
ignating transformations of wildly varying sorts, material as well 
229as symbolic. A quick example, taken from Spain: Juan de Junta, 
an editor in Salamanca in the mid­sixteenth century, publishes 
eight translations between 1544 and 1549 – from Italian and 
Latin.  What we call “translation” he calls not only “traducir,” 
but also “trasladar,” “sacar,” “volver,” and “romançar.” The earlier 
word “trujamanear,” from the Arabic, nestles in the vocabulary of 
the conquest of America; Covarrubias’s 1611 Tesoro de la lengua 
castellana o española refers to “verter,” to pour. “Transportar” is 
not uncommon. A small controversy haunts even traducere, the 
most common humanist term for translation: Is it first used by 
Bruni, as Italian scholars maintain, or by Alonso de Cartagena, as 
some Spanish scholars suggest? A matter of claiming historical 
precedence for different schools and histories of translation; a 
matter of national pride (Pöckl 1996–1997).
Everything is staked on the possibility of translating the dis­
persed and contradictory semantic field that “translation” covers 
into a systematic and coherent vehicle for the production of 
subjectivities – subjectivities recognizable amongst themselves, 
associated on the minimal ground of that recognition, capable of 
carrying out transactions of an economic, social, and linguistic 
sort upon that basis. But the term’s irreconcilable senses and 
functions attest not to the systematicity and coherence of the 
term’s senses but to the machinic violence required to imagine 
that systematicity, and to its fictitious, even compensatory 
quality. Something disturbing but inescapable stands forth in 
the earliest uses to which “translation” is put, then – in the early 
modern definitions we have seen, for instance, or in the ways that 
Thomas Hobbes or Niccolò Machiavelli will construe the granting 
of “human” rights to sovereign instances and representatives 
under the aegis of a defective concept of “translation.” From the 
vantage of these sometimes violently antagonistic terms and 
from the futures into which “translation’s” divided semantic field 
appears to be translated, we knock into something other than 
the reasonable, contractarian system of mutual recognitions 
that appear to define the human animal in translation. This hard, 
230 anti­humanist core renders systematic and properly conceptual 
the senses of “translation.” Machinic, it captures translation’s 
incompatible functions and semantic registers and trans­
lates them into a regulated and perspicuous field: a system for 
assigning (economic and other) values. It makes the transference 
of rights to others (humans, animals, institutions, positions) and 
the recognition of others as bearers of rights stand upon fictions. 
We call this hard, anti­humanist core at the heart of the university 
by the name of “machine translation.” 
For technical and strategic reasons, it makes sense to turn 
the humanities toward the figure of translation, and to grant 
“translation” its patient and appealing sovereignty internally 
and externally. But this technical and strategic appeal to the 
human in translation should not keep us from understanding 
what may be the university’s genuinely revolutionary task in the 
age of the global reproducibility of the university­commodity, 
in the age of the effective transformation of the university 
into a machine for the production of what Maurizio Lazzarato 
(2012) calls “the indebted man.” That task is to help guard and 
produce the violence of translation, and on this condition to 
allow us to imagine, think through, and set in place formal, 
ephemeral, and reversible regimes of democratic association 
which are incompatible with the human in translation. It is in this 
machine inside the machine of the globally reproducible cultural 
commodity form, in this machinic, anti­humanist core, and on the 
basis of non­recognition, of the incoherence of the principle of 
translation, that democratic regimes can and should be imagined 
– that is, produced – today.
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Utopia
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor 
For much of the twentieth century, looking back on failures of 
visionary political revolutions and regime building, utopia was 
discredited. As long as social harmony is construed as sameness, 
and perfection defined in terms of an achieved teleology, utopian 
experiments in the world, and in the worlds of literature and 
art, will tend toward the disciplining of difference. Utopia’s 
final solution is dissolution of difference. Exclusion rather than 
inclusion is the ideological motive: “Utopias are designed to keep 
people out” (Farnsworth, 1998) is what Toni Morrison reminded 
us of with her novel, Paradise (1997). As that narrative shows us, a 
social body that becomes hardened, inhospitable, and intolerant 
is a dying body. Without a theory of difference, can utopia be 
anything but dystopia? 
Yet, Oscar Wilde, who knew about the ways in which power 
disciplines and punishes otherness, will always remind us that 
a map without utopia on it is not worth looking at. Utopia’s reha­
bilitation – or, more positively, its conceptual resiliency – lies in its 
essential radicality. What is the nature of that radicality? Darko 
Suvin’s notion in the 1970s of the novum as the radical momentum 
of the utopian imaginary (Suvin 1979) is fallen out of use. It should 
be revived and refreshed, because it illuminates the importance 
of understanding utopia not as a political pursuit for that final 
solution, or perfect static state, but as a politically radical 
234 process of ongoing critique. The function of the novum might be 
compared to the function of the immature stem cell in a living 
body: It does not contain but is itself the capacity to take on the 
form and function of any one of the many specialized cells that 
self­organize into living being. The virtue of the stem cell is its 
plasticity, containing, as it were, the potentiality for generating, 
repairing, and regenerating the body. 
Like all metaphors, the comparison of novum and stem cell even­
tually falls short, at which point the difference between them 
is exposed. In this case, the difference lies in the distinction 
between replication and (re)generation or (re)production. The 
regenerative function of the novum goes beyond simply repairing 
a political or social “body” and bringing it back to its putatively 
whole or healthy form; this is replication of a particular ideologic 
formation. This is status quo. But the novum does not close off 
the possibility of alterity, but introduces it continuously. Therein 
lies the capacity for critique that defines utopia’s political and 
formal energies. If there can be such a thing as a stem cell for 
alterity, then it is, in that sense alone, that the novum is a concep­
tual stem cell. The novum is the paradoxical point in Catherine 
Malabou’s description, in What Should We Do with Our Brain? 
(2008), of plasticity’s contradictory nature at which “possibility, 
the wholly other version” is held off by “the expectation of the 
arrival of another way of being,” or “a possibility of waiting” (87). 
Possibility awaits then, now, then again. 
For this reason the notion of utopia as representing a “blueprint 
for the future” is rejected by recent theorists. A static­state utopia 
is relevant only to an “end­stop” world, as contemporary fiction­
writer Jeanette Winterson puts it in Art Objects (1997); without 
the possibility of difference and change, utopia tends toward the 
fascistic or the dictatorial. A process utopia requires possibility, 
awaiting. To quote Winterson’s entire sentence: 
Process, the energy in being, the refusal of finality, which is 
not the same thing as the refusal of completeness, sets art, 
235all art, apart from the end­stop world that is always calling 
“Time Please!” (1997, 19) 
That refusal of finality (the blueprint model) marks the radical 
correspondence of process­utopia to critique. What sets utopia 
apart is its pro­visionality, its looking forward toward a horizon 
(landmark or boundary) that constantly recedes as any traveler, 
especially a utopian traveler, will experience. Thus the brilliance 
of Wilde’s epigraph to The Soul of Man Under Socialism: 
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth 
even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which 
Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, 
it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress 
is the realisation of Utopias. (2001, 139) 
Utopia is a state of deferral and difference, as the identical 
etymology of both words indicates. 
The real state of utopia is a form of virtual reality, in the several 
senses of the word virtual. Toni Morrison knows and shows us 
this. The town of Ruby, Oklahoma, is the paradise lost in Para-
dise. Founded during the post­Reconstruction emigration of 
freed slaves from the U.S. South, Ruby is not a light on the hill 
but a purposely hidden jewel, one place on the American map 
where former slaves can thrive free of bigotry, cruelty, and dis­
enfranchisement. Over one hundred years on, however, the 
utopian town has bred its own forms of intolerance and hatred. 
Ruby’s fatal flaw is its almost absolute intolerance of any form 
of difference, much less anything so challenging as critique. So 
much the worse for the newly generated community of women 
at a former convent, where a diverse set of strangers find 
themselves at home for the time: at home with, in and through 
their own differences. Their community is open, generous, 
hospitable—the opposite of what Ruby has become under the 
leadership of its male leadership: insular, suspicious, inflexible, 
and gracelessly narcissistic.  And so again: without a theory of 
difference, can utopia be anything but dystopia? 
236 By 1976, when the novel is set, this insular town is at a historical 
dead end, quite literally: its babies cannot seem to stay alive, 
either in the womb or outside it; its young people either leave, 
or stay only to fester in its toxic spiritual environment. The 
culmination of this toxicity is the July 4th mass homicide that 
opens the novel.  Explained retrospectively over the next several 
hundred pages is the etiology of the dis­ease that expresses itself 
in the armed midnight attack on the Convent women. But from 
that horrific event emerges a certain clarity: that “pre­lapsarian” 
Ruby is a simulacrum of the town’s imagined mythic past. Now, 
the town appears as it really is, eaten by a cancer in part of its 
own making, and in full collapse. To this present reality, however, 
is offered a possibility other than death, thanks to Rev. Misner 
and his partner Anna, both outsiders, who witness the town’s 
social pathology and remain after the crime as the only possible 
guides beyond it: 
It was when he [Rev. Misner] returned … that they saw it. Or 
sensed it, rather, for there was nothing to see. A door, she 
said later. “No, a window,” he said … What did a door mean? 
what a window? … Whether through a door needing to be 
opened or a beckoning window already raised, what would 
happen if you entered? What would be on the other side? 
What on earth would it be? What on earth? (Morrison 1998, 
305).
What on earth, indeed? Misner’s return, which comes only after 
the community expresses its wish for him to stay, is the turning 
point toward that future. In doing so, they acknowledge that Ruby 
is no utopia; what Ruby­ites do not know yet is that they have not 
even set out for utopia. For the moment, no horizon is visible, 
as they cannot see past themselves. But Misner is reminded just 
here that his decision to return is the arrival that generates both 
“the sign” and “the event” of future possibility. 
As Misner buries the dead, with a sermon that begins the critical 
process of examining individual and communal histories, he 
237receives a second affirmation. Even as he closes a coffin, a 
window appears in the nearby garden, “beckon[ing] toward 
another place – neither life nor death – but there, just yonder, 
shaping thoughts he did not know he had” (307, emphasis added). 
This is a brilliant description of what utopia does to us and for 
us. Utopia makes possible the shaping, the realizing of what was 
not “known” in any objective sense, but that was there already 
as potentiality. This process informs philosopher Catherine 
Malabou’s notion of the “possibility of waiting,” (2004, xxxii) an 
achievement in itself: The waiting enacts the process of imagining 
possibility, the shaping of thoughts we do not know we have, 
new thoughts, different framings and representations, that take 
shape as we think and expect other­wise. This plastic process 
of shaping constitutes the virtual reality that is utopia, as we 
stand expectant, waiting, worlding. Finally, utopian process 
effectively performs “the principle of Hope” (Bloch 1995). These 
performances are forms of transitive imagining, and not immobile 
ideologic constructions. Utopia is plastic, mobile, performative, 
and inviting: it invites us always to wonder, the most reliable and 
objective sign of hope. 
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Vision
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor 
“Visibility is a trap.” This famous Foucauldian statement 
is a springboard for the last thirty­plus years of feminist 
visual studies. Visibility would seem to be, overall, a positive 
achievement: “being able to be seen” suggests presence, rec­
ognition. Feminist art theory, following Foucault, tells another 
story. The passive register of the word is critical: “visibility” is 
not simply a matter of physical vision but a matter of visuality: a 
matter, in other words, of power. In Western art, women, slaves, 
the working class, children – any not­quite­human being (from 
the superior perspective of the dominant class) – are “able to be 
visible,” if at all, through a mediating male gaze. Woman herself is 
a cypher, as Mary Wollstonecraft puts it in Vindication of the Rights 
of Woman (1792) that gains significance only insofar as the male 
viewer confers it. Laura Mulvey’s theory of visual pleasure and 
the gaze, appearing in 1975, illuminates the obscured workings 
of the Foucauldian visibility trap. The “hinge” to the trap is 
revealed as the very “event” of vis­(a)bility itself, a pleasurable 
event because the image of woman is a narcissistic formation. 
What is “able to be seen” is not a singular woman but a projection 
of a singular male’s desire – itself a reflection of (unable to be 
seen) ideological figurings of gender and sexuality. Mulvey’s 
intricate reading suggests that the event of a woman’s (be)
240 coming­into­being­seen is at the fold of the visible and the invis­
ible, and the self­reflection of the viewer.
The poet Christina Rossetti understood these dynamics implicitly. 
Observing the art practices of brother Dante Gabriel Rossetti and 
other Pre­Raphaelite colleagues (e.g., William Morris, John Water­
house, John Everett Millais), Rossetti describes the “visibility trap” 
quite precisely, well over one hundred years before Mulvey’s 
psychoanalytic account, in a succinct fourteen­line sonnet she 
wrote in 1856: 
One face looks out from all his canvasses, 
   One selfsame figure sits or walks or leans; 
   We found her hidden just behind those screens, 
That mirror gave back all her loveliness. 
A queen in opal or in ruby dress, 
   A nameless girl in freshest summer greens, 
   A saint, an angel;  every canvass means 
The same one meaning, neither more nor less. 
He feeds upon her face by day and night, 
   And she with true kind eyes looks back on him 
Fair as the moon and joyful as the light; 
   Not wan with waiting, not with sorrow dim; 
Not as she is, but was when hope shone bright; 
   Not as she is, but as she fills his dream.
 – “In An Artist’s Studio” (Complete Poems, 796)
The nature of the trap is very clear. Furthermore, we might read 
from this poem a modification of Foucault’s statement: “Vision is 
a trap.” This recalls Susan Sontag’s early notion regarding vision 
and photography in On Photography (1977, 3): vision fetishizes the 
seen as the known; the reality of what is seen is presumed; the 
abstract becomes the concrete. Vision as fetish and as capture 
are antithetical to feminist ontology and feminist epistemology, 
equally. 
241Contemporary theories of visuality make possible, at least, a 
rescue from vision’s “usage” as an (false) agent of truth and 
reality. Nicholas Mirzoeff’s genealogy of the term traces a dis­
tinction between visuality and vision to a profoundly ideological 
debate, between social philosopher Thomas Carlyle on the 
one hand and artist J. M. W. Turner on the other regarding the 
authority of vision and visuality, respectively. Turner’s progres­
sive modernity meant a “refusal to adjudicate between what 
is seen, what is visible, what is in shade and what is imagined” 
(Mirzoeff 2006, 64). Turner thus anticipates our own con­
temporary focus on relations of power that inhere in the notion 
of visuality, which Mirzoeff describes as a “doubled interaction” 
(66), or even as “collision, intersection and interaction” (66). 
“Collision, intersection, interaction”: these are actually excellent 
descriptors of Turner’s boldest work, those magnificent sea­ and 
landscapes in which the viewer – as well as any hapless human 
figure within the painting – is hardly, if at all, able to discriminate 
one element from another. Turner’s willingness to dwell in 
ontological and epistemological uncertainties represents a 
radical aesthetic standpoint remarkable for his time and place. 
These modes (of collision, intersection, interaction), Mirzoeff 
adds, “operate in deconstruction, as a relation of difference that 
is always deferred” (66), and thus beyond ideologic capture. 
This deferral of difference grounds a complex relational notion 
of vision and visuality that might usefully be considered, for the 
moment, as a Baradian entanglement. There is no easy sep­
aration of the seen from the being­seen; the co­constitution of 
the one mode and the other, adds Mirzoeff, creates a “space or 
area, … not bounded by constant time but rather ‘time as lived, 
not synchronically or diachronically, but in its multiplicities and 
simultaneities, its presences and absences’” (quoting Achille 
Mbembe, 76). This pregnant space opens to a simultaneous 
“sharing and dividing that is political and aesthetic at once” (76), 
he concludes, with a nod to Jacques Rancière. The multiple entan­
glements give this space its dimensionality and texture. 
242 Laura U. Marks’s elaboration of a haptic visuality attempts a 
further step away from the ongoing “suspicion of vision” and 
“critique of instrumental vision” (2002, 4), toward a theory of 
embodied perception. But her work hardly approaches the 
unique robustness of Karen Barad’s work on entanglement and/
as touching, offering a theory of relationality complex enough to 
account for the “working” of difference, without working through 
or out of it; indeed, such a working through or out is antithetical 
to “the really hard work” (2012, 215) of investigating “the infinity of 
constitutive inclusions – the in/determinacy, the virtuality that is a 
constitutive part of all finitude” (215–216). “On Touching,” Barad’s 
introduction to a 2012 special issue of differences, refers to visual 
hapticity, a reversal of Marks’s formulation that signals Barad’s 
prioritization of touch – not as the dominant faculty of sense but 
rather as the “primary concern of physics” (208), since touch is 
“enacted” from the quantum level upward. In physics, she notes, 
touch is explored for “its physicality, its virtuality, its affectivity, 
its e­motion­ality, whereby all pretense of being able to sep­
arate out the affective from the scientific dimensions of touching 
falls away” (209). The pretensions of Donna Haraway’s “perfect 
knower” are, quite simply, scientifically and ethically unsound. 
Barad’s neo­Levinasian proposal that we face “the inhuman – the 
indeterminate non/being non/becoming of mattering and not 
mattering” (216) might also direct contemporary clarifications of 
an ethics of vision. The concept of entanglement could ground 
such an ethics. Barad proposes the “irreducible” binding of self 
and other, “otherness” being “an entangled relation of difference 
(différance). Ethicality entails noncoincidence with oneself” (217), 
seeing oneself, perhaps, as a stranger at least momentarily. Ethi­
cality, she implies, asks us to see pro­visionally and relationally, 
in recognition of the “noncoincidence with oneself.” This kind 
of vision is self­reflexive but not in the narcissistic sense. To see 
both oneself and others differently requires, in other words, a 
speculative and critical practice. We must no longer see what is 
known to us, but see other­wise. Turner’s critical art practice does 
243just this, challenging us to search for what appears invisible or 
obscured, but which is able­to­be­seen through the “really hard 
work” of confronting what is unknown or strange. 
Vision cannot simply be conceived as a transaction that begins 
and ends with ourselves, any more than we can say that insofar 
as we see reality, we “make” it. Seeing speculatively, and critically, 
means recognizing that reality makes us, “[s]ee[ing] into the 
life of things,” as William Wordsworth puts it in a poem which 
is all about vision, in both its physical and abstract dimensions 
(“Tintern Abbey” 1798, lines 47–49). To envision is to regard 
the lives of things, of self, of others “in [their] multiplicity and 
simultaneities, [their] presence and absences” (Mbembe 2001, 1), 
and to identify the complicities of our own gaze. This is the “really 
hard work” Barad urges upon us: this is critique, which refuses 
the fetishizing of vision, and makes possible the envisioning of 
others­as­ourselves, and vice versa. These are more generous 
visions of worlds to come.
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Work
Mercedes Bunz
Critique is work – working with a given situation to transform 
it. It is work that is productive. But what makes critique work? 
Where does the productivity of this work, or of work in general, 
come from? And how can “work” at present be critical? In order 
to find out, this entry seeks inspiration from Karl Marx’s text 
“Estranged Labour” (1844) to transform today’s destructive 
conditions of flexible and precarious work into something more 
productive.  
Working with Marx, one quickly notices the following: Despite 
the fact that in the twenty­first century work has started to 
follow us home on our smartphones to stay annoyingly around 
on the weekend like an uninvited guest, the concept of work 
has not significantly changed since 1844. Back then, when Marx 
was writing about “Estranged Labour,” he made an observation 
still relevant today. The following activities are still part of many 
actual weekend plans: “eating, drinking, procreating,” “dwelling, 
and … dressing­up” (Marx 1844, 275). Back then as much as 
today, we feel ourselves more freely active in our “animal 
functions” (275) than at work. Back then as much as today, work 
is productive and leaves us estranged. Work appears “only as 
a means to life” instead of being “a conscious life activity” (276). 
Yet work has also changed. As Hannah Arendt (1958) has pointed 
out, in the Western world “labor” has been replaced with “work,” 
246 and this means that instead of our bodies acting out physical 
labor, today only our hands are moving (always typing). Labor 
is taking place in our minds. We are gathering, penetrating, 
summarizing, and re­packing information. We are creating con­
nections where there was nothing before. Communication has 
become hard work, and concentration is immaterial labor. It is 
exhausting. What did we expect? Most certainly, living kills us. But 
death has always been a good reason to dance, and Marx wrote 
texts that are excellent to swing around – when criticizing work, 
changing perspective is necessary. 
These days we often find ourselves in work situations which keep 
us – because they are so fulfilling – precariously overworked 
or underemployed. Work fulfillment has been turned against 
us. Helpful when analyzing this ambiguous fulfillment is Marx’s 
manuscript “Estranged Labour,” a work unfinished to this day. 
The text ends right in the middle of an argument that looks into 
the social conditions exploiting the workers and leaving them 
estranged. Marx blames unjust property distribution as a reason 
for this estranged labor. In twenty­first century capitalism, this 
uneven distribution is still widespread and growing. So, to still 
ensure and even maximize our identification with work, the 
“New Spirit of Capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) tricked 
us with work autonomy and employee­initiative. The Marxian 
“estrangement” is gone, with the effect that today we work 
fulfilled while still being exploited. Thus, it “falls to us now to go 
on thinking,” as Virginia Woolf (2006, 62) once put it.  
What if back in Marx’s time it was not just the unjust distribution 
that created the workers’ estrangement? What if “estrangement” 
is overall elementary for work? Or, even further, could it allow 
for a different take, as some theorists ponder? Inspired by a dis­
cussion in Homo Sacer, in which Agamben explores the concept 
of an “empty form of relation” (1998, 38), Eva Geulen (2012) has 
addressed estrangement as a “non­relation,” thereby refuting the 
understanding of estrangement as a deficient term, that hinders 
an identification with the world. Taking up her line of thought, 
247“estrangement” could be turned into a productive concept.
Consigned to itself and non­relational, estrangement becomes 
nothing but an empty form thereby opening a zone between 
work and life that can be inhabited in a different way. This z0ne 
proves helpful when working with both, today’s concept of work, 
and its critique. An interesting observation Marx makes earlier 
in his text also points in this direction. In “Estranged Labour,” he 
describes a particularly human capacity that could be read as a 
capacity for “estrangement.” Humans, he points out, are the only 
species able of creating an object not merely according to their 
own standards but according to the standards of others: 
An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and 
the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man 
knows how to produce in accordance with the standard 
of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the 
inherent standard to the object. (1844, 277)
Applying the inherent standard of a species, a situation, or an 
object is working with an estranged perspective. With this, Marx 
discusses “estrangement” as a productive part of labor, work, and 
human life. Being more than just a negative effect of the con­
ditions of labor, estrangement here is a capacity to show empathy 
and to relate to something other – an animal, another human, 
or a situation. Read in a non­self­relational way, it appears to 
become far more than a concept that denotes a failing to identify 
with oneself. Pushing this line of thought even further, Adorno’s 
famous remark that “there is no right life in the wrong one” (1985, 
3) comes to mind. Today we can say: the ability to do our work 
“estranged” – i.e., living a beautiful, “right” life after our work to 
pay the rent is done in the “wrong” life – does not seem to be an 
option anymore. In the era of work autonomy and employee­
initiative, work has taken over our lives. There seems to be no 
outside to capitalism. Resistance, however, is inevitable, and 
the same applies to critique, which finds in its critical toolbox 
two new appliances: non­relation and estrangement. With these 
248 new tools, it enters the workplace again, this time by sneaking in 
through the backdoor. 
As is well known, Marx’s philosophical notion of labor gains its 
political force from the understanding that there are aspects 
at work simultaneous to when we are working. For Marx and in 
his time, the following two were the most important: labor as a 
process that produces a valuable product, and labor as a process 
that gives one a place as a “species­being” (1844, 275) – for when 
humans create objects, they also are “posited by objects” (1844b, 
336). What applied in Marx’s time still applies today. Capitalism 
has successfully turned us, the human workers, into our own 
enterprises. We compete with other professionals on the job 
market for which we become fit by getting an education. For this, 
we have forced job seekers to become attractive “offers” and we 
address students as the university’s “clients” – a situation that 
needs to be abused, and it easily can be: we can fall back on a 
non­relation, we don’t need to relate to this.
Worried by the current work­terror, Stefano Harney and 
Fred Moten bring up such a strategy in their discussion of 
the American University as a workplace, pointing out that 
“competition” and “negligence” (Harney and Moten 2013, 30–31) 
do not need to be at the heart of professionalization. Work can be 
different: Work, wherever and whatever it may be, paid or unpaid, 
has always already enabled different situations. Situations that 
can be further affirmed. History provides us with examples, with 
the imaginative praxis of the Paris Commune 1871, for example, 
when people were “… trying to carve out spaces and ways to live 
on the edges of various informal economies, testing the pos­
sibilities and limitations of living differently now,” as described by 
Kirsten Ross (2015, 12). Living differently and working differently 
today then means kitchens and freelance hubs can become 
refugee camps from which a new solidarity seizes the workplace; 
collective team breakthroughs can be kidnapped thereby giving 
birth to a community; the pain of working set­backs gets com­
forted with a solidarity that knows about the vulnerability of all 
249humans. If we become alert and claim these and other moments, 
we will find a multiplicity of processes open for us to become 
someone else, or something other than the (mere) capitalist 
worker. After all, work necessarily involves estrangement. And as 
such work has a transformative potential as it always also leads 
“somewhere else.” So, dare to follow.
Today as much as in Marx’s time, work offers both an irritating 
and enlivening potential that awaits to be uncovered and 
strengthened. If – as Marx once said – “nature appears [to the 
worker] as his work and his reality” (1844, 277), then to work – 
wherever and whatever this work is – can make a difference. For, 
as it always was, our realities are and will remain out of control. 
Today, in as much as in 1844, work is an effective tool within this 
world. And since this world is your work, may we ask what kind of 
world you are currently working on? 
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World
Kári Driscoll
In 1939, Gertrude Stein published a book for children entitled The 
World Is Round, about a girl named, inevitably, Rose, her dog Love, 
and her cousin Willie, who has a lion. Chapter eight, entitled “Rose 
Thinking,” consists of a single sentence: “If the world is round 
would a lion fall off” (2013, 25). This enigmatic and seemingly 
whimsical thought raises many questions, but I will limit myself 
to the following: First, the absence of a question mark here, as 
elsewhere in the text, makes it ambiguous how the sentence is to 
be read, and this ambiguity also begins to trouble the constative 
nature of the book’s title, enabling us to question whether the 
world is indeed round – whether this is not to conflate it with 
the planet earth, say. Relatedly, we might also question the use 
of the definite article; is there such a thing as “the world” (and if 
so, is it round?) and so forth. Second, this growing ambiguity is 
compounded by the abrupt shift from the indicative (“is”) to the 
subjunctive (“would”). How are we to interpret this? And third, if 
there is such a thing as the world, and if it is in fact round, why 
would a lion in particular be in danger of falling off?
Let us begin with the lion. The title of the first chapter of The 
World Is Round invokes Stein’s most famous phrase, “Rose is a 
rose is a rose is a rose” from her poem “Sacred Emily” (Stein 1922, 
187). Like many poets of her generation, Stein felt that words had 
become worn out and lost their immediacy, so that now when 
252 you read or write a poem about roses, “you know in your bones 
that the rose is not there” (Stein 1947, vi). The formula, which Stein 
reused time and again, was an attempt to reassert the thingness 
of words, and hence to minimize the difference between word 
and world. Interestingly, while Rose is declared “a rose” and 
“would have been Rose” by any other name as well (Stein 2013, 
1), her cousin Willie’s identity is less secure, seemingly because 
of the lion. The lion, we read, has “a name as well as a mane and 
that name is Billie” (27). The similarity of the two names appears 
to invite confusion, and prompts Rose to wonder: “Is a lion not a 
lion” (21). If a lion is not a lion, would that mean that the lion is not 
there?
By a curious coincidence, shortly after Stein published her book, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein was also worrying about the proposition 
“Lion is a lion” and what it meant for the place of lions in the 
world. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – also a product 
of the crisis of language and representation, and published, 
incidentally, in 1922, the same year as Stein’s “Sacred Emily” – he 
had defined the world as “everything that is the case,” but in 
his notes from the year 1944, Wittgenstein was moved to revise 
his stance on the limits of the world, seemingly for the sake 
of the lion. According to the Tractatus, a statement could have 
sense only if it represented a state of affairs, i.e., something 
which is “the case.” Thus any and all statements about fictional 
lions – the lion in the fable tradition, say – would be relegated 
to the realm of nonsense. The Tractatus demands that in order 
for something to be “the case,” and hence “in the world,” it must 
be possible to determine not only that it exists but that it does 
so in a definite number of instances as well. Consequently, the 
phrase “Lion is a lion” must be taken to be using the word “lion” 
in two different ways, namely as a name for an individual and as 
a species designation. But in fables we encounter the lion, not 
a lion, “nor yet a particular lion so­and­so,” and thus “it actually 
is as if the species lion came to be seen as a lion” (Wittgenstein 
1967, 182; Blumenberg 2010, 63–69). This leads to a contradiction, 
253because it is impossible to determine whether “the Lion” refers 
to the species or an individual – or indeed whether it is the same 
lion each time. The criterion for existence in the world of the 
Tractatus was the avoidance of contradictions: it had to be pos­
sible to determine whether something is “the case” or not. Now, 
two decades later, Wittgenstein is no longer satisfied with such 
a definition. In reference to the formally nonsensical proposition 
“the class of lions is not a lion,” he now asks, simply: “How do 
you know?” (1967, 182). Even though it “seems like nonsense,” 
Wittgenstein argues that it can be read as a “proper sentence, if 
only it is taken right” (182), namely as a language­game involving 
a different kind of certainty than mathematical certainty (see 
Wittgenstein 1958, 224). For Wittgenstein, the ultimate aim 
of these ruminations is thus a reevaluation of the problem of 
certainty, and the lion’s rescue is simply a felicitous by­product 
– but I would like to take this as an argument for literature as a 
means of extending “the world” beyond whatever happens or 
appears to be “the case.”
How might we relate this to the questions of critique – especially 
of terrestrial critique, of the question of the planet, the world, the 
cosmos, and our place in it? The word “world” and its cognates 
(Welt, wereld, veröld) consists of the Germanic roots “wer” (“man”; 
as in “werewolf” and “virile”) and “ald,” and means, literally, “age 
of man.” Thus, in a sense, the concept of the Anthropocene is 
already implicit in “world” – both in terms of its anthropocentrism 
and, more interestingly, the fact that it denotes a temporality 
rather than a locality. As critics of the term have pointed out, the 
term “Anthropocene” is nonsensical, etymologically speaking. 
Moreover, since “Holocene” means “wholly recent,” “the decision 
to bring this epoch to an end would mark the present as a 
peculiar time, after the recent, a time out of time in more than 
one sense” (Luciano 2015). Time is not only out of joint; it is 
running out. The “world” would thus seem to name a series of 
disjunctures between incompatible conceptions of what is “the 
case”: despite its anthropocentric denomination, this new “age of 
254 man” also marks a heightened awareness of our entanglement 
and codependence, of the fact that we share a terrestrial space 
with other creatures and other forms of life, each of which have 
their own Umwelten and hence their own worlds. “World” is thus 
both singular and plural: there is only one, and there is an infinite 
variety, each tied to a different mode of being­in­the­world, which 
is also simultaneously a form of being­with. Is it not the task 
of critique to interrogate the interstices of these two senses of 
“world” – as something that is simply there but simultaneously 
cannot simply be taken for granted, and as something, especially 
if we want to conceive of it as something we have in common with 
other forms of life on this planet, that we must actively work to 
produce?
Perhaps this might help us understand the abrupt shift from 
indicative to subjunctive in Rose’s question. In his 1929–30 
lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Martin 
Heidegger notoriously posited that “the animal is poor in world,” 
in contrast to man, who is “world­forming” (1995, 177). Thus, while 
man “has world” in the full sense, the animal has world only in 
a circumscribed capacity – and hence its mode of being­in­the­
world is not a being­there (Da-sein). The difference, for Heidegger, 
lies in the notion that the animal does not have a relation to the 
world as such – the lion, say, sunning himself on the savannah, 
does not perceive the warmth of the sun as such. To which 
Wittgenstein might quite reasonably respond: “How do you 
know?” And, conversely, as Jacques Derrida puts it, how do you 
know that “man, the human itself, has the ‘as such’” (2008, 160)? 
This apophantic “as”­structure grounds Heidegger’s approach to 
the problem of world. But is there such a thing as “the world as 
such”? In his final seminar, Derrida opposed this indicative “as” 
with a subjunctive “as if”: The unity and community of the world is 
“nowhere and never given in nature” (Derrida 2011, 9). In fact, “[t]
here is no world, there are only islands” (9). And yet, we carry on 
“as if we were inhabiting the same world” (268), and this as if is an 
act of poetic creation. Thus, as Michael Naas summarises, it is “as 
255if there were a performative as if lodged within all our constative 
assertions and reassuring statements about the world, a comme 
si at the heart of every claim that the world is comme ça” (Naas 
2015, 58). In other words, the subjunctive precedes the indicative 
– the lion’s hypothetical fall comes before whatever is “the case” 
[der Fall] – and every “world” is contingent upon the possibility of 
other worlds, even ones in which a lion would not fall off.
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Diagrams: Visualizing Connections 
Although the critical terms in this book are presented in 
alphabetical order, this does not imply that they are bound to a 
lexical structure. Instead, with the following diagrams we want 
to invite the reader to consider the terms of this vocabulary 
as a dynamic constellation, as terms in relation to each other. 
Clustering the terms can sharpen our usage of them as well as 
reinforce their analytic powers. In what follows, we suggest four 
constellation­diagrams that for us visualize some of those pos­
sible connections: How, for example, criticality can be read as a 
striving for change; or how critical practice does not merely wit­
ness from a distance but modifies where it intervenes, something 
clustered here under the caption writing. Equally, many terms 
foreground critical analysis as an entangled practice so that 
relating becomes a foundational aspect of this critical map. And 
last but not least, diffraction is an onto­epistemological starting 
point for several terms. It transforms the practice of critique itself 
from a dissective endeavour into creating new patterns.
Each of the suggested diagrams offers a perspectival clustering. 
This is intentional, as we neither aim to present a complete 
lexicon (that is, other terms could be added to each constellation, 
from within and without the vocabulary), nor an exclusive map 
(i.e. many other constellations and perspectives can be distilled 
from the presented terms). Instead, the suggested constellations 
hope to provide vistas of possible and provisional assemblages of 
terms, serving the reader as ‘think­maps’ to draw out significant 
dimensions of critique, to navigate the vocabulary when used and 
to work with its entries in further constellations. 
The blank pages at the end of this section leave space for each 
reader’s individual sketches and diagrams. In this way, we hope 
for the vocabulary to produce further patterns and creative 
openings, and to trigger the reassessment and sharpening of our 
critical vocabularies for the issues and challenges of our times. 
So, revisit, resist and revamp!
Parrhesia
Utopia
Speculation
Sensibility
Translation
Transformation
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Work
Risk
Creation
Affi  rmation
Process
Change
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Experience
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Aff ect
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Relating
Writing
Entanglement
Perspective
Affi  rmation
Terra
Regard
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Technology Process
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About Terra Critica
Terra Critica is an interdisciplinary research network for the 
critical humanities, founded as a forum to discuss the task of 
critical theory and critique today, for the twenty­first century 
and a globally entangled world. The international network 
meets regularly for intensive workshops and other activities to 
exchange ideas across disciplines; a group of core members as 
well as a wider circle of local participants contribute to these 
activities. Initiated by Birgit Mara Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele, Terra 
Critica started its work in 2012, with a workshop entitled “Terra 
Critica: Re­visioning the Critical Task of the Humanities in a Glob­
alized World” held at Utrecht University. Informed by their back­
ground in comparative literature, feminist philosophy, and critical 
theory, both initiators felt that a differentiated response to the 
neoliberal pressure put on the humanities was urgent. Kaiser and 
Thiele coordinate the network since its inception in 2012.
The discussion of the initial workshop continued a year later in 
2013 with another meeting at Utrecht University, for which two 
texts served as joint basis: Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938) 
and Félix Guattari’s The Three Ecologies (1989). These texts gave 
the second workshop its title: “From Three Critiques to Three 
Guineas and Three Ecologies: Grappling with critique beyond 
negativity and judgment.” Its focus lay on the challenges that 
immanence – speaking of an entangled and co­emerging uni­
verse as multiplicity or manifold – poses to critique, and on what 
critique beyond its classical meaning – negation and judgment 
– might imply. Instead of paper presentations, both workshops 
invited short position papers from each of the participants, which 
were shared with everyone beforehand for preparation. The 
discussions were clustered around focal points distilled from the 
position papers (now online http://terracritica.net/publications/); 
a set­up that was chosen in order to experiment with more con­
versational modes of engagement and exchange. This practice 
did succeed in shifting the traditional academic gesture – to stake 
264 one’s own claims – to a more affirmative encounter with the ques­
tions posed, also allowing the network to start thinking through 
contemporary problems with each other. 
The third meeting took place within the framework of the 2014 
annual conference of the American Comparative Literature 
Association (ACLA), which was held at New York University in 
March 2014 and was devoted to “Capitals.” The Terra Critica ACLA 
seminar “Capital(s) of Critique” invited papers to reengage with 
Three Guineas and/or The Three Ecologies methodologically (how 
do they practice critique?), theoretically (how are they pushing 
critique beyond judgment?), and thematically (how do they 
engage with capitalism?). An edited volume collecting all papers 
presented at this meeting is in preparation, to be published in 
the New Critical Humanities book series with Rowman & Littlefield 
International. 
The present book, on the other hand, is the outcome of the 
May 2015 meeting “Terra Critica: Symptoms of our Planetary 
Condition” at Leuphana University Lüneburg (Germany). At the 
center of the two­day workshop were the short texts that make 
up this vocabulary. Instead of delivering a neutral overview over 
the most important theoretical catchwords, each participant 
was asked to select a term they viewed as key to contemporary 
practices of critique and reflect on this term against the back­
ground of their own theoretical perspectives and (inter)dis­
ciplinary practices. The meeting took place at the Hybrid Pub-
lishing Lab of Leuphana University and drew also on the lab’s 
expertise with experimental and collaborative peer reviewing. 
After the successful workshop experience, more authors were 
invited still to propose terms; all of them had previously partici­
pated in the 2012–2014 Terra Critica events. The introduction to 
this book has been authored collectively.
“Transactions” was the focus of the most recent meeting to 
date, in December 2015, at the conference “Critical Transactions: 
Engaging the Humanities East & West” organized by the School 
265of Humanities at Hong Kong University and Terra Critica. Held in 
Hong Kong, this meeting examined the kinds of transactions and 
knowledge transfers that are currently under way between “East 
& West” and how they might contribute to a reevaluation of the 
conventional matrix that sees “North & South” or “East & West” 
as markers of dis/privilege or non/hegemony. Which transactions 
occur between (and beyond) the traditional humanities dis­
ciplines, but also between spaces, regions, and social contexts, 
between the academy and the societies of which it is a part? 
Terra Critica will further explore the relation between ethics and 
critique implied in such questions in the next intensive workshop 
at Penn State University in May 2017. 
As a local initiative in Utrecht, Terra Critica has also established a 
series of meetings entitled “ReadingRoom” in collaboration with 
Casco – Office for Art, Design and Theory, which are open to all. 
ReadingRoom is a space for careful and generous conversations 
in the humanities, arts, and beyond. A first series (December 
2014 – June 2015) discussed “speculation & fabulation – critique in 
the SF mode,” a second series (September 2015 – February 2016) 
looked into “relationality – envisioning new wor(l)dings” with a 
focus on Caribbean poetics and philosophy. A third series on “Pol­
itics and Poetics in the Affirmative” is running from September 
2016 – May 2017.
Terra Critica has been kindly supported by several academic 
institutions, including Utrecht University, New York University, 
Leuphana University Lüneburg, University of Westminster, 
Hong Kong University and Penn State University. In addition, 
the network’s projects have been made possible by the 
generous support of the Institute for Cultural Inquiry (ICON), 
Utrecht University; the former Research Focus Area Cultures & 
Identities, Utrecht University; The Netherlands Research School 
for Gender Studies (NOG); The Netherlands Research School 
for Literary Studies (OSL); the Netherlands Institute for Cul­
tural Analysis (NICA); the Amsterdam Center for Globalization 
Studies (ACGS); Radboud University Nijmegen; Vrije Universiteit 
266 Amsterdam; the Kattendijke Drucker Stichting; the NWO­Project 
“Back to the Book”; as well as by the Strategic Research Theme in 
China­West Studies at Hong Kong University and the Louis Cha 
Fund.
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